ARTICULATING PROPERLY FUNCTIONING EMOTIONAL SENSE WITHIN VIRTUE EPISTEMOLOGY

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ABSTRACT: This paper seeks to articulate an individual's general capacity towards emotions with virtue epistemology. Using the contrasting frameworks of virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism, emotionality can be articulated, in different senses, as a faculty or a trait virtue, and assessed according to pre-existing criteria for making this distinction. Additionally, emotionality can be articulated within the context of being a self- or other-regarding virtue, differently in different circumstances. Finally, the significance of this is explored by evaluating emotionality's epistemic goods with regard to different forms of epistemic justice, testimonial and hermeneutical. Emotionality is epistemically non-neutral, but its nature and impact as an epistemic virtue are difficult to unpack and vary dramatically according to the circumstances.

KEYWORDS: virtue epistemology, emotions, reliabilism, responsibilism, epistemic justice

The epistemic potential and consequences of emotions are an underexplored topic. Emotions, broadly understood as affective attitudes, are not discussed in epistemological contexts; on the occasions that they are, what are discussed are not what are most typically understood as emotions of the type described above: happiness, sadness, anger and so forth. Rather, they are epistemic emotions, which are markedly different from the emotions to which I am referring, as I will discuss, and not the subject of this paper. Feeling emotions properly, or having a an accurate or reliable emotional sense, are not discussed as possible or objectionable epistemic virtues. This is surprising, given that intuitively emotions have epistemic significance, even for those who consider themselves the most rational, un-emotional, types of people. A person's emotional reaction to an event indicates something to themselves, and to others, about the state of the world. What that is will obviously be different between people, as well as varying depending on if the emotional response is of yourself or another.

This work is an initial exploration of the epistemic goods of emotions and how to understand emotional facilities in the context of virtue epistemology. It is by no means definitive. I will seek to categorise emotions felt properly, within virtue epistemology, according to how they function – relying on, among others, the Stanford Encyclopedia for broadly agreed upon definitions of key concepts within

virtue epistemology – before evaluating its epistemic merit by examining some of its implications for epistemic justice. I will conclude that that emotionality is an intellectual virtue to be taken seriously, with significant consequences for epistemic justice, which vary according to the specific type of injustice, as well as the extent to which each individual's emotional sense functions appropriately.

I. Defining the Epistemic Role

In a feminist defence of contempt as an emotion, Macalester Bell (2005) argues, among other things, for the epistemic value contempt possess. Although, she says, contempt is epistemically valuable in more than one way. The first one however, is quite clear:

> As I have argued, persons offering contempt psychologically distance themselves from the object of their contempt. Because of this, the oppressed who hold their oppressors in contempt may have a better understanding of the psychological and interpersonal costs of oppression than those who do not. Those who are contemptuous of their oppressors recognise that systems of oppression preclude relationships of mutual respect and engagement between oppressors and oppressed. Women's contempt for sexist men and male-dominated institutions gives women knowledge of the cost of oppression that is absent in those who are not oppressed. (Bell 2005, 86).

The epistemic value gained from contempt in this instance is quite plain; the feeling of contempt enables a person to gain more awareness of their circumstances and knowledge about what those circumstances actually are, the ways in which they work, and the effects they have on the people in them. In this case, the circumstances are the sexists oppression of women, but the need not necessarily be that systematic; we could easily imagine a situation where an individual's contempt of another gives them new insight into the mistreatment they are experiencing, which is purely personal.

The other way in which contempt has epistemic value is in the reaction to the emotion itself. For example, if you are contemptuous of another person, which is manifest in your behaviour and discovered by the other person, and they react in a way that does not address the causes of your contempt, then they haven't given your emotion "proper uptake", as Bell describes it (2005, 86). This is more indirect than above, but it still has epistemic value because it highlights the ways in which those who are oppressed are dismissed, trivialised, or deplatformed; the lack of uptake in the reaction to the contempt is likely to provoke more contempt which is more directly systematic as it is more immediately caused by oppressive frameworks. It is this additional contempt that alerts one to the added nature oppression – the emotion then is the epistemic cause.

