Ian M. CHURCH ABSTRACT: VThis paper will be broken down into four sections. In §1, I try to assuage a worry that intellectual humility is not really an intellectual virtue. In §2, we will consider the two dominant accounts of intellectual humility in the philosophical literature—the low concern for status account the limitations-owing account—and I will argue that both accounts face …
Read More »I KNOW YOU ARE, BUT WHAT AM I? ANTI-INDIVIDUALISM IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY AND WU-WEI (pages 435-459)
Brian ROBINSON and Mark ALFANO ABSTRACT: Virtues are acquirable, so if intellectual humility is a virtue, it’s acquirable. But there is something deeply problematic—perhaps even paradoxical—about aiming to be intellectually humble. Drawing on Edward Slingerland’s analysis of the paradoxical virtue of wu-wei in Trying Not To Try (New York: Crown, 2014), we argue for an anti-individualistic conception of the trait, concluding that one’s …
Read More »CARTESIAN HUMILITY AND PYRRHONIAN PASSIVITY: THE ETHICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF EPISTEMIC AGENCY (pages 461-487)
Modesto GÓMEZ-ALONSO ABSTRACT: While the Academic sceptics followed the plausible as a criterion of truth and guided their practice by a doxastic norm, so thinking that agential performances are actions for which the agent assumes responsibility, the Pyrrhonists did not accept rational belief-management, dispensing with judgment in empirical matters. In this sense, the Pyrrhonian Sceptic described himself as not acting in …
Read More »KNOWLEDGE, ASSERTION AND INTELLECTUAL HUMILITY (pages 489-502)
J. Adam CARTER and Emma C. GORDON ABSTRACT: This paper has two central aims. First, we motivate a puzzle. The puzzle features four independently plausible but jointly inconsistent claims. One of the four claims is the sufficiency leg of the knowledge norm of assertion (KNA-S), according to which one is properly epistemically positioned to assert that p if one knows that …
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