Tag Archives: epistemic justification

CHARLES MILLS’ EPISTEMOLOGY AND ITS IMPORTANCE FOR SOCIAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL THEORY (pages 137-162)

Eric BAYRUNS GARCÍA ABSTRACT: In Charles Mills’ essay, “White Ignorance,” and his trail-blazing monograph, The Racial Contract, he developed a view of how Whiteness or anti-Black-Indigenous-and-Latinx racism causes individuals to hold false beliefs or lack beliefs about racial injustice in particular and the world in general. I will defend a novel exegetical claim that Mills’ view is part of a …

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RELIABILISTS SHOULD STILL FEAR THE DEMON (pages 193-202)

B.J.C. MADISON ABSTRACT: In its most basic form, Simple Reliabilism states that: a belief is justified iff it is formed as the result of a reliable belief-forming process. But so-called New Evil Demon (NED) cases have been given as counterexamples. A common response has been to complicate reliabilism from its simplest form to accommodate the basic reliabilist position, while at …

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INFERENTIAL INTERNALISM AND THE CAUSAL STATUS EFFECT (pages 429-445)

Nicholas DANNE ABSTRACT: To justify inductive inference and vanquish classical skepticisms about human memory, external world realism, etc., Richard Fumerton proposes his “inferential internalism,” an epistemology whereby humans ‘see’ by Russellian acquaintance Keynesian probable relations (PRs) between propositions. PRs are a priori necessary relations of logical probability, akin to but not reducible to logical entailments, such that perceiving a PR …

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UNDAUNTED EXPLANATIONISM (pages 117-127)

Kevin McCAIN ABSTRACT: Explanationism is a plausible view of epistemic justification according to which justification is a matter of explanatory considerations. Despite its plausibility, explanationism is not without its critics. In a recent issue of this journal T. Ryan Byerly and Kraig Martin have charged that explanationism fails to provide necessary or sufficient conditions for epistemic justification. In this article I …

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IS THERE ROOM FOR JUSTIFIED BELIEFS WITHOUT EVIDENCE? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF EPISTEMIC EVIDENTIALISM (pages 137-152)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be …

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ON INFERENTIALLY REMEMBERING THAT P (pages 225–230)

Andrew NAYLOR ABSTRACT: Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference …

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A HUMEAN ACCOUNT OF TESTIMONIAL JUSTIFICATION (pages 209–219)

Shane RYAN ABSTRACT: I argue that a Humean account can make sense of the phenomenology associated with testimonial justification; the phenomenology being that in standard cases hearers regularly simply accept a testifier’s assertions as true – hearers don’t engage in monitoring. The upshot is that a Humean account is in a better position dialectically than is usually supposed. I provide some background …

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