Discussion Notes/Debate, XVI, 3

John Ian K. BOONGALING ABSTRACT: This paper critically examines Cabbolet’s JTB+S account, in particular his proposed fourth condition for knowledge: S’s justification for believing that p must be sufficient to exclude ¬p. Since Cabbolet’s proposed fourth condition: (1) does not eliminate Gettier cases, (2) leads to either skepticism or triviality, and (3) suffers from internal inconsistency, I argue that Cabbolet …

Alexandru DRAGOMIR, Mihai RUSU ABSTRACT: The aim of this note is to analyze four externalist conditions on knowledge about the real world based on beliefs formed in VR. We will discuss Wheeler’s sensitivity conditions for VR-based knowledge and propose a case wherein his favored condition, Virtual Sensitivity+, fails. Furthermore, we will advance two safety conditions and argue that while they …