Volume XVII, Issue 3, 2026

THE CONJUNCTION THESIS FROM NON-AXIOMATIC LOGIC (pages 309-317)

Miguel López ASTORGA ABSTRACT: There is a debate over the acceptance or rejection of the conjunction thesis. That debate is linked to the concept of truthmaker. The aim of this paper is not to enter that discussion or try to clarify the concept of truthmaker. The goal is just to address the thesis from Non-Axiomatic Logic. I will attempt to …

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CLOSURE, UNIFORMITY AND INTENSION: ANOTHER CASE FOR THE ANALYTICITY OF DEDUCTION PREMISES (pages 319-341)

Carin ROBINSON ABSTRACT: This paper asks the following question: How is deduction non-ampliative? It answers with a conditional: If deduction is non-ampliative then its premises are non-informative. To establish the truth of this conditional, is the task of this paper. I argue that the non-ampliative nature of deduction entails the non-informative epistemic status of the sentences which are its premises. …

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THE SAFETY RADIUS OF SKILL: MODAL ROBUSTNESS AND THE DEFENSE OF INTELLECTUALISM (pages 343-361)

Feinan YE, Xia LI ABSTRACT: The gradability of know-how presents a persistent puzzle for theories of skill. While knowing that p is typically binary, knowing how to φ admits of degrees of excellence. Leading Intellectualist accounts (Pavese 2017; Zhang 2025) typically explicate this gradability in terms of representational resolution or default reliability in the actual world. This paper argues, however, …

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GETTIER CASES AND THE EVALUATOR’S PARADOX (pages 365-369)

John Ian K. BOONGALING ABSTRACT: This paper identifies a structural feature of Gettier cases that has received little attention in the literature. In such cases, there is a decisive fact that explains why a subject’s justified true belief fails to constitute knowledge, yet that fact is inaccessible to the subject. By contrast, an evaluator who correctly judges that the subject …

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TWO DILEMMAS FOR SETIYA’S REDUCTIVE EPISTEMOLOGY (pages 371-381)

Shlomit WYGODA COHEN ABSTRACT: Kieran Setiya has developed an original and promising version of non-inferential moral epistemology which he calls Reductive Epistemology. While I find Reductive Epistemology to be an attempt in the right direction, it leaves some important questions unanswered. Tackling these questions brings to the surface the intuition underlying the view’s plausibility, but also reveals a significant challenge …

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THE ANIMAL OBJECTION TO REDUCTIVE ACCOUNTS OF TESTIMONY (pages 383-387)

Tyler Dalton MCNABB and Michael DEVITO ABSTRACT: The reductionist and anti-reductionist debate features prominently within the larger canon of literature devoted to the epistemology of testimony. Reductionism is the thesis, roughly, that testimonial knowledge is reducible to some other, more general, form(s) of knowledge. We take anti-reductionism’s thesis to be the denial of reductionism. In this note, we develop an …

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