Logos and episteme
Eric GILBERTSON
ABSTRACT: Even if credence 1 is justified for many contingent propositions, it is not justified in cases where a disposition to revise in light of counterevidence is rationally required. First, credence 1 may be compatible with admission of fallibility, but this does not imply that it is compatible with a disposition to revise. Moreover, credence 1 entails being sure, which requires that one remain steadfast. Since steadfastness with respect to belief entails a disposition not to revise in light of counterevidence, credence 1 entails a disposition not to revise. Finally, since there are closure of inquiry defeaters for a wide range of contingent propositions, and since having credence 1 in p entails closure of inquiry about p, it is not justified to have credence 1 in such cases.
