ARE PAIN-BELIEFS GETTIER PROOF?

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ABSTRACT: In 'The Case of Patient Smith: Pain-Belief, Epistemic Luck, and Acquaintance,' Elliott Crozat challenged the infallibility of the belief that "I feel pain" by providing a Gettier-type example that shows that such a pain-belief can be fallibly justified and luckily true. We claim that this move is problematic given that the case is not the Gettier sort. To demonstrate this, we first question the causal relation or lack thereof between the subject's pain-belief and the pain he felt. We argue that this leads us to a dilemma. Either the pain-belief and the pain are causally connected or not. If there is a causal connection, the subject's true belief is justified, not epistemically lucky, and therefore qualifies as knowledge. If we grant no causal connection, we show that this leads to either an unjustified pain-belief or a justified false one. The result of both horns shows that Crozat's Gettier-type example does not qualify as a bona fide Gettier case.

KEYWORDS: epistemology, infallibility, Gettier, pain-beliefs, epistemic luck

Introduction

Can we have a justified true belief that we are in pain, yet fail to know it? When the statement "I feel pain" is sincerely uttered by an epistemic subject S and is true and justified, can S be said to know that S feels pain infallibly? In *The Anatomy of Certainty,* Roderick Firth (1967, 17) makes a distinction between two uses of the word "certain": weak and strong. He classifies empirical statements about the external world as certain in the weak sense. On the other hand, he classifies statements about mathematics and pain as certain in the strong sense (Firth 1967, 17). Perhaps our propositions about pain contain properties that make believing them epistemically certain and infallible.

Our pain-beliefs include self-presenting properties insofar as it is impossible for pain states to occur without the subject being certain of experiencing such states. Roderick Chisholm defines self-presenting as follows:

> For any state of affairs F, F is self-presenting for any epistemic subject S at time t just in case the property of being F is "necessarily such that, for every x and for any time t, if x is F at t, then the state of affairs, something being F, is certain for x at t" (Chisholm 1979, 120).

He describes certainty as attributable to S if and only if the state of affairs S appeals to be certain about is beyond reasonable doubt and indefeasible (Chisholm 1979, 119).

Elliott Crozat (2024) argues against this by offering a Gettier-type counterexample in which *S* has luckily stumbled upon a justified true pain-belief. In the stipulated Gettier-type case, which Crozat dubs the case of Patient Smith, pain-beliefs are shown to be fallibly formed by resting on non-introspective justification and epistemic luck. *S* is said to have formed a justified true pain-belief through evidence other than the pain, accompanied by a lucky circumstance that made the pain-belief true.

In this paper, we argue against Crozat's contention by demonstrating that the case is not a Gettier-type case. In the first section of this paper, we give an overview of Crozat's argument. In the second section, we discuss the problems with Crozat's claim. More precisely, we demonstrate that it is not a Gettier case by interpreting it in two ways. Either the belief is causally connected or disconnected from the state of affairs (i.e., pain). Inadvertently, the two interpretations lead us to a dilemma. As such, the second section is divided into two subsections dedicated to discussing the horns of the dilemma, respectively. If the belief of the epistemic subject is causally connected to the pain, then the belief is not epistemically lucky and so qualifies as knowledge. If the belief is causally disconnected, then either it is not justified or else it is false. In the final section, we conclude that the case Crozat established is not a Gettier case on either of the dilemma's horns.

Gettiered Pain-Beliefs

Crozat challenges the infallibility of pain-beliefs through Gettier-type counterexamples. Gettier-type cases originated from Edmund Gettier's (1963, 121-123) paper, which challenged the sufficiency of the justified-true-belief (JTB) account of knowledge by providing two cases that demonstrate why having JTB is insufficient for knowledge due to odd circumstances. Crozat follows this line of thought to establish a case where an epistemic subject has justified-true-pain-belief but is not knowledge. However, to construct such a counterexample, one must be aware of two underlying assumptions in Gettier's cases.