It is relatively easy, then, to see how emotions that are frequently characterised as negative could have epistemic value. The point is more commonly made in reference to anger: Srinivasan makes reference to the epistemic productivity of anger, in her more general and more political defence of it (2018, 126). Anger as a response to oppression indicates the nature and permeability of that oppression for oneself and for others as well. Similarly, disgust, although not often talked about in this context, could have similar epistemic consequences. It is a common enough phenomenon to experience disgust towards a friend when that friend behaves in an oppressive way, or indicates bigoted or oppressive tendencies. The disgust functions in an epistemic way as feeling it towards another potentially gains one knowledge about how oppressive tendencies are formed and what consequences they bring about. The epistemic value of emotions such as these is not universally considered a positive thing; Pettigrove (2012, 358) argues that anger is epistemically harmful as it distracts from the rational purpose of knowledge formations. This view will be discussed more fully below, but it acknowledges that emotions are neither epistemically irrelevant nor neutral; they are epistemically significant.

Other negative emotions can even function in the more indirect way described above. Anger is again very notable here. For instance, if you were to get angry with someone for interfering with a project of yours and you shout at them, and they responded by saying "You're crazy", or the less dismissive but equally patronising "You're tired", or if they did not respond at all but walked away, then they would not be giving your anger proper uptake (Frye 1983). They would be discarding your reaction as unrelated to anger, which would, as with contempt above, promote more anger with the additional epistemic consequences of increasing your awareness of sexist, or otherwise oppressive, norms (ibid). As with contempt, the emotion of anger has an epistemic role.

So, given that negative emotions frequently have an epistemic role, it is not difficult to imagine that positively characterised emotions could have an epistemic role. However, given that a lot of the epistemic consequences of negative emotions come from signifying instance of, explaining the nature of, and expanding the scope of various forms of injustice, the epistemic possibility of positive emotions is, in practical terms, reduced. Nevertheless, it does occur; for instance, you could easily imagine feeling gratitude to another for a favour they have done you. This could be epistemically significant as the gratitude gives insight into the difficulty of the task, or the characteristics of the person who would give the favour, or, perhaps most concretely, the gratitude could give insight into the obstacles significant for you which weren't for the other, potentially shedding light on structural obstacles you

faced. In this way, the injustice enlightening possibilities of negative emotions are still present, but distinctly less likely.

Similarly, the praise one has for another could be epistemically significant; if the praise is within a personal relationship, it sheds light on the nature of that relationship. If the praise is for a public figure, in which some political, cultural, and economic reasons were cited, then it could provide insight into the broader socio-economic and cultural climate. Either way, the emotion is potentially epistemically significant. As such, the epistemic role of emotions is apparent; here I have mostly characterised emotions as having epistemic value, of increasing and clarifying knowledge, but as alluded to that is not necessarily the case. Some argue that emotions distract from knowledge and make knowledge-making a muddier process. As a result, whether the capacity towards emotions is epistemically detrimental will be discussed.

II. Intellectual Virtue?

Firstly, I wish to briefly distinguish between the epistemic significance of emotions and epistemic emotions. I will rely on the Stanford Encyclopedia to aid this basic distinction. The former is the phenomenon described above; the latter refers to emotions that specifically relate to an epistemic state (Turri, Alfano, and Greco 2021). An inexhaustive list could include intrigue, hope, doubt, boredom, trust, and confusion (ibid). The reason these emotions relate to an epistemic state is because they provoke an epistemic reaction: since emotions are motivational states, emotions like the ones listed above are dispositions towards epistemic inquiry, and so these emotions are close corollaries or embodiments of different intellectual virtues. Emotions of the type listed in the previous section don't directly have this function; as discussed, they have an epistemic role just as they have a motivational role, but these do not necessarily overlap as they do in epistemic emotions. As such, I make the distinction between epistemic emotions, and the epistemic role of *ordinary emotions*; that is not to say that ordinary emotions cannot lead to epistemically motivated states, but it is not their identifiable characteristic and that phenomenon is beyond the scope of this essay.

