LIE FOR THE OTHER:
A SOCIO-ANALYTIC APPROACH TO TELLING LIES

Rauf ORAN

ABSTRACT It is a widely held view that lying is defined in the traditional tripartite model as the conjunction of a statement, the false belief, and the intended deception. Much of the criticisms have been levelled at the third condition—intended deception—with contemporary counterexamples. My main criticism of the traditional and contemporary model of lying centres on that philosophers discard the social existence of the hearer. Schutz’s phenomenological sociology gives a sheer inspiration to redefine the third condition by taking the hearer as a consciously social being into account. Lying should be an intersubjective action for the Other from the perspective of the liar; it might be, thus, reasonable to assume that there should be commonsense awareness between the speaker and the hearer. This paper, by focusing on this commonsenseness and its typifications, introduces a new approach to the third condition: S must intend that H be induced to believe that \( p \), where \( p \) is false. In this regard, once you lie, by being subjected to the taken-for-granted commonsenseness in our daily life, you must try as hard as possible to succeed in deceiving the hearer by stating that \( p \). You, as a typical person, tell a typical lie in typical contexts for typical Others. The focus of attention, therefore, is on the hearer and it is the key to understanding that mere intent to deceive is too broad and unpragmatic for a social human being who always intends to flee the negative consequences of the context in which she has to lie. Making the extension narrower necessitates a new term, anti-social bullshit generally being replied rhetorically as “how can you expect me to believe that?” comprises the excluded cases.

KEYWORDS: lying, Schutz. commonsense-world, anti-social bullshit, induce-to-believe

1. Introduction
As Nietzsche (1998, 7) said, the lie is “a condition of life.” There is no denying the fact that lying is as much a part of our social life as any other use of our language. Lying is a social action that involves at least two people interacting linguistically with one another; if the speaker intends to lie, then manifestly there must be a hearer for whom the lie is intended.
The traditional definition of lying is broken down into three conditions, ‘to make a statement, ‘to believe that the statement is false,’ and ‘to intend to deceive.’ More exactly, S lies to H, if and only if,

\[ C_1 \] S states that \( p \) to H,

\[ C_2 \] S believes that \( p \) is false,

\[ C_3 \] S intends to deceive H by stating that \( p \).

Although this had been considered as the universal definition of lying for ages, it has come to be seen as debatable by some contemporary philosophers—specifically \( C_3 \) (hereafter trad-\( C_3 \)) of which emphasis is firmly on the speaker’s ‘intention to deceive.’ Yet contemporary analytic philosophers make no attempt to consider the social norms of lying. Thus, as in many other analytic philosophers, I also claim that trad-\( C_3 \) should be open to criticism; however, by being different from others, I claim that it is problematic in that it ignores the participants’ social awareness in daily life. Lying is an intersubjective action between the speaker’s and the hearer’s social existence, so, by taking the hearer’s social existence into account, lying should be redefined as on par with the binary—speaker and hearer—relationship.

To better understand how this relationship operates on lying, it might be helpful to briefly mention Alfred Schutz’s phenomenological sociology which chiefly elaborates on the significance of social action in terms of the commonsense experience regarded as an everyday world. Consistent with it, roughly, the typical human being—the speaker or the hearer, in this case—is integrated into her social world which is taken for granted. The significance of why such a perspective is chosen resides in his philosophy, which links the human, qua social being, and the taken-for-granted social actions together hint that the traditional or any contemporary model of lying is incompatible with the commonsensical social world and also what a new model should be. Since lying is an intersubjective action that depends on the speaker-hearer relationship, a mere hearer-insensitive analytic perspective may be insufficient to define what lying is and thus socio-analytic model should be taken into consideration to underline the dependency of lying on the hearer’s social existence. To formulate a new model, I should associate analytic philosophy with Schutzean phenomenological sociology to make lying more rational, commonsensical, and pragmatic as a speaker-hearer-sensitive social action. Given this situation, it is hardly surprising that the new model entirely agrees with the statement and false belief conditions, namely that it is in keeping with \( C_1 \) and \( C_2 \). As a result, in this paper, special attention is mainly given to the hearer-sensitive party, and the significance of the new-\( C_3 \) lies in having the intention to induce to believe that \( p \). More precisely,
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C1 - S states that \( p \) to \( H \),
C2 - S believes that \( p \) is false,
new-C3 - S must intend that \( H \) be induced to believe that \( p \).

