Volume VIII, Issue 2, 2017

WHAT ARE EXPLANATORY VIRTUES INDICATIVE OF? (pages 179-193)

Miloud BELKONIENE ABSTRACT: This paper discusses an assumption on which explanationist accounts of the evidential support relation rely with a focus on McCain’s recent account. Explanationist accounts define the relation of evidential support in terms of relations of best explanation that hold between the evidence a subject possesses and the propositions she believes. Such a definition presupposes that the explanatory …

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WHAT IS EVIDENCE OF EVIDENCE EVIDENCE OF? (pages 195-206)

Fabio LAMPERT and John BIRO ABSTRACT: Richard Feldman’s well-known principle about disagreement and evidence – usually encapsulated in the slogan, ‘evidence of evidence is evidence,’ (EEE) – invites the question, what should a rational believer do when faced by such evidence, especially when the disagreement is with an epistemic peer? The question has been the subject of much controversy. However, …

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A THOROUGHLY MODERN WAGER (pages 207-231)

Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Pascal’s wager is a familiar heuristic designed to show that believing that God exists is of greater practical value than believing that God does not exist given the outcomes associated with those beliefs as understood in Christian theology. In this way Pascal argues that we that we ought to believe that God exists, independent of epistemic …

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PRAGMATIC OR PASCALIAN ENCROACHMENT? A PROBLEM FOR SCHROEDER’S EXPLANATION OF PRAGMATIC ENCROACHMENT (pages 235-241)

Andy MUELLER ABSTRACT: I argue against Schroeder’s explanation of pragmatic encroachment on knowledge. In section 1, I introduce pragmatic encroachment and point out that an explanation of it should avoid Pascalian considerations. In section 2, summarize the key aspects of Schroeder’s explanation of pragmatic encroachment. In section 3, I argue that Schroeder’s explanation faces a dilemma: it either allows for …

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STILL STUCK ON THE BACKWARD CLOCK: A REJOINDER TO CLARKE, ADAMS AND BARKER (pages 243-269)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: Neil Sinhababu and I presented Backward Clock, an original counterexample to Robert Nozick’s truth-tracking analysis of propositional knowledge. In their latest defence of the truth-tracking theories, “Methods Matter: Beating the Backward Clock,” Murray Clarke, Fred Adams and John A. Barker try again to defend Nozick’s and Fred Dretske’s early analysis of propositional knowledge against Backward Clock. …

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