closure of inquiry – Logos and episteme

CREDENCE 1 CRUXES: CLOSURE OF INQUIRY, SURETY, AND STEADFASTNESS (pages 21-50)

30 May 2025 Comments Off on CREDENCE 1 CRUXES: CLOSURE OF INQUIRY, SURETY, AND STEADFASTNESS (pages 21-50)

Eric GILBERTSON ABSTRACT: Even if credence 1 is justified for many contingent propositions, it is not justified in cases where a disposition to revise in light of counterevidence is rationally required. First, credence 1 may be compatible with admission of fallibility, but this does not imply that it is compatible with a disposition to revise. Moreover, credence 1 entails being …

BEING SURE AND BEING CONFIDENT THAT YOU WON’T LOSE CONFIDENCE (pages 45-54)

2 April 2016 Comments Off on BEING SURE AND BEING CONFIDENT THAT YOU WON’T LOSE CONFIDENCE (pages 45-54)

Alexander R. PRUSS ABSTRACT: There is an important sense in which one can be sure without being certain, i.e., without assigning unit probability. I will offer an explication of this sense of sureness, connecting it with the level of credence that a rational agent would need to have to be confident that she won’t ever lose her confidence. A simple formal …