Xuanzi FANG ABSTRACT: In recent work, Palermos and Tollefsen develop a novel account of group know-how (GKH)—know-how applicable to a group as a whole—and which they take to be superior to envisioned accounts of group know-how that reduce the group know-how to that of individuals. While their argument has promise, I aim to show that it succumbs to several objections, …
Read More »STAKES-SHIFTING CASES RECONSIDERED—WHAT SHIFTS? EPISTEMIC STANDARDS OR POSITION? (pages 53-76)
Kok Yong LEE ABSTRACT: It is widely accepted that our initial intuitions regarding knowledge attributions in stakes-shifting cases (e.g., Cohen’s Airport) are best explained by standards variantism, the view that the standards for knowledge may vary with contexts in an epistemically interesting way. Against standards variantism, I argue that no prominent account of the standards for knowledge can explain our …
Read More »BRIDGING THE INTELLECTUALIST DIVIDE: A READING OF STANLEY’S RYLE (pages 299-324)
Jesús NAVARRO ABSTRACT: Gilbert Ryle famously denied that knowledge-how is a species of knowledge-that, a thesis that has been contested by so-called “intellectualists.” I begin by proposing a rearrangement of some of the concepts of this debate, and then I focus on Jason Stanley’s reading of Ryle’s position. I show that Ryle has been seriously misconstrued in this discussion, and …
Read More »OVERCOMING INTELLECTUALISM ABOUT UNDERSTANDING AND KNOWLEDGE: A UNIFIED APPROACH (pages 7-26)
Eros M. de CARVALHO ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend a unified approach to knowledge and understanding. Both are achievements due to cognitive abilities or skills. The difference between them is a difference of aspects. Knowledge emphasizes the successful aspect of an achievement and the exclusion of epistemic luck, whereas understanding emphasizes the agent’s contribution in bringing about an achievement …
Read More »KNOWLEDGE AND THE IMPORTANCE OF BEING RIGHT (pages 265-289)
Davide FASSIO ABSTRACT: Some philosophers have recently argued that whether a true belief amounts to knowledge in a specific circumstance depends on features of the subject’s practical situation that are unrelated to the truth of the subject’s belief, such as the costs for the subject of being wrong about whether the believed proposition is true. One of the best-known arguments used …
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