Domingos FARIA

CAN CONVERSATIONAL AIS TESTIFY? CHALLENGING THE CONSERVATIVE VIEW (pages 249-261)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: The conservative view on testimony rests on the assumption that a testifier must (1) believe or know the propositional content of the testimony, (2) intend to deliver the testimony, (3) be a responsible epistemic agent, (4) be an object of trust, and (5) be capable of making assertions. According to this view, such conditions apply exclusively to …

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THE PROBLEM OF RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY OR DISAGREEMENT: RECENT FORMULATIONS AND SOLUTIONS (pages 7-23)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: In this paper, we have two goals: Firstly, we intend to examine the most robust recent formulation of the problem of religious diversity or disagreement. We will argue that Sanford Goldberg’s version is better than John Greco’s. Secondly, we aim to examine different solutions and develop a new one based on Ernest Sosa’s virtue epistemology as a …

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IS THERE ROOM FOR JUSTIFIED BELIEFS WITHOUT EVIDENCE? A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF EPISTEMIC EVIDENTIALISM (pages 137-152)

Domingos FARIA ABSTRACT: In the first section of this paper I present epistemic evidentialism and, in the following two sections, I discuss that view with counterexamples. I shall defend that adequately supporting evidence is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for epistemic justification. Although we need epistemic elements other than evidence in order to have epistemic justification, there can be …

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