Wai Lok CHEUNG ABSTRACT: Pritchard explains the putative failure of knowledge in the fake barn case using epistemic safety. I bring out the notion of epistemic luck, and interact epistemic competence with it through epistemic situation. I propose that evidence supervenes on epistemic situation, such that, given an epistemic success, the measure of epistemic luck of the corresponding epistemic act …

Wai Lok CHEUNG ABSTRACT: Practical encroachment may be understood with an influx of epistemic possibilities into the epistemic context through raising epistemic standard. The same piece of evidence no longer epistemically justifies the corresponding belief because of the extra alternative possibilities. I differentiate relevance into ethical relevance and epistemic relevance through practical interest, and note that, even though one lost …

Wai Lok CHEUNG ABSTRACT: Stewart Cohen’s epistemic responsibility conception of epistemic justification in illustrating the problem of the new evil demon is assessed through some virtue-theoretic attempts, notably by Timothy Williamson and Clayton Littlejohn, whose accounts provide a good departure point to differentiate epistemic blamelessness through epistemic excusability via exercise of epistemic competence with epistemic recklessness. Some failure of epistemic …