Tag Archives: bounded rationality

WHEN THE (BAYESIAN) IDEAL IS NOT IDEAL (pages 271-298)

Danilo Fraga DANTAS ABSTRACT: Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. …

Read More »

RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING IN A COMPLEX WORLD: TOWARDS AN INSTRUMENTAL, YET EMBODIED, ACCOUNT(pages 381-404)

Ragnar VAN DER MERWE ABSTRACT: Prima facie, we make successful decisions as we act on and intervene in the world day-to-day. Epistemologists are often concerned with whether rationality is involved in such decision-making practices, and, if so, to what degree. Some, particularly in the post-structuralist tradition, argue that successful decision-making occurs via an existential leap into the unknown rather than …

Read More »

PHILOSOPHICAL SITUATIONISM AND THE VICIOUS MINDS HYPOTHESIS (pages 7-39)

Guy AXTELL ABSTRACT: This paper provides an empirical defense of credit theories of knowing against Mark Alfano’s challenges to them based on his theses of inferential cognitive situationism and of epistemic situationism. In order to support the claim that credit theories can treat many cases of cognitive success through heuristic cognitive strategies as credit-conferring, the paper develops the compatibility between virtue …

Read More »