Discussion Notes/Debate XIII 4

Discussion Notes/Debate XIII 4

Objecting to the ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ Theory of Knowledge: A Reply to Feit and Cullison(pages 407-415)

Timothy KIRSCHENHEITER ABSTRACT: In this paper, I explain Neil Feit and Andrew Cullison’s two proposed theories of knowledge, their initial No Essential Falsehood-Justifying Grounds account and their ultimate ‘Doesn’t Justify the Denial of a Defeater’ account. I then offer original counterexamples against both of these theories. In the process of doing so, I both explain Feit and Cullison’s motivation for …

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ON THE PERSISTENCE OF ABSOLUTE METAPHYSICS(pages 417-419)

Gustavo PICAZO ABSTRACT: Greenwood (2019) casts doubts upon whether a certain view about social groups (the view that social groups persist throughout changes in their membership, by virtue of the maintenance of their structure or function) is a fundamental metaphysical truth about social groups, rather than a theoretical truth about some or many social groups. In this note, I introduce …

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Defending Joint Acceptance Accounts of Group Belief against the Challenge from Group Lies(pages 421-428)

Lukas SCHWENGERER ABSTRACT: Joint acceptance accounts of group belief hold that groups can form a belief in virtue of the group members jointly accepting a proposition. Recently, Jennifer Lackey (2020, 2021) proposed a challenge to these accounts. If group beliefs can be based on joint acceptance, then it seems difficult to account for all instances of a group telling a lie. …

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