Volume XVI, Issue 3, 2025

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: The conservative view on testimony rests on the assumption that a testifier must (1) believe or know the propositional content of the testimony, (2) intend to deliver the testimony, (3) be a responsible epistemic agent, (4) be an object of trust, and (5) be capable of making assertions. According to this view, such conditions apply exclusively to …

Gareth FULLER ABSTRACT: It is commonly accepted that scientific models include many misrepresentations of their real-world target. One type of misrepresentation is that of an “idealizing assumption”. An idealizing assumption is a modeling assumption that omits some factor of the real-world target that is known or presumed of being causally relevant to the phenomenon of interest. Some find the inclusion …

Rogelio MIRANDA VILCHIS ABSTRACT: In this paper, I develop a minimal empirically-based characterization of philosophical expertise, exploring its significant theoretical and practical implications for philosophy and metaphilosophy. Throughout the history of philosophy, philosophers have engaged in metaphilosophical reflections on the nature of philosophy (think, e.g., of Plato’s efforts to distinguish philosophers from sophists) and the present era is no exception. …

Nastasia MUELLER ABSTRACT: What distinguishes virtue reliabilism from virtue responsibilism is that the latter requires that epistemic virtues involve epistemically virtuous motivation, whereas the former denies that motivation is needed for virtue. But although epistemically virtuous motivation is what distinguishes virtue responsibilism not only from virtue reliabilism but also from other types of virtue, such as aesthetic, athletic, and moral …

Lei NIU ABSTRACT: How do we understand trust in human experts? The total evidence view suggests that the beliefs of experts provide additional reasons for beliefs. Correspondingly, one should combine the beliefs of experts with one’s own beliefs and at least give some epistemic weight to one’s own evidence. On the contrary, the preemption view suggests that unequivocal deference to …

John Ian K. BOONGALING ABSTRACT: This paper critically examines Cabbolet’s JTB+S account, in particular his proposed fourth condition for knowledge: S’s justification for believing that p must be sufficient to exclude ¬p. Since Cabbolet’s proposed fourth condition: (1) does not eliminate Gettier cases, (2) leads to either skepticism or triviality, and (3) suffers from internal inconsistency, I argue that Cabbolet …

Alexandru DRAGOMIR, Mihai RUSU ABSTRACT: The aim of this note is to analyze four externalist conditions on knowledge about the real world based on beliefs formed in VR. We will discuss Wheeler’s sensitivity conditions for VR-based knowledge and propose a case wherein his favored condition, Virtual Sensitivity+, fails. Furthermore, we will advance two safety conditions and argue that while they …