Gettier (1963, 121) poses two assumptions that most epistemologists will readily accept. First, it is possible to form a well-justified but false belief. Such an assumption is uncontroversial because we form well-justified false beliefs daily. You may assume it will rain tomorrow because you watched a weather forecast. If it turns out that it did not rain, your belief is nonetheless justified, even if it is false. It is justified because weather forecasts may be reliable in predicting true events in the future, and it just so happens that there is a miscalculation in this case. Second, justification can be transferred. Suppose that an epistemic subject (S) and a proposition (P):

(1) Suppose that S is justified in believing P.

(2) P implies Q.

(3) Following (1) and (2), if S is justified in believing P, then S is justified in believing Q.

∴ S is justified in believing Q.

Putting these assumptions together leads to Gettier-type cases, such that one's initial justified belief that P may be false but leads to a justified true belief Q.

It is important to note that a Gettier-type case remains committed to maintaining the three conditions mentioned above (i.e., justification, belief, and truth). This is because Gettier's analysis is intended to show instances where all three conditions are present but do not amount to knowledge. Leaving any of the three out of the equation unqualifies the case as a Gettier case. In the case that Crozat (2024, 225) offered, all three conditions are said to be present such that the pain-belief is true and justified. Whether Crozat's Gettier-type case maintains these conditions remains to be examined.

Crozat follows the recent development in *somatoparaphrenia* — a delusional belief, often accompanied by left-sided paralysis and lack of awareness of the paralysis, causing a patient to attribute her limbs as belonging to another person (Rahmanovic et al., 2012, 37). From here, Crozat (2024, 224) adds epistemic situations into the mix to establish a Gettier-type case. We reformulate it as follows:

> **THE CASE OF PATIENT SMITH.** Smith is working with a neuropsychologist for an extreme case of *hypochondria* — a disorder that causes Smith to have excessive worries about his health conditions. As it happens, this is the 60th time that Smith has gone to his neuropsychologist. Suppose the neuropsychologist does two things to prove that Smith's belief is irrational. First, he uses advanced technology to implant memories in Smith's brain about Smith claiming to have felt pain in his right foot. Second, he utilized an advanced AI generative system to orchestrate an audio-visual representation of Smith claiming to have felt pain in his right foot. However, as the neuropsychologist is concluding the process, he accidentally drags a 200-pound vase into Smith's right foot. When Smith awoke, Smith stated and rightfully believed "I feel pain in my right foot". However, he believes that the pain in his foot is caused by the vase that fell on his foot yesterday. Does he know that he is feeling pain in his right foot?

Notice how Gettier's two assumptions are maintained in the example. First, Smith falsely believes that he feels pain in his right foot. This belief happens to be justified by referring to his memory of testifying about it and the audio-visual recording of his testimony. Second, this justified false belief led to his acquisition of the justified true belief that he is feeling pain in his foot. By the principle of

deductive closure, he forms a justified and true pain belief from false yet justified evidence. Like other Gettier-type cases, Patient Smith's case includes odd variables that preclude knowledge

Crozat points to two odd variables: (1) veritic epistemic luck and (2) non-introspective justification. Smith's pain-belief seems to be formed luckily, insofar as we can instantiate close possible worlds where the justified and true pain-belief would easily be false. Had the vase not fallen on Smith's foot, he would have formed a false belief (Crozat 2024, 227). Smith's pain-belief is justified through two non-introspective pieces of evidence: the implanted false memory (e_1, from now on) and the AI-generated recording to support e_1 (e_2 hereafter). Crozat (2024, 225) states that both e_1 and e_2 non-introspectively justify Smith's belief as they did not appeal directly to their pain states to justify the pain-belief.

