Volume XVI, Issue 1, 2025

Darren BRADLEY ABSTRACT: Some philosophers argue that coherence is a normatively significant type of rationality, over and above substantive rationality. The most detailed and substantive arguments are given by Alex Worsnip (2021, 2022). In this paper I will criticize his arguments. We are left with the thesis that the only type of rationality we need is substantive rationality. Download PDF

Eric GILBERTSON ABSTRACT: Even if credence 1 is justified for many contingent propositions, it is not justified in cases where a disposition to revise in light of counterevidence is rationally required. First, credence 1 may be compatible with admission of fallibility, but this does not imply that it is compatible with a disposition to revise. Moreover, credence 1 entails being …

Deke Caiñas GOULD ABSTRACT: In this paper, I will argue that the dialogical account of the normativity of logic does not succeed, and that a different direction will be required. I first present a recent challenge by Russell (2017), which argues that on a three-fold distinction of degrees of normative entanglement, logic is only normative in the weakest sense. I …

Jinhua HE ABSTRACT: The views of epistemic buck-passing (also known as the deferral of epistemic challenge) has been used to argue for the epistemic distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge. The overall strategy for the argumentation is to demonstrate that the epistemic distinctiveness of testimonial knowledge depends on a distinctive feature of it, i.e., epistemic buck-passing, granted the truthfulness of any of …

Izak TAIT ABSTRACT: This paper proposes a comprehensive classification scheme for identifying agentic entities based on six essential aspects: perception, predictive capacity, decision-making capability, goal-content integrity, resource input and output, and manipulators. By systematically examining these aspects, this paper aims to distinguish true agents from non-agentic entities, including advanced tools and collective entities. The classification scheme addresses practical implications, such …

John C. DUFF ABSTRACT: Scott Soames argued that Wittgenstein’s private language argument reveals ambiguity, presenting two possible conclusions, wherein either conclusion exhibits devastating implications for the private language argument. I contend that interpreting Wittgenstein’s reasoning holistically dissipates inclinations to infer ambiguity in the private language argument. In particular, I challenge Soames’ ambiguity argument by demonstrating its contrived limitations, resulting in …

James SIMPSON ABSTRACT: Gualtiero Piccinini has recently proposed an interesting new solution to the Gettier Problem: Knowledge is factually grounded belief. But there is a problem with this purported solution: It is both too strong and too weak. In this paper, I provide two counterexamples to substantiate the claim that it is both too strong and too weak. Thus, the …