To place the ability to experience emotion within the framework of virtue epistemology is place this ability on the scale between virtue and vice. I believe this is a reasonable assertion: to speak of emotions as an ability defines it as an individual characteristic, and although the term "ability" has connotations of choice, practice, and development which gives experiencing emotions an implied level of optionality, the terms "trait" or "skill" could also apply, which again is the language of virtue epistemology. The optionality is present however; there are many instances of

people who are either incredibly repressed or closed off from their emotions, as well as those who feel everything to an extreme. Additionally, it is something that can be changed with effort and practice. So it is clear that the experiencing of emotions is not a discrete category. Similarly, the language of epistemic emotions pointing to intellectual virtues would imply that emotions generally are indicative of virtue. The parallel between ordinary emotions and ethical virtues reasonably established, so it is fair to consider that ordinary emotions collectively constitute an epistemic virtue or vice.

As to which of those this is, I would argue that experiencing emotions is an intellectual virtue rather than a vice. Pettigrove (2012, 358) argues that anger contaminates or distorts epistemic rationality; this is a fair assertion, one can imagine many examples of people who are so angry that their perception of reality is distorted to varying extents, but it is not incompatible with Srinivasan's (2018, 126) more modest assertions of the clarifying potential of anger. The fact that anger can add to the scope of knowledge is twinned with its capability to undermine knowledge; the extent to which someone is angry, their reasons for it, and whether the person themselves is just a dispositionally angry person affect the epistemic merit of the anger. Someone whose anger is sparse and with good justification is more epistemically sound than someone who is angry because it is in their character to blow up over the slightest provocation. The former is, when generalised to their other emotions, intellectually virtuous whereas the latter is intellectually vicious. To liken to two other intellectual virtues, the former enables open-mindedness with a clear perception, while the latter promotes close-mindedness with a blinkered perception. It is the former that I am primarily interested in as an intellectual virtue, but emotionality as an intellectual vice, how it is to be characterised and what its consequences are, must be considered in addition.

III. Type of Intellectual Virtue

Having established the epistemic significance of ordinary emotions, and that the capacity for these emotions is individual, dependent on the knower or agent rather than being belief dependent, the capacity towards ordinary emotions is characterised as an intellectual virtue. However, within virtue epistemology, there are two prevalent ways of determining and describing what intellectual virtues are and how they function. How the capacity towards ordinary emotions falls into this distinction is unclear, as many of the determining factors for what constitutes a virtue within both sides of the distinction are applicable to this capacity. As such, an understanding of the distinction is necessary to see the uncertain place in which the capacity towards emotions falls.

This distinction is between virtue reliabilism and virtue responsibilism. Both hold that intellectual virtues are, to use Battaly's phrase, "cognitive excellences" (2008, 644), but differ in terms of the type they are. Axtell (1997, 1-22) points out that these positions sit on either side of the internalism externalism distinction within epistemology, there being a definitive link between externalism and virtue reliabilism, and a co-responding, though less strong, inference from common assumptions between internalism and virtue responsibilism. But, more relevantly, reliabilists understand virtues as "dispositions of subjects that serve as reliable methods of belief formation" (Fleisher 2017, 2974). In other words, they are cognitive capabilities that people just have, irrespective of any deliberate decision to develop them even though once they are present an agent may wish for theirs to be improved. It is for that reason that Fleisher uses the term virtue, in the reliabilist sense, synonymously with competency, although the Stanford Encyclopedia refers to reliabilist virtues as "faculty-virtues" (Turri, Alfano, and Greco 2021). This is perhaps demonstrated through an inexhaustive list of them: perception, memory, deduction, induction (Battaly 2008, 644). These are cognitive faculties, and as such I will refer to reliabilist virtues as faculties. Conversely, the responsibilist notions of intellectual virtues is that they are "character traits for which we can hold the subject responsible" (Fleisher 2017, 2974). They are part of a person's personality and as such are much more individual and vary much more greatly between individuals than faculty virtues. An inexhaustive list of these includes open-mindedness, intellectual courage, intellectual autonomy, and conscientiousness (Battaly 2008, 645; Montmarquet 1987, 484). The Stanford Encyclopedia refers to these types of virtues as "trait-virtues", which I will do as well owing to the affiliation with personality (Turri, Alfano, and Greco 2021).

