RESEARCH ARTICLES XIV 2

Miguel López ASTORGA ABSTRACT: Carnap and Popper proposed ways scientists have to work. According to Carnap, they should look for confirmations for hypotheses. In Popper’s view, what is important is to try to falsify hypotheses. Cognitive science seems to prove that, in real scientific research, both activities play a role. First, people attempt to confirm hypotheses. Second, they seek examples …

Ali Hossein KHANI ABSTRACT: Blackburn and Searle have argued that Quine’s thesis of the indeterminacy of translation results in a denial of the sort of first-person authority that we commonly concede we have over our mental and semantical content. For, the indeterminacy thesis implies that there is no determinate meaning to know at all. And, according to Quine, the indeterminacy …

Jimmy Alfonso LICON ABSTRACT: Philosophy plausibly aims at knowledge; it would thus be tempting to hold that much of the value of doing philosophy turns on securing knowledge. Enter the agnostic challenge: suppose that a philosophical agnostic (named ‘Betsy’) wants to discover only fundamental philosophical truths. However, the intractable disagreement among philosophical experts gives her pause. After reflecting on expert …

Daniel RÖNNEDAL ABSTRACT: According to the so-called truth norm, we ought to believe that A if and only if A is true. There are many possible interpretations of this norm. What does ‘ought’ in this norm mean? Does ‘ought’ have a wide or a narrow scope, etc.? In this paper, I will investigate one version of this norm and I …