Central to the definition of the new-C3 is the term, *induce to believe*: unlike *intend to deceive*, the new component alludes to trying to be successful, namely that S must try as hard as possible to succeed in leading H to believe that \( p \). Put another way, S must *try as hard as possible to succeed in deceiving* \( H \) by stating that \( p \). One idiosyncrasy with this condition, which is further considered, however, is that it reduces the new model’s scope but makes the new model more rational and commonsensical.

Section 2 attempts to provide a brief introduction to a few preliminary Schutzean terms and perspectives. It does not carry out an in-depth analysis of it to avoid digressing from the main topic. It is presented concisely so that the reader can get a picture of the new model.

Section 3 associates Schutzean terms with the new-C3 and describes the logic used in this new model. Furthermore, in combination with concrete examples as well as in comparison with the traditional model, the new model becomes more rational and daily-life-friendly. At the end, it introduces a new term, *anti-social bullshit*, which encompasses the ruled-out cases of the new model.

Section 4 provides an overview of Chisholm and Feehan’s (hereafter abbreviated C&F) model of lying in their notable paper, *The Intent to Deceive*. It then goes on to discuss and compare with the new model. A little consideration will show that C&F also imply that the lie should be successful to deceive someone; however, they do not take social norms and existence into account. Despite a resemblance, thus, the salient discrepancy in the method cannot be ignored.

Section 5 introduces the non-deceptive lie definitions of Thomas Carson and Jennifer Lackey with the analysing of, from the viewpoint of the new model, the two prominent objections that have been raised against the traditional model at large by them. This section is divided into three subsections: ‘inveterate liar’, which is deceptive and not a counterexample to the traditional, but rather to the C&F and the new model; ‘bald-faced lies’ and ‘coercion lies,’ on the other hand, as non-deceptive cases, are examined to stress the distinction between the new model and its contemporary rivals.

2. Socio-Phenomenological Remarks for the New-C3

Phenomenology has influenced sociology in many ways and some social scientists have approached phenomenology as an alternative perspective to understand social
processes. Alfred Schutz is one of the most important key figures, who was particularly interested in Edmund Husserl’s philosophy and focused on analysing the structure of daily life interactions in the social world.

The purpose of this section is briefly to introduce some ideas of Alfred Schutz which will be helpful to comprehend the new model of lying. Again, I do not intend to carry out an in-depth analysis of his philosophical works, what I only present is the essential points of some of his terminologies, namely, commonsense world, typification, Thou-orientation as well as We-relationship, to understand the sense underlying the new model. These underlie the new model of lying which focuses on the intersubjectivity between the speaker’s and the hearer’s social existence in our everyday life. Analysing these concepts allows us to understand the new model without hindrance.

2.1. Commonsense World and Typification

The *commonsense world*, variably as ‘world of daily life’ or ‘every-day world,’ is the domain of social interactions where people come into contact and have a relationship with one another by being taken for granted. The taken-for-granted (*das Fraglos-gegeben*), wrote Schutz (1967, 74), “is always that particular level of experience which presents itself as not in need of further analysis.” In short, the taken-for-granted commonsense world is a kind of immediate experience that is familiar to all of us. For instance, the existence of other people, meaningful communication and collaboration with others, socially accepted rules and principles for everyday life, etc. are all in our commonsense world and taken-for-granted.

