Nicholas DANNE ABSTRACT: To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that perceiving a PR …
Read More »THE SUBJECT’S PERSPECTIVE OBJECTION TO EXTERNALISM AND WHY IT FAILS (pages 323-331)
Perry HENDRICKS ABSTRACT: The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been lost. After this, I provide an explanation …
Read More »INTERNALISM, EVIDENTIALISM AND APPEALS TO EXPERT KNOWLEDGE (pages 291-305)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge and our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do have knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of course, much ink has been spilled …
Read More »PHENOMENAL CONSERVATISM, REFLECTION AND SELF-DEFEAT (pages 187-199)
Julien BEILLARD ABSTRACT: Huemer defends phenomenal conservatism (PC) and also the further claim that belief in any rival theory is self-defeating (SD). Here I construct a dilemma for his position: either PC and SD are incompatible, or belief in PC is itself self-defeating. I take these considerations to suggest a better self-defeat argument for (belief in) PC and a strong form …
Read More »INFERENTIAL, COHERENTIAL, AND FOUNDATIONAL WARRANT: AN ECLECTIC ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF WARRANT (pages 377-398)
Mark J. BOONE ABSTRACT: A warranted belief may derive inferential warrant from warranted beliefs which support it. It may possess what I call coherential warrant in virtue of being consistent with, or lacking improbability relative to, a large system of warranted beliefs. Finally, it may have foundational warrant, which does not derive from other beliefs at all. I define and distinguish …
Read More »A DISPOSITIONAL INTERNALIST EVIDENTIALIST VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 399-424)
T. Ryan BYERLY ABSTRACT: This paper articulates and defends a novel version of internalist evidentialism which employs dispositions to account for the relation of evidential support. In section one, I explain internalist evidentialist views generally, highlighting the way in which the relation of evidential support stands at the heart of these views. I then discuss two leading ways in which evidential …
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