Veritic epistemic luck is a factor that necessarily precludes knowledge. The sort of epistemic luck we are concerned with should be distinguished from evidential epistemic luck, where S stumbles upon a piece of evidence luckily to form a justified true belief (Pritchard 2005, 136). Evidential epistemic luck does not necessarily preclude knowledge insofar as utilizing the luckily acquired evidence can be properly used to justify the true belief. We should also distinguish this from doxastic epistemic luck, where S luckily believes a true proposition (Pritchard 2005, 138). Similar to evidential epistemic luck, doxastic epistemic luck does not necessarily preclude knowledge acquisition. This is because S can luckily acquire a belief, but be justified in having that true belief. Veritic epistemic luck is a vicious form of luck insofar as the truth of the target proposition is threatened. In the case of patient Smith, Smith's belief could have easily been false in the nearest possible worlds, which makes it lucky in the sense of veritic epistemic. This also helps in explaining why Smith does not know he feels pain.

To identify non-introspective justification, we first need to define what it means for a subject to have introspective justification for a belief. According to Declan Smithies (2012, 261), introspective justification is a type of justification that one has for a belief concerning a mental state by virtue of having that specific mental state, which is the content of the belief. As such, introspective justification is said to have positive consequences, such as the justified true belief being infallible, indefeasible, self-intimated, and immune (Smithies 2012, 261-263). On the other hand, non-introspective justification can be of different types, exclusive of introspection. In the said case, Crozat takes advantage of memory and perception, which do not necessitate introspective justification. The first depends on the reliability of a belief-forming process, which takes experiences as a subject's inputs from an earlier time to produce an output belief at a later time (Goldman 1979, 12).

The second depends on the reliability of a belief-forming process, the subject's perceptual experiences. The crucial difference between introspective justification and the other two mentioned is as follows. The subject matter in introspective justification is equivalent to the source (Smithies 2012, 261).

It is important to note that, among the two non-introspective sources of justification, Crozat framed the case such that Smith's belief heavily depends on e_1 (the implanted pseudo-memory), supported by e_2 (the AI-generated video). However, the role of memory in justification is heavily contested. Epistemologists are divided as to how memory affects justification. Although this paper has no space for an extensive discussion on these positions, we can briefly go through them. Some epistemologists argue that memory preserves the justifiedness of an epistemic subject for believing a proposition he believed at an earlier period. This position is commonly known as preservationism (Goldman 2009, 323). Other epistemologists contend that justification can be generated through memory. This is referred to as the foundational theory of memory (Pollock 1999). Some would say that justification is inferred through memory by its reliability. Such a position is called the inferential theory of memory (Huemer 2002, 347-348). Some argue that memory confers justification if and only if it coheres with the evidence that the epistemic subject holds (Feldman and Conee 1985, 15). This position is known as evidentialism. Crozat seems to position Patient Smith's justification in terms of evidentialism insofar as memory coheres with his total body of evidence, including e_2 and the actual feeling of pain.

Evidentialism holds that memory can confer justification in two different ways. The first way is doxastic evidentialism. It purports that memorial beliefs confer justification if and only if they fit well with the subject's evidence. Doxastic evidentialism has two orders of evidence, first- and second-order evidence. The first-order evidence is evidence S has directly in support of any proposition, p, accessed via memory. The second-order evidence is evidence S has indirectly supporting p by merely remembering that it is the case that p (McGrath 2007, 8-10). The second way is non-doxastic evidentialism. In this way, memory is taken to enjoy quasi-perceptual states. This quasi-perceptual state is also called memory experience (McGrath 2007, 10). Memory experience confers justification if and only if the evidence borne out of perception fits well with the subject's set of evidence. It is unclear whether Crozat subscribes to doxastic or non-doxastic evidentialism. Regardless, the Gettier-type case he offered would function as follows if the conditions for a Gettier case are maintained.

The case of Patient Smith alludes to a lesson about Gettiered pain-beliefs. That is, the decisive factor regarding our pain-beliefs is not only the mere accessibility of

pain states and the truth of the beliefs. Crozat argues that the decisive factor for pain-beliefs is precisely the status of justifying such beliefs through acquaintance via introspection (McGrath 2007, 10). In other words, Smith can be infallible in his beliefs about pain only if he is epistemically certain about such beliefs and introspectively aware of the pain states. Otherwise, his pain-belief can be true and justified by false evidence, making it defeasible. We have rehearsed Crozat's argument against the infallibility of pain-beliefs from the preceding discussion. In the next section, we analyze whether this argument succeeds.

