Logos and episteme
Nastasia MUELLER
ABSTRACT: What distinguishes virtue reliabilism from virtue responsibilism is that the latter requires that epistemic virtues involve epistemically virtuous motivation, whereas the former denies that motivation is needed for virtue. But although epistemically virtuous motivation is what distinguishes virtue responsibilism not only from virtue reliabilism but also from other types of virtue, such as aesthetic, athletic, and moral virtue, it is far from clear how this motivation is to be understood. One of the most promising accounts of epistemically virtuous motivation is put forward by Linda Zagzebski (1996). She states that two motivational components are involved: the motivation for truth and the motivation to act in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question. This paper aims, first, to clarify the relationship between the two motivational components. I argue that the two motivational components are distinct and can come apart. The motivation for truth should be understood as the fundamental motivation and the motivation to act in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question should be understood as a distinct, proximate motivation. Second, the paper seeks to refine the notion of epistemically virtuous motivation in such a way that it is not only viable and resilient to objections raised against it, but also psychologically plausible. Akin to John Greco (2006), I argue that the motivation for truth should be understood as our default state of trying to believe what is true and that one can, but need not, be consciously aware of either the motivation for truth or the motivation to act in accordance with the epistemic end of the virtue in question.
