

ERRATUM NOTICE

Due to error at the proof stage, the last section, section 5., and the references for the article “Epistemic Context: A Justifiability Theory of Relevance,” authored by Wai Lok Cheung and published in the previous issue of *Logos & Episteme*, are to be updated as follows:

“Relevance, from the relevant alternative theorists, often confuses the metaphysical modality with the epistemic modality. Gail Stine states that ‘an alternative is relevant only if there is some reason to think that it is true’, in contrast to what he attributes to Fred Dretske, which states that ‘an alternative is relevant only if there is some reason to think it *could* be true’.¹ He indeed considers metaphysical possibility,² but I applaud him through perforcing the understanding of his theory as describing how metaphysical impossibility entails epistemic impossibility: ‘A relevant alternative is an alternative that might have been realized in the existing circumstances if the actual state of affairs had not materialized’.³ The interaction between epistemology and epistemic logic demonstrated in this paper is that as long as I provided a theory of epistemic context that describes epistemic accessibility of fact, I would have differentiated the normative – what is to be settled philosophically – from otherwise.⁴ The lingering thought between the difference of what must have belonged to an epistemic context and what belonged to an epistemic context shall clear as I apply the theory to other epistemological problem. A belief constituted knowledge if it is epistemically immune from error within the epistemic context; so how is it that an alternative does not handicap the belief? The relevance of epistemic safety to the present theory is thus apparent.⁵

¹ Stine (1976:152).

² Dretske (1970:1020-1fn5).

³ Dretske (1970:1021).

⁴ See Cheung (2026) for a theory of belief using a theory of knowledge through the normativity of the latter via a given epistemic accessibility.)

⁵ See Cheung (2025) for a theory of epistemic safety through epistemic risk, when alternatives to actuality with which a belief is false commits an epistemic agent to an epistemic wrong.

References

- Cheung, Wai Lok. 2025. Epistemic safety: risk and its negativity in the good case. *Logos & Episteme*. 16(2):139-156. <https://doi.org/10.5840/logos-episteme202516211>
- Cheung, Wai Lok. 2026. Epistemic sense: interpreting Frege with Kripkean metaphysics. *teorema. International Journal of Philosophy*. 45(2). <https://doi.org/10.30827/trif.35460>.”