Tag Archives: knowledge

Mark SCHROEDER ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the view that knowledge is belief for reasons that are both objectively and subjectively sufficient from an important objection due to Daniel Whiting, in this journal. Whiting argues that this view fails to deal adequately with a familiar sort of counterexample to analyses of knowledge, fake barn cases. I accept Whiting’s conclusion that …

Daniel WHITING ABSTRACT: Mark Schroeder has recently proposed a new analysis of knowledge. I examine that analysis and show that it fails. More specifically, I show that it faces a problem all too familiar from the post-Gettier literature, namely, that it is delivers the wrong verdict in fake barn cases. Download PDF

Giovanni MION ABSTRACT: The paper aims to stress the structural similarities between Nelson Goodman’s ‘new riddle of induction’ and Edmund Gettier’s counterexamples to the standard analysis of knowledge. Download PDF

James FILLER ABSTRACT: Recently, there has been a move in contemporary epistemological philosophy toward a virtue epistemology, which sees certain character traits of the rational agent as critical in the acquisition of knowledge. This attempt to introduce virtue into epistemological investigations has, however, relied almost exclusively on an Aristotelian account of virtue. In this paper, I attempt to take a new …

Stephen HETHERINGTON ABSTRACT: This paper highlights an aspect of Gettier situations, one standardly not accorded interpretive significance. A remark of Gettier’s suggests its potential importance. And once that aspect’s contribution is made explicit, an argument unfolds for the conclusion that it is fairly simple to have knowledge within Gettier situations. Indeed, that argument dissolves the traditional Gettier problem. Download PDF

Sanford GOLDBERG ABSTRACT: Whether or not all assertion counts as testimony (a matter not addressed here), it is argued that not all testimony involves assertion. Since many views in the epistemology of testimony assume that testimony requires assertion, such views are (at best) insufficiently general. This result also points to what we might call the epistemic significance of assertion as such. …