Is The Case of Patient Smith a Gettier Case?

We have reason to believe that Crozat's argument fails. To see why this is so, it is crucial to highlight that the argument he presents rests on the success of the case he stipulated. That is, if the case of Patient Smith is a Gettier case that demonstrates an epistemic subject who has a justified true pain-belief but not knowledge because of the presence of veritic epistemic luck, then pain-beliefs are fallible. In this section, we show two ways in which the antecedent of this conditional fails. In particular, Crozat's argument faces a dilemma with two horns: Either there is a causal connection between the pain belief and Smith's felt pain, or there is none. Admitting any of the disjuncts leads to conclusions contrary to Crozat's claim.

Horn 1: Causally Connected Pain and Pain-Belief

To demonstrate the first horn of Crozat's dilemma, we first highlight three aspects considering the case at face value. On the one hand, we have the belief itself. Additionally, such a belief is said to be founded on a non-introspective basis, e_1 and e_2. Finally, there's the truthmaker of the belief about pain, which is the pain itself caused by the 200-pound vase that accidentally fell. Beginning with this initial consideration, we assume that all of these aspects are present in the situation to generate a Gettier-type case that supposedly precludes knowledge about pain, proving the fallibility of pain-beliefs.

Our standard understanding of the case is as follows. Smith's justified pain-belief is based on two pieces of evidence, e_1 and e_2. These pieces of evidence are non-introspectively justified, but are enough to warrant Smith in believing "I feel pain." Additionally, Smith actually felt the pain. That is, he acquired the mental state of pain because of the accident. But it is to be maintained that Smith's belief is fallible because it is primarily justified by e_1 and e_2. Despite having the experience of pain, which may contribute to his justification, his belief remains threatened by epistemic luck, which exposes it to possible epistemic failure worlds. Smith would not be in such a predicament if Smith had been introspectively aware of his actual pain.

In our view, there is a problem with the claim that Smith's belief is fallible in the standard interpretation. To motivate this problem, we only need to look at the causal connection between Smith's pain and the belief about the pain. It seems implausible that Smith's pain does not directly cause his belief about the pain, and so does not also contribute to his justification. While e_1 and e_2 may be evidence for his belief, it is unclear how the presence of Smith's pain would be left in the backseat to justify the belief. Following this line of reasoning, it is reasonable to assert that there is a causal connection between Smith's pain and his pain-belief. Accepting this leads us to the first horn of Crozat's dilemma.

If there is a causal connection between Smith's pain-belief and the pain that he experiences, then his pain-belief is justified, and true, and is not a matter of luck. We are not rejecting that both e_1 and e_2 contribute to Smith's belief about pain. Smith's memory of him uttering a statement about the pain, and perhaps video evidence supporting that memory, regardless if both are false, hold a contributory factor in our epistemic justification. However, if the pain itself causes Smith's belief, the belief is also justified by the experience of such pain. As such, Smith's true belief, being justified by the experience of pain, ceases to be a product of veritic epistemic luck.

A perceptual experience of pain is a source of justification that contributes as evidence for believing the existence of such a mental state. That is, experiencing mental states contributes to the justificatory status of our beliefs of the same mental states. In support of this, we can consider Matthew McGrath's (2007, 13) claim that perceptual experience "does not merely provide evidence; it serves as a basis on which we form perceptual beliefs." This occurs regardless of whether we are introspectively aware of such mental states. Their mental accessibility, as perceptually experienced, without the act of epistemically accessing them, is sufficient to warrant an epistemic subject for believing their existence. Applying this to Smith's case, it appears that Smith is also justified by the feeling of pain, along with e_1 and e_2.

