Logos and episteme
Darren BRADLEY ABSTRACT: Some philosophers argue that coherence is a normatively significant type of rationality, over and above substantive rationality. The most detailed and substantive arguments are given by Alex Worsnip (2021, 2022). In this paper I will criticize his arguments. We are left with the thesis that the only type of rationality we need is substantive rationality. Download PDF
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WEIGHING THE AIM OF BELIEF AGAIN (pages 141-145)
Asbjørn STEGLICH-PETERSEN ABSTRACT: In his influential discussion of the aim of belief, David Owens argues that any talk of such an ‘aim’ is at best metaphorical. In order for the ‘aim’ of belief to be a genuine aim, it must be weighable against other aims in deliberation, but Owens claims that this is impossible. In previous work, I have pointed out …
Read More »ANOTHER DEFENCE OF OWENS’S EXCLUSIVITY OBJECTION TO BELIEFS HAVING AIMS (pages 147-153)
SULLIVAN-BISSETT and Paul NOORDHOF ABSTRACT: David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded …
Read More »ANOTHER DEFENCE OF OWENS’S EXCLUSIVITY OBJECTION TO BELIEFS HAVING AIMS (pages 147-153)
SULLIVAN-BISSETT and Paul NOORDHOF ABSTRACT: David Owens objected to the truth-aim account of belief on the grounds that the putative aim of belief does not meet a necessary condition on aims, namely, that aims can be weighed against other aims. If the putative aim of belief cannot be weighed, then belief does not have an aim after all. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen responded …
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