Volume XI, Issue 3, 2020

Volume XI, Issue 3, 2020

AGRIPPAN PROBLEMS (pages 259-282)

Robb DUNPHY ABSTRACT: In this article I consider Sextus’ account of the Five Modes and of the Two Modes in his Outlines of Pyrrhonism. I suggest that from these we can derive the basic form of a number of different problems which I refer to as “Agrippan problems,” where this category includes both the epistemic regress problem and the problem …

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GROUP TESTIMONY: DEFENDING A REDUCTIONIST VIEW (pages 283-304)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: Our aim in this paper is to defend the reductionist (or deflationist) view on group testimony from the attacks of divergence arguments. We will begin by presenting how divergence arguments can challenge the reductionist view. However, we will argue that these arguments are not decisive to rule out the reductionist view; for, these arguments have false premises, …

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MORAL REALISM AND THE PROBLEM OF MORAL ALIENS (pages 305-321)

Thomas GRUNDMANN ABSTRACT: In this paper, I discuss a new problem for moral realism, the problem of moral aliens. In the first section, I introduce this problem. Moral aliens are people who radically disagree with us concerning moral matters. Moral aliens are neither obviously incoherent nor do they seem to lack rational support from their own perspective. On the one …

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THE SUBJECT’S PERSPECTIVE OBJECTION TO EXTERNALISM AND WHY IT FAILS (pages 323-331)

Perry HENDRICKS ABSTRACT: The subject’s perspective objection (SPO) is an objection against externalist theories of justification, warrant, and knowledge. In this article, I show that externalists can accommodate the SPO while remaining externalist. So, even if the SPO is successful, it does not motivate internalism, and the primary motivation for internalism has been lost. After this, I provide an explanation …

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HUSSERLIAN EIDETIC VARIATION AND OBJECTUAL UNDERSTANDING AS A BASIS FOR AN EPISTEMOLOGY OF ESSENCE (pages 333-353)

Robert MICHELS ABSTRACT: Vaidya has recently argued that while Husserl’s method for acquiring knowledge of essence through use of our imagination is subject to a vicious epistemic circle, we can still use the method to successfully attain objectual understanding of essence. In this paper, I argue that the Husserlian objectual understanding-based epistemology envisaged by Vaidya suffers from a similar epistemic …

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EMPATHY AS A TOOL FOR LEARNING ABOUT EVALUATIVE FEATURES OF OBJECTS (pages 355-367)

Diana SOFRONIEVA ABSTRACT: It is generally agreed that empathy can give us knowledge about others. However, the potential use of empathy as a tool to learn about features of objects in the world more generally, as opposed to learning only about others’ internal states, has not been discussed in the literature. In this paper I make the claim that empathy …

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TRUTH TRACKING AND KNOWLEDGE FROM VIRTUAL REALITY (pages 369-388)

Billy WHEELER ABSTRACT: Is it possible to gain knowledge about the real world based solely on experiences in virtual reality? According to one influential theory of knowledge, you cannot. Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking theory requires that, in addition to a belief being true, it must also be sensitive to the truth. Yet beliefs formed in virtual reality are not sensitive: in …

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DOES METAPHILOSOPHICALLY PRAGMATIST ANTI-SKEPTICISM WORK? (pages 391-398)

Scott AIKIN ABSTRACT: Michael Hannon has recently given “a new apraxia” argument against skepticism. Hannon’s case is that skepticism depends on a theory of knowledge that makes the concept “useless and uninteresting.” Three arguments rebutting Hannon’s metaphilosophical pragmatism are given that show that the concept of knowledge that makes skepticism plausible is both interesting and useful. Download PDF

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