In the previous section, I likened the capacity towards emotion to both perception and open-mindedness in my argument that it is an intellectual virtue. This was intentional, because the emotional capacity has features in common with both trait and faculty virtues, and prioritising one over the other would perhaps have indicated a distinct categorisation for this capacity, which is not immediately apparent. Emotionality initially seems more akin to a faculty virtue in that it is an innate cognitive process that is either present or not, and whether or not it is present has very little to do with the intention of the agent – in that a person does not choose to have a memory impairment or lack perception from one or more of their senses. Similarly, and although I described emotional capacity as something which can be changed with effort, this also applies in the case of faculty virtues, just as someone can seek to improve their deductive skills or memory. Whereas trait virtues can deliberately be developed from scratch. Just as poor perception or memory could be

a faculty vice, the same holds true for emotionality. However, excessive emotionality is also an intellectual vice, in the way that a hypothetical surplus of perception or memory could not be. In this way, emotionality is perhaps more akin to a trait virtue as it is conscionable that a person could be too open-minded or have too much intellectual autonomy; these things could inhibit, rather than enhance, the epistemic agent (Battaly 2018, 29-33). Emotions are more readily associated with personality than common faculty virtues; a person's emotional nature is much more central to their interpersonal interactions, along with their open-mindedness and conscientiousness, than their deductive reasoning or memory. Similarly, the language used around emotions is much more akin to a trait virtue as it implies a level of agency and deliberation which would not be appropriate for faculty virtues. People's emotions develop, just as their character develops, affected by factors which would not necessarily affect cognitive processes like perception.

However, this paradigm is problematic: a good epistemic agent needs both faculty and trait virtues, and the distinction between them is not as categorical as it appears. Fleisher (2017, 2978), for instance, has argued that trait virtues can only arise after faculty virtues are present. In that way, it could be argued that emotionality is part of this overlap. But a more schematic analysis is needed.

Five Questions

In order the determine the fundamental nature of specific intellectual virtues, Heather Battaly outlines five questions which, when answered, will detail how a particular virtue is best characterised and categorised:

> First, are the virtues natural or acquired? Second, does virtue possession require the agent to possess acquired intellectually virtuous motivations or dispositions to perform intellectually virtuous actions? Third, are the virtues distinct from skills? Fourth, are the virtues reliable? Finally, fifth, what makes the virtues valuable? Are they instrumentally, constitutively, or intrinsically valuable? (2008, 645)

This provides a useful mechanism in the analysis of emotionality as an intellectual virtue, leading to clarification concerning its nature and function within epistemic agents. Battaly goes on to describe how the different conceptions of intellectual virtues are categorised according to these questions, and whether emotionality is a faculty or trait virtue, and other clarifications within that distinction, will be determined on this basis.

So, as to whether emotionality is natural or acquired, it is clearly and relatively unambiguously natural; although I have argued, to a certain extent, that the degree to which a person is emotional can be altered through the deliberate actions of that person, on a more fundamental level the capacity of emotions is

something people have in virtue of the fact that they are people. Even those whose emotional activity is clinically distinct, still have the fundamental capability.

With regard to the second question, emotionality, again, doesn't require specific dispositions that lead to intellectually virtuous action. Emotionality, when functioning properly, is automatically intellectually virtuous; it does not require activity for the intellectual virtue to be realised or expressed. This is consistent with the third question, which is also concerned with the intentionality behind virtuous activity. Emotionality would not be a skill, in the traditional sense, because it is not acquired; a skill requires effort and time to develop it, and as such Battaly considers that it is acquired. Whereas emotionality, because it is natural, simply occurs independently of deliberate cultivation and so is not a skill. Incidentally, Battaly does not consider acquired virtues as identical to skills, merely like skills, so obvious disjunctions do not necessarily undermine her point.