Inadvertently, Smith's experience of the pain, which then justifies his pain-belief, divorces the belief from veritic epistemic luck. The case ceases to be an instance of epistemic luck because the causal connection between Smith's belief and the actual pain leads Smith to acquire the belief in such a way exactly similar to how any person acquires a pain-belief (i.e., by experiencing the pain itself). Given that Smith's acquisition of the pain-belief is no different from how another person acquires a pain-belief, Smith does not appear to be epistemically lucky after all. This point stresses the need to explain better why Smith's belief is lucky.

An interlocutor may object that there are possible worlds where Smith's belief is only justified by e_1 and e_2. Such an objection may be motivated by the idea that the 200-pound vase only fell on Smith's foot accidentally. That said, we can conceive of nearby possible worlds where the vase had not fallen on Smith's foot, and his claim would still be justified and false by virtue of e_1 and e_2. The interlocutor may conclude that if such is the case, Smith's belief is only luckily true and justified because the actual pain that causes him to justify his belief about pain could have easily been absent.

We reply that referring to possible worlds does not explain why any circumstance is epistemically lucky. Imagine a nearby possible world, φ, where the vase had not fallen on Smith's foot. In this imaginary situation, Smith is not subject to veritic epistemic luck. He may form the false belief that "I feel pain" because of e_1 and e_2. But φ is irrelevant for explaining why Smith is epistemically lucky in the actual world, @. This is because, in φ, Smith (or his counterpart) is not epistemically lucky. It is unclear how we can explain why Smith in @ is epistemically lucky because Smith's belief therein is false in φ, where he is not epistemically lucky.

An interlocutor may further raise that close possible worlds where the belief is false pose a threat to knowledge in the actual world. We reply that such a threat needs to be well-established. As Hetherington (2024, 184) argues in his criticisms of modal epistemology, the modally envisaged state of affairs in analyzing lucky true beliefs constitutes "only the belief" and not the luckily true belief itself. In other words, if we look at instantiations where the belief is false, it ceases to be lucky. As such, those possible worlds where the belief is false remain irrelevant to the analysis of pain-beliefs. Furthermore, this leaves us with insufficient reason to believe that Smith's belief about the pain in his foot is only epistemically lucky.

If Smith's belief that "I feel pain" is justified, true, and not epistemically lucky, then we have reason to believe that Smith *knows* that he feels pain. But if this were the case, Patient Smith's case ceases to be a Gettier case. As mentioned earlier, Crozat's argument that pain-beliefs are fallible is dependent on the success of his stipulated Gettier-type case. If it is not a genuine Gettier case, then we have reason to doubt the argument itself. As such, this concludes the first horn of Crozat's dilemma.

Horn 2: No Causal Connection between Pain and Pain-Belief

One potential means to maintain that Patient Smith's case is a *bona fide* Gettier case is by omitting the causal connection between the pain and Smith's belief. By this, we are considering Patient Smith's case, with all things being equal, while removing the causal link between the feeling of pain and the pain-belief from the equation. To

stick with the narrative, let us say that even if the vase accidentally drops on Smith's right foot, the neuropsychologist's experiment includes a technology that precludes Smith from experiencing any sensation of pain. The removal of the causal connection between the pain and Smith's belief appears advantageous because we do not have to trouble ourselves with Smith's true pain-belief being unqualified as epistemically lucky and, as such, potentially qualifying as knowledge. With the pain out of the way, we can maintain that Smith's belief is epistemically lucky insofar as it is not directly caused by the pain, and the belief can be luckily true.

However, this move leads us to the second horn of the dilemma. If there is no causal connection between Smith's pain-belief and the pain itself, then Smith's pain-belief is caused by his pseudo-memories (e_1) supported by a manufactured video (e_2). Smith's belief being caused by e_1 and e_2 includes that he either did not feel the pain or that he has epistemically irrelevant evidence. If Smith's belief is caused by e_1 and e_2, both pieces of evidence are epistemically irrelevant to contribute to Smith's justification of the pain-belief. As such, this causes him to fail the justification condition. On the other hand, if we grant that e_1 and e_2 are good sources of justification and Smith's belief is caused by them, then Smith fails the truth condition insofar as his belief is false. Either way, Patient Smith falls short of being Gettiered. In the succeeding portion of this paper, we discuss these two in detail.

