IN DEFENSE OF THE COMPOSSIBILITY OF PRESENTISM AND TIME TRAVEL (pages 141–159)

Thomas HALL

ABSTRACT: In this paper I defend the compossibility of presentism and time travel from two objections. One objection is that the presentist’s model of time leaves nowhere to travel to; the second objection attempts to equate presentist time travel with suicide. After targeting some misplaced scrutiny of the first objection, I show that presentists have the resources to account for the facts that make for time travel on the traditional Lewisian view. In light of this ability, I argue that both of the objections fail.

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