However, the reliability of emotionality is questionable, and varies greatly from person to person; as previously discussed, the epistemic consequences of emotionality diverge depending on the emotional constitution of the individual, but also according to factors affecting their state of mind at particular instances My assertion that emotionality is generally reliable would be readily rejected by many, despite the arguments of Bell, Frye, and Srinivasan. As a result of this, the epistemic value of emotionality is not necessarily instrumental on an individual basis. However, they are constitutively valuable because properly functioning emotionality is central part of a virtuous epistemic agent – they are necessary for that person to live well. Consequently, this may have secondary instrumental value, as virtuous epistemic agents reliably have true beliefs, and are motivated to have true beliefs. This motivation is intrinsically valuable.

As such, on the basis of the first three questions, emotionality is clearly identified as a faculty virtue. Its unsought presence is indicative of this. However, the response to the fourth question doesn't demarcate either side of the distinction, with proponents of responsibilism and reliabilism confirming the importance of virtue reliability. This lack of reliability is at the root of why emotionality is not often considered an intellectual virtue. It is the result of this that, for the fifth question, emotionality does not fit as a faculty virtue, as they are justified solely for their instrumental value. But trait virtues are also valuable constitutively, as part of an agent's holistic "living well" (Battaly 2008, 651), and intrinsically, so long as the agent is motivated to discover the truth. I would therefore describe emotionality as faculty virtue, given its functional basis, but more akin to a trait virtue in its presentation and justification. Its unreliability undermines its virtue status however, as previously alluded to, and will be discussed in later sections.

Self-Regarding Virtues

The parallel between virtue ethics and virtue epistemology has been understated but unaddressed up to this point. However, there are significant structural similarities: virtue epistemology explores faculties or traits whose consequences are the promotion of knowledge, while virtue ethics explores characteristics whose consequences are the promotion and upholding of moral standards (Kawall 2002, 258-267). A prominent difference however is that virtue ethics distinguishes between self- and other-regarding virtues; the former's use promotes virtuousness in the agent such as courage and patience, and the latter's use promotes virtuousness in people other than the agent such as compassion and honesty (ibid).

Jason Kawall highlights this distinction and draws attention to the discontinuance of the parallel in this area; he argues for the inclusion of other-regarding intellectual virtues:

> An epistemic agent who focuses exclusively on self-regarding epistemic virtues (gaining knowledge and justified beliefs for herself alone) could be a deficient epistemic agent to the extent that she is a member of a community. Similarly, an epistemology which examines and articulates only the self-regarding duties and virtues of agents could be an inadequate epistemology to the extent that it fails to analyze the other-regarding virtues of epistemic agents. (2002, 260).

However, it is not clear that emotionality would fall into these epistemically egoistic traps. My criteria above for determining the epistemic contribution of emotions did focus on an agent's emotion increasing knowledge within that agent about that agent, but this need not necessarily be the case. The epistemic value of the anger that Frye (1983) discusses could very easily be applicable to others: for example, your anger at a systemic injustice your friend experiences increases the knowledge your friend has of systemic injustice and its manifestations. Consequently, just as the self-regarding epistemic capacity of emotions was generalised from isolated instances of emotion shedding light on systemic injustice to the emotional potential of a wide variety of emotions in day-today life, other-regarding epistemic capacity of emotions can be generalised on the same basis. Another's anger can make you aware of a slight they have perceived against you, leading to insight about that other person, or about the environment you are in, or both. Similarly, and most suggestibly, a friend's praise of another person, whether an acquaintance or a public figure, can gain knowledge about your friend individually, socially, or about the cultural climate they or both of you occupy.

As such, emotionality is a rare intellectual virtue in that it is both self- and other-regarding; it is a virtue that consistently refuses to be discretely categorised.