Smith's evidence is epistemically irrelevant to the case if Smith's pain-belief is caused by his pseudo-memories, which are then supported by a manufactured AI-generated audio-visual representation. Recall that one of Crozat's contentions is that Smith has non-introspective sources of justification for believing that he feels pain. To see why this is so, we can first examine Patient Smith's memory belief as evidence that hangs well with his total body of evidence regarding the proposition "I feel pain." Right off the bat, we can disqualify Smith's memory belief as first-order evidence because he does not have any direct evidence regarding the proposition. If we were to qualify his memory belief as first-order evidence for the pain-belief, then he should, among other things, remember feeling pain and having a sense of what caused it. But, he only remembers himself uttering that it is the case that "I feel pain." Given that his memory belief is limited to what indirectly supports the belief about pain, we qualify Smith's memory belief as doxastic evidence of the second-order form.

But it seems rather unclear how this can serve as a justification for the pain that he is feeling now. Considering that both e_1 and e_2 pertain to justifying Smith having uttered a statement indicative of a pain-belief moments ago, it is not clear that the evidence supports the "I feel pain" that pertains to the present. What appears to be a more reasonable qualification for Smith's memory belief, as doxastic

evidence, is that it justifies another proposition. That is, it does not justify the proposition "I feel pain." To see why this is so, we need to take into account the proposition that his memory belief refers to.

If Smith is to continue believing the proposition "I feel pain," it is most likely that he would be referring to a pain state that occurred before and not now. In the Gettier-type case stipulated by Crozat, both the pseudo-memories and the AI-generated video recording allegedly happened at an earlier time t_1 and not at present t_n. Thus, if Smith continues to believe that he feels pain based on e_1 and e_2, he would have been justified in believing such a proposition if he meant "I remember to have felt pain at t_1." This dissolves the pain-belief and turns it into a belief purely borne out of memory. Such is the case because pain-beliefs refer to pain states that are self-presenting at the current time of the utterance.

But if we grant that Smith's proposition means "I felt pain at t_1," where $t_1 < t_n$, asserting that "I feel pain" deviates from the task of showing that pain-beliefs are infallible. As mentioned above, the belief turns out to be caused by memory and not the pain itself. Memory beliefs about pain are not *bona fide* pain-beliefs insofar as our memory of the pain is not dependent on the pain state, and so lacks self-presenting properties. In such instances, Smith would be justified in believing that "I seem to remember to have felt pain at t_1," but not justified in believing that "I felt pain at t_1." The two propositions are distinguished by the beliefs that they assert. On the one hand, the propositional attitude is a memory belief. On the other hand, it takes the form of a *perceptual belief.*

If we grant that Smith's memory can justify a perceptual belief, we are considering Smith's memory as a memorial experience that qualifies as non-doxastic evidence for the proposition "I feel pain." That is, we are considering Smith's memory as a quasi-perceptual state which qualifies it to have self-presenting properties. This move makes for an attractive and potential solution for explaining why Smith is justified in believing that he feels pain by relying on e_1 and e_2. However, this quasi-perceptual account of Smith's memory also fails to justify his belief.

We can shed light on this failure if we view the fundamental problem with such an account. McGrath states that the main problem is the disanalogy between seeming to remember and having perceptual experience of the same proposition (McGrath 2007, 12). Accordingly, perceptual experience consists of the foundational relationship between the belief, the content of the experience, and the relevant objects and properties in the world. All of which are absent in the memorial experience of Smith (McGrath 2007, 12). When we think of memory beliefs, we

immediately only think of retained beliefs, as opposed to new ones based on the aforementioned content of perceptual experience.

