Volume XV, Issue 3, 2024

RETHINKING RATIONALITY ATTRIBUTIONS (pages 261-283)

Lisa BASTIAN ABSTRACT: Although much has been written about the property of rationality, its requirements, and whether it is normative, rationality attributions themselves have not received much attention. The main aim of this paper is to address this oversight by focussing directly on rationality attributions and their complexities. After offering a diagnosis for why attributions have been largely overlooked, the …

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LUMINOSITY AND DISPOSITIONS TO BELIEVE (pages 285-331)

Iñaki Xavier LARRAURI PERTIERRA ABSTRACT: Defences of Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument (ALA) that employ doxastic propagation principles—i.e., rules by which cases of beliefs and/or dispositions to believe are inferred from other such cases—risk running into sorites. Since these principles are explainable by an ineffective capacity to phenomenally discriminate between two adjacent cases, luminist rejections of the ALA can halt sorites by …

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A PROPOSITION IS EPISTEMICALLY POSSIBLE IF AND ONLY IF ITS NEGATION IS NOT OBVIOUS (pages 333-349)

Chris TWEEDT ABSTRACT: According to a prominent account of epistemic possibility endorsed by John Hawthorne and Jason Stanley (“H-S Account”), a proposition q is epistemically possible for a subject just in case what the subject knows doesn’t obviously entail not-q. I argue that H-S Account is false by its own lights by first showing that H-S Account entails a different …

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DIVINE HIDDENNESS IS COSTLY FOR ATHEISTS (pages 353-357)

Perry HENDRICKS ABSTRACT: I’ve argued that those who endorse the argument from divine hiddenness must give up all pure de jure objections to theism, and this means that endorsing the argument is costly for atheists. Benjamin Curtis claims that this isn’t a significant cost for atheists. I show that—contrary to Curtis—there is a significant cost, and spell out why this …

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THE END OF THOUGHT EXPERIMENTS? (pages 359-367)

Mark MALLER ABSTRACT: This reply is a refutation of Santiago Vrech’s article “The End of the Case? A Metaphilosophical Critique of Thought Experiments” (2022) which argues that thought experiments used in argumentation cannot hold in All Possible Worlds (APW) modality, and thus should end. Cases are used to justify or refute a philosophical theory, but should not have the power …

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