Given the relevance of other-regarding intellectual virtues for epistemic justice, the significance of emotionality to epistemic injustice is emphasised, as will be discussed.

IV. Emotionality and Epistemic Justice

The other-regarding features of emotionality mean that it has doubled edged implications for epistemic justice. There is an emphasis on epistemic community which is brought about by other-regarding intellectual virtues; very broadly, a person's other-regarding intellectual virtues will improve the epistemic goods and quality of the community, which in turn will foster the development of more intellectual virtues, improving the community's epistemic goods and a cycle of improvement develops. Epistemic injustice then can be articulated as the reverse of this in a virtue epistemological context; when one's ability or status as a knower is undermined, neglected, or otherwise reduced, one cannot improve the epistemic goods of the community and may in fact reduce them, and so, in turn, more individuals' epistemic status is damaged, and the cycle continues in that manner.

Miranda Fricker (2003) and Benjamin Sherman (2016) both address a form of epistemic injustice from within virtue epistemology; they focus on testimonial injustice, which is the idea that one's beliefs, assertions, or claims are considered and given an inappropriate weight owing to factors other than their epistemic merit, often factors associated with the identity of the epistemic agent, frequently age, race, and gender. Fricker draws attention to one specific and unfortunately relatable example: "Accent can have a significant impact on how much credibility the hearer affords the speaker, especially in a one-off exchange" (2003, 164). This is illustrative because it could function in a variety of ways; a person's accent may result in them receiving more epistemic credit than they deserve, or it may have the exact opposite effect. However, it is fairly superficial, as getting to know the speaker more fully would reduce this manifestation, and somewhat misleading. The latter because, as Fricker points out, even a very prejudiced hearer would not disbelieve a believable assertion in favour of a more fanciful assertion simply on the basis of an accent. Rather, an epistemic agent's testimonial injustice means that their criteria, for which they will believe a claim, is increased or diminished according to the credibility which the agent gives to an individual speaker. Fricker clarifies this with notable cultural examples, including *To Kill a Mockingbird*, in which an all-white jury cannot overcome their prejudice in the face of evidence which entirely contradicts it; the defendant suffers testimonial injustice because his credibility is greatly diminished because of the jury's racist presuppositions, that all of his supporting evidence is not sufficiently impactful to overcome those same racist presuppositions.

As such, emotionality would, realistically, have the effect of increasing testimonial injustice. This is due to the common occurrence that authorities which pride themselves on their rationality tend to be unpersuaded (and sometimes disgusted) by arguments which derive from emotions or in which emotions play a role. A common cultural occurrence is the man who will reject a woman's point of view because he considers her to be too emotional. Authorities like these already use their emotional sense to privilege their own credibility and biases – prejudice is, on some level, emotional – resulting in their opponents' credibility being diminished to points of irrelevance. Fricker and Sherman disagree over solutions to this, with Fricker favouring the development of virtues to combat this, with Sherman considering this a distraction in favour of more immediate, consequentially leaning response to improve community epistemic goods. As such, with emotionality, encouraging the development of a properly functioning emotional sense as an intellectual virtue may be useful, but it is contingent on good epistemic communities, so as the value of this virtue is not overprivileged, even when properly functioning. However, clarifying the existence may serve to undermine some people's unconscious epistemic hierarchy, so emotionality is given less weight and pervasiveness by individual epistemic agents; although, again, this is unlikely if the epistemic community cannot sustain this kind of de-linking.

