BELIEF IN NATURALISM: AN EPISTEMOLOGIST’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

Susan HAACK

ABSTRACT: The present study reiterates one of the main ideas that we exposed in 1983, in the paper “Din fals rezultă orice” (“From False Follows Anything”), published in the volume Întemeieri raţionale în filosofia ştiinţei (Rational Foundations in the Philosophy of Science) when we referred to the notion of semi-truth, as a third alethic value, placed between „truth” and „falsehood”, thus contributing to the functionality of the trivalent logic. Now we analyze the conceptions of Petre Botezatu, Mario Bunge, Karl R. Popper and Nicholas Rescher, in order to argue that it is important not to identify the epistemological term „probable” (= uncertain) with the semantic term „partial” or „approximate”, when we speak about the concept of truth.

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