MOORE’S PARADOX AND EPISTEMIC NORMS (pages 445-464)

Patrizio LO PRESTI

ABSTRACT: Why does it strike us as absurd to believe that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is raining? Some argue that it strikes us as absurd because belief is normative. The beliefs that it is raining and that one doesn’t believe that it is are, it is suggested, self-falsifying. But, so it is argued, it is essential to belief that beliefs ought not, among other things, be self-falsifying. That is why the beliefs strike us as absurd. I argue that while the absurdity may consist in and be explained by self-falsification, we have no reasons to accept the further claim that self-falsifying beliefs are absurd because violating norms.

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INFERENTIAL, COHERENTIAL, AND FOUNDATIONAL WARRANT: AN ECLECTIC ACCOUNT OF THE SOURCES OF WARRANT (pages 377-398)

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