Tag Archives: factivity

Elliott R. CROZAT ABSTRACT: In this article, I argue that fallibilistic justification is insufficient for propositional knowledge if veritic luck is involved. I provide a thought experiment to demonstrate that even very strong non-factive evidence is insufficient for knowledge if veritic luck is present. I then distinguish between precise justification (PJ), which I suggest is required for knowledge in cases …

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper is a constructive response to Peter Baumann’s comments concerning the argument from inconsistency and explosion that was originally introduced in “Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?” Specifically, this paper deals with Baumann’s two suggestions for how quasi-factivists might avoid this argument and it shows that they are both problematic. As such, his paper extends and …

Peter BAUMANN ABSTRACT: That knowledge is factive, that is, that knowledge that p requires that p, has for a long time typically been treated as a truism. Recently, however, some authors have raised doubts about and arguments against this claim. In a recent paper in this journal, Michael Shaffer presents new arguments against the denial of the factivity of knowledge. …

Jakob KOSCHOLKE ABSTRACT: Francesco Praolini has recently put pressure on the view that justified believability is closed under conjunction introduction. Based on what he calls ‘the hybrid paradox,’ he argues that accepting the principle of conjunction closure for justified believability, quite surprisingly, entails that one must also accept the principle of factivity for justified believability, i.e. that there are no …

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken the factivity condition so that knowledge implies only approximate truth. Download PDF

Jeffrey HOOPS ABSTRACT: In recent discussions in this journal, Moti Mizrahi defends the claim that knowledge equals epistemic certainty. Howard Sankey finds Mizrahi’s argument to be problematic, since, as he reads it, this would entail that justification must guarantee truth. In this article, I suggest that an account of the normativity of justification is able to bridge the gap between …

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: This is a reply to Howard Sankey’s comment (“Factivity or Grounds? Comment on Mizrahi”) on my paper, “You Can’t Handle the Truth: Knowledge = Epistemic Certainty,” in which I present an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. While Sankey is right that factivity does not entail epistemic certainty, the …

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This reply provides further grounds to doubt Mizrahi’s argument for an infallibilist theory of knowledge. It is pointed out that the fact that knowledge requires both truth and justification does not entail that the level of justification required for knowledge be sufficient to guarantee truth. In addition, an argument presented by Mizrahi appears to equivocate with respect …

Howard SANKEY ABSTRACT: This note is a comment on a recent paper in this journal by Moti Mizrahi. Mizrahi claims that the factivity of knowledge entails that knowledge requires epistemic certainty. But the argument that Mizrahi presents does not proceed from factivity to certainty. Instead, it proceeds from a premise about the relationship between grounds and knowledge to the conclusion …

Moti MIZRAHI ABSTRACT: In this discussion note, I put forth an argument from the factivity of knowledge for the conclusion that knowledge is epistemic certainty. If this argument is sound, then epistemologists who think that knowledge is factive are thereby also committed to the view that knowledge is epistemic certainty. Download PDF