Research Articles, VIII, 4

Research Articles, VIII, 4

A CONSTITUTIVE ACCOUNT OF KNOWLEDGE OF ONE’S OWN BELIEFS (pages 389-416)

Peter BAUMANN ABSTRACT: Can I be wrong about my own beliefs? More precisely: Can I falsely believe that I believe that p? I argue that the answer is negative. This runs against what many philosophers and psychologists have traditionally thought and still think. I use a rather new kind of argument, – one that is based on considerations about Moore’s …

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CONTEXTUALISM AND CONTEXT INTERNALISM (pages 417-423)

David COSS ABSTRACT: Contextualism is the view that the word ‘knows’ is context sensitive and shifts according to the relevant standards in play. I argue that Contextualism is best paired with internalism about contexts. That is to say, an attributor’s context is completely determined by mental facts. Consequently, in the absence of awareness, external facts do not lead to contextual …

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LIMITATIONS AND THE WORLD BEYOND (pages 425-454)

Patrick GRIM and Nicholas RESCHER ABSTRACT: This paper surveys our inescapable limits as cognitive agents with regard to a full world of fact: the well-known metamathematical limits of axiomatic systems, limitations of explanation that doom a principle of sufficient reason, limitations of expression across all possible languages, and a simple but powerful argument regarding the limits of conceivability. In ways …

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EPISTEMIC UTILITY AND THE NORMATIVITY OF LOGIC (pages 455-492)

Richard PETTIGREW ABSTRACT: How does logic relate to rational belief? Is logic normative for belief, as some say? What, if anything, do facts about logical consequence tell us about norms of doxastic rationality? In this paper, we consider a range of putative logic-rationality bridge principles. These purport to relate facts about logical consequence to norms that govern the rationality of …

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WHY ANTI-LUCK VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY HAS NO LUCK WITH CLOSURE (pages 493-515)

Maura PRIEST ABSTRACT: In Part I, this paper argues that Duncan Pritchard’s version of safety is incompatible with closure. In Part II I argue for an alternative theory that fares much better. Part I begins by reviewing past arguments concerning safety’s problems with closure. After discussing both their inadequacies and Pritchard’s response to them, I offer a modified criticism immune …

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