Fricker (2016) also addresses another form of epistemic injustice: hermeneutical marginalisation is the circumstances in which different peoples do not have equitable access to the creation of shared concepts, and so whose perspectives are not voiced in shared discourse. Hermeneutical epistemic injustice, then, is less clearly apparent than testimonial almost by definition, as those who are aggrieved do not have access to the conceptual and linguistic tools necessary to understand, communicate, and resolve their own experiences, and those who may be attempting to support them similarly lack the tools to be able to do so adequately. An example Fricker to uses to contextualise this is the experience of workplace sexual harassment. The people who experienced this did not possess the conceptual tools, existing hermeneutical resources did not include them, to "experience this lucidly" and descriptive alternatives were not sufficiently accurate (2016, 165). In this example, the hermeneutic injustice was overcome through the creation of a community of people with similar experiences and dialogue with the consequent development of a conceptual framework and vocabulary. This is a maximal example, where the lack of conceptual and linguistic resources is clearly apparent, and where the aggrieved people are separated from the rest of society at large. Fricker quite rightly points out that there are more minimal examples – where the aggrieved person has a shared conceptual framework with the larger community, but lacks it

with specific individuals – and hybrid examples – where the lack of a shared conceptual framework is the result of power's refusal to allow the increase of hermeneutic resources in common in spite of means and need.

Fricker's example is illustrative of the potential role of emotionality for hermeneutic epistemic injustice. The language Fricker uses to describe the process by which potential descriptors for their experiences aren't sufficiently accurate is explicitly emotional: people who experience workplace sexual harassment may be upset, intimidated, demeaned, confused (ibid). Even if an epistemic agent does not possess the language or concepts to characterise their exploitation and complain about it, the agent's emotions make them aware of their personal violation and the professional impropriety causing it. The fact of that emotional reaction means that the agent's emotional capacity has resulted in insight into their situation – the emotion itself is knowledge-making. As a consequence, communication can be achieved through an examination of the emotions the harassment brought about. This communication would lead to shared knowledge, and the development of conceptual and linguistic tools to understand it, as indeed happened. Therefore, emotionality is capable of alleviating hermeneutic injustice

However, all the discussion of the consequences of emotionality for epistemic justice presupposes a trait notion of the intellectual virtue. This is particularly apparent for testimonial justice, as it is the other-regarding quality of the emotional capacity that causes it to have such potentially dire consequences. Similarly, although in the example I referenced it was the agent's own experience fuelling the emotional reaction and its epistemic consequence, it could just as easily have been the agent reacting to a friend's experience, resulting in a second-hand outrage which the friend themselves has normalised or repressed. As a result, the epistemic justice implications of the emotional capacity are apparently contingent on a trait notion of emotional capacity as an intellectual virtue. As discussed above, this is not necessarily an easy case to make, as it is more easily applicable to a faculty virtue. However, the epistemic justice implications of this virtue have not vanished simply by viewing the virtue from a different perspective. The problems deriving from its other-regarding tendencies remain, as does the potential hermeneutical upshot. However, when considering other faculty virtues, all are consequential for epistemic justice, perhaps distinctly less ambiguously so. Therefore, emotionality has great potential for promoting or undermining epistemic justice, and the way in which it does so is illustrative for determining its fundamental nature as an intellectual virtue.

V. Conclusion

The epistemic potential of emotions is intuitive and evidently significant within individual epistemic agents. I have argued that it falls within the category of intellectual virtue or vice on the basis that it is variable from person to person, and to a certain extent changeable within individuals across time, as long as there is the will to change. However, defining it more concretely within that designation is difficult, because intuitively and linguistically, emotionality functions as an individual trait, however, upon scrutiny, its characteristics are more that of a faculty. This is complicated, as emotionality is, unusually, both self- and other-regarding. Additionally, the significance of emotionality is emphasised by its epistemic justice implications; a person's emotional epistemic sense may not have proper function, accentuating their biases and prejudices, which would increase instances of testimonial injustice. But the intuitive, non-rational aspects, its fundamental strength, could reduce hermeneutic injustice. The conflicting nature of its justice implications though could illustrate more about its fundamental nature; the significance for epistemic justice seems to presuppose trait virtue notions, as does the self- vs other-regarding distinction. However, by nature, faculty virtues are both self- and other-regarding and, simply through their epistemic quality, have epistemic justice implications. On this basis, emotionality can be considered an outlier faculty virtue, with trait aspects phenomenologically, and consequent implications for epistemic justice.

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