Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper is a constructive response to Peter Baumann’s comments concerning the argument from inconsistency and explosion that was originally introduced in “Can Knowledge Really be Non-factive?” Specifically, this paper deals with Baumann’s two suggestions for how quasi-factivists might avoid this argument and it shows that they are both problematic. As such, his paper extends and …
Read More »Deontic Logic, Weakening and Decisions Concerning Disjunctive Obligations (pages 93-102)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper introduces two new paradoxes for standard deontic logic (SDL). They are importantly related to, but distinct from Ross’ paradox. These two new paradoxes for SDL are the simple weakening paradox and the complex weakening paradox. Both of these paradoxes arise in virtue of the underlying logic of SDL and are consequences of the fact …
Read More »CAN KNOWLEDGE REALLY BE NON-FACTIVE? (pages 215-226)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper contains a critical examination of the prospects for analyses of knowledge that weaken the factivity condition so that knowledge implies only approximate truth. Download PDF
Read More »THE AVAILABILITY HEURISTIC AND INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION (pages 409-432)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper shows how the availability heuristic can be used to justify inference to the best explanation in such a way that van Fraassen’s infamous “best of a bad lot” objection can be adroitly avoided. With this end in mind, a dynamic and contextual version of the erotetic model of explanation sufficient to ground this response …
Read More »QUINE AND THE INCOHERENCE OF THE INDISPENSABILITY ARGUMENT (pages 207-213)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: It is an under-appreciated fact that Quine’s rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction¾when coupled with some other plausible and related views¾implies that there are serious difficulties in demarcating empirical theories from pure mathematical theories within the Quinean framework. This is a serious problem because there seems to be a principled difference between the two disciplines that cannot …
Read More »SAFETY AND THE PREFACE PARADOX (pages 215-219)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: In the preface paradox the posited author is supposed to know both that every sentence in a book is true and that not every sentence in that book is true. But, this result is paradoxically contradictory. The paradoxicality exhibited in such cases arises chiefly out of the recognition that large-scale and difficult tasks like verifying the …
Read More »AN ARGUMENT FOR THE SAFETY CONDITION ON KNOWLEDGE (pages 517-520)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: This paper introduces a new argument for the safety condition on knowledge. It is based on the contention that the rejection of safety entails the rejection of the factivity condition on knowledge. But, since we should maintain factivity, we should endorse safery. Download PDF
Read More »INTERNALISM, EVIDENTIALISM AND APPEALS TO EXPERT KNOWLEDGE (pages 291-305)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Given the sheer vastness of the totality of contemporary human knowledge and our individual epistemic finitude it is commonplace for those of us who lack knowledge with respect to some proposition(s) to appeal to experts (those who do have knowledge with respect to that proposition(s)) as an epistemic resource. Of course, much ink has been spilled …
Read More »A THOROUGHLY MODERN WAGER (pages 207-231)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Pascal’s wager is a familiar heuristic designed to show that believing that God exists is of greater practical value than believing that God does not exist given the outcomes associated with those beliefs as understood in Christian theology. In this way Pascal argues that we that we ought to believe that God exists, independent of epistemic …
Read More »WHAT IF BIZET AND VERDI HAD BEEN COMPATRIOTS? (pages 55-66)
Michael J. SHAFFER ABSTRACT: Stalnaker argued that conditional excluded middle should be included in the principles that govern counterfactuals on the basis that intuitions support that principle. This is because there are pairs of competing counterfactuals that appear to be equally acceptable. In doing so, he was forced to introduced semantic vagueness into his system of counterfactuals. In this paper it …
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