If McGrath is correct, memory beliefs cannot justify perceptual beliefs because remembering a mere utterance of the proposition "I feel pain" does not amount to justifying that Smith truly felt pain at an earlier time. This is mainly because of the disanalogy between the two. Additionally, if we should insist that Smith's utterance of "I feel pain" means "I feel pain at t_n" then Smith would not be justified in believing the proposition because his basis of the pain would be of this form: "I feel pain because I remember having uttered that I felt pain moments ago." In these considerations, we fail to have reasons for accepting that Smith's belief is justified (McGrath 2007, 13).

If Smith's justification for his pain-belief is epistemically irrelevant to the pain, his belief is not justified. Furthermore, if his belief is not justified, Smith's case is not a genuine Gettier case. Recall that another fundamental feature of a Gettier case is that the epistemic subject is well justified in believing a true belief while not attaining knowledge. This is because Gettier's primary goal was to show that the JTB account is insufficient for knowledge. If we remove that justification condition from a Gettier case, it inadvertently and immediately ceases to be a Gettier case. As such, we have another reason to believe that Crozat's case of Patient Smith is not a Gettier case.

Perhaps we can give the benefit of the doubt and push the case further by granting that both e_1 and e_2 are good sources of justification for Smith's belief about his pain. One can argue that memory coheres with e_2, thereby qualifying it as evidence contributing to the justification-conferring status of e_1. The objection continues, so long as the pseudo-memory belief fits well with his other evidence for the pain, Smith is justified in believing that the proposition "I feel pain." In the succeeding discussions, we give the benefit of the doubt to e_1 and e_2 as good sources of justification for Smith's pain-belief.

If both of Smith's non-introspective evidence for justifying that he feels pain are good sources of justification, and the hypnosis hindered Smith from actually feeling the pain, we get an instance of a justified false belief. This is because the truthmaker of the proposition "I feel pain" is taken out of the equation. His foot may have been severely injured by the vase, but the pain is nonetheless absent and robbed of its self-presenting properties. In the current case that we are working with, Smith is non-introspectively justified in holding a pain-belief without actually experiencing the pain.

But if Smith's belief, albeit justified, is false in the first place, we do not have further reason to believe that Smith is Gettiered. To argue that Smith's justified pain-

belief is Gettiered, we must do so by maintaining that the belief is true. Truth is a necessary component that the subject has in the Gettier cases (Hetherington 2016, 42). Removing it from the equation leaves us with an epistemic subject who has justification for a false belief. And instances like these are unproblematic. Recall that one of Gettier's assumptions is that we can be justified in believing a false proposition. We also have no problem claiming that such a belief does not amount to knowledge.

We can summarize the second horn of Crozat's dilemma as follows. In the second horn of the dilemma, we grant that there is an absence of a causal connection between Smith's pain-belief and the pain that he experienced because of the vase that fell on his right foot. This prima facie avoids the problem that we faced in the first horn. Be that as it may, we have to admit the pseudo-memory supported by the video evidence as the primary cause of Smith's pain-belief. However, admitting that the pseudo-memory caused Smith's pain-belief leads us to accept that either Smith's belief is not justified, or false. In both disjuncts, the case of Patient Smith is not a genuine Gettier case. Therefore, our claim that Crozat's argument fails holds water.

Conclusion

In this paper, we looked into Crozat's Gettier-type case that supposedly shows how pain-beliefs are not Gettier-proof proof which makes them subject to fallibility. We have presented a dilemma that Crozat's Gettier-type case may face. Here is the result. Either the pain belief and Smith's felt pain are causally connected or not. If it is causally connected, we are warranted in accepting that Smith's justified and true pain-belief is not epistemically lucky, which lessens our prospects of judging the case as precluding knowledge. If it is causally disconnected, we have reason to believe that Smith's belief is either unjustified or justified yet false. Together, the premises of our argument give us reason to deny Crozat's case of Patient Smith as a bona fide Gettier case.

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