Research Articles, XIV, 3

Research Articles, XIV, 3

UNIQUENESS AND LOGICAL DISAGREEMENT (REVISITED)(pages 243-259)

Frederik J. ANDERSEN ABSTRACT: This paper discusses the Uniqueness Thesis, a core thesis in the epistemology of disagreement. After presenting uniqueness and clarifying relevant terms, a novel counterexample to the thesis will be introduced. This counterexample involves logical disagreement. Several objections to the counterexample are then considered, and it is argued that the best responses to the counterexample all undermine …

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IS JTB KNOWLEDGE HOPELESS? (pages 261-270)

Arnold CUSMARIU ABSTRACT: An argument structure that covers both cases Gettier described in his 1963 paper reinforces the conclusion of my 2012 Logos & Episteme article that the justified true belief (JTB) conception of knowledge is inconsistent. The stronger argument makes possible identification of fundamental flaws in the standard approach of adding a fourth condition to JTB, so that a …

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WHEN THE (BAYESIAN) IDEAL IS NOT IDEAL (pages 271-298)

Danilo Fraga DANTAS ABSTRACT: Bayesian epistemologists support the norms of probabilism and conditionalization using Dutch book and accuracy arguments. These arguments assume that rationality requires agents to maximize practical or epistemic value in every doxastic state, which is evaluated from a subjective point of view (e.g., the agent’s expectancy of value). The accuracy arguments also presuppose that agents are opinionated. …

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SUBJECTIVE RATIONALITY AND THE REASONING ARGUMENT (pages 299-321)

Erhan DEMIRCIOGLU ABSTRACT: My main aim in this paper is to show that Kolodny’s intriguing argument against wide-scopism – ‘the Reasoning Argument’ – fails. A proper evaluation of the Reasoning Argument requires drawing two significant distinctions, one between thin and thick rational transitions and the other between bare-bones wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism) and embellished wide-scopism (and narrow-scopism). The Reasoning Argument is …

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CONTEXTUAL SHIFTS AND GRADABLE KNOWLEDGE (pages 323-337)

Andreas STEPHENS ABSTRACT: Epistemological contextualism states that propositions about knowledge, expressed in sentences like “S knows that P,” are context-sensitive. Schaffer (2005) examines whether one of Lewis’ (1996), Cohen’s (1988) and DeRose’s (1995) influential contextualist accounts is preferable to the others. According to Schaffer, Lewis’ theory of relevant alternatives succeeds as a linguistic basis for contextualism and as an explanation …

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