ABSTRACT: In this paper, I focus on the disputes arising in regions of discourse in which bare sentences with predicates of personal taste occur. After I introduce, in the first section, the distinction between the disputes arising in regions of discourse concerning objective matters of fact and those arising in regions of discourse about subjective matters of personal taste, I present, in the second section, the solutions which the main semantic theories have offered to the puzzle of faultless disagreement. In the third and the fourth section of the paper, I discuss the proposal advocated by truth perspectivalism, according to which the disputes concerning matters of personal taste constitute faultless disagreements. After I present the solution proposed by Kölbel to an argument whose conclusion establishes that no disagreement can be faultless, I show that this solution presents major disadvantages for truth perspectivalism. These disadvantages highlight the fact that the disputes concerning matters of personal taste, as they are construed in truth perspectivalism, do not constitute authentic examples of faultless disagreements, and that the coherence of the semantic program which truth perspectivalism advocates, with regard to sentences from regions of discourse about matters of personal taste, must be put in doubt.