We are entirely aware that this world already existed and it was understood, interpreted, and experienced by others before us. Now, we, with our contemporaries and consociates¹, are experiencing and interpreting it with the help of the stock of our previous experiences which is called *knowledge at hand*. It encompasses all of the knowledge coming from our world and the others, i.e. parents, teachers, friends, members of society, etc. and it functions as a reference to us for our daily life. The constituents of the stock of knowledge at hand are not individual; all of them are categorized under the related classes, which are called *typification*. For better understanding, as Schutz (1962, 8) notes,

> The outer world is not experienced as an arrangement of individual unique objects, dispersed in space and time, but as ‘mountains,’ ‘trees,’ ‘animals,’

¹ Consociates are the people in face-to-face situations directly and simultaneously experienced. Contemporaries, on the other hand, are the people not directly in contact with.
‘fellowmen.’ I may have never seen an Irish setter but if I see one, I know that it is an animal and in particular a dog, showing all the familiar features and the typical behavior of a dog and not, say of a cat. I may reasonably ask: “What kind of dog is this?”

In other words, we possess a sort of fundamental knowledge concerning our world. For instance, in the previous example, I can identify that it is a typical dog even though I cannot identify its genus. The chief source of this knowledge is from all of my previous experiences of seeing and typifying dogs.

The rest of the paper, however, only concentrates on the socially derived—or accepted—stock of knowledge at hand, namely, typical anticipations, characters, behaviours, etc. that have been piling up from our early life without our control. As Maurice Natanson (Schutz 1962, XXIX) states,

This ‘stockpiling’ of typifications is endemic to common-sense life. From childhood on, the individual continues to amass a vast number of ‘recipes’ which then serve as techniques for understanding or at least controlling aspects of his experience. The thousands of concrete problematic situations that arise in the course of daily affairs and have to be handled in some form are perceived and even initially formulated in terms of the individual’s stock of knowledge at hand. The typifications which comprise the stock of knowledge are generated out of a social structure.

One of the sub-argument of that paper is that lying, as a social action, has also typifications in our stock of knowledge at hand. More precisely, we lie typically for any typical problematic situations that have been experienced in the past. Typifications that have been formed from childhood are applied to the current situation and both past and current experiences are relevant to the formulation of plans of action for the future. In the light of this information, this paper attempts to show that lying, as all of our intersubjective social actions, postulates typifications grounded in the commonsense world, or as Schutz (1962, 20) puts it, “the Husserlian idealization, ‘I-can-do-it-again,’ that is the assumption that I may under typically similar circumstances act in the typically similar way that I did before in order to bring about a typically similar state of affairs.” More exactly, you, as a typical person, tell a typical lie in typical contexts for typical Others.

Although you can lie via pigeon post, mail, message, phone, etc., this paper analyses only the most complex, intersubjective, and familiar method, namely the face-to-face lie. It does not mean that one cannot employ the new model of lying to the non-face-to-face methods; it is rational for any kind of method, but the analysis will run on the face-to-face method. Thus, the following subsection gives some preliminary remarks on Schutz’s approach to face-to-face intersubjectivity.
2.2. The Face-to-Face Situation and the We-Relationship

If we take intersubjectivity into account for lying, we should focus on *face-to-face* relationships in the social world. When the speaker encounters her hearer face-to-face, she shares a spatio-temporal domain within both of them reach in which she interprets the Other’s acts. According to Schutz (1967, 163), “the face-to-face situation presupposes an actual simultaneity with each other of two separate streams of consciousness.” This is the thesis that for the act of lying, the hearer is a conscious being as same as the speaker, both of whom are aware of one another in a psychophysical sense, and of the context where they experience together.

When the speaker lies to her hearer in the face-to-face context, she is conscious of the hearer and, thus, her conscious, attention, etc. oriented toward the hearer, and this attitude is called *Thou-orientation*. The Thou-orientation can be either one-sided or reciprocal. One-sided Thou-orientation is that only one of the parties is aware of the Other. For the new model of lying, however, I only focus on the reciprocal Thou-orientation, namely, the speaker and the hearer are mutually aware of one another, that is, the speaker is Thou-oriented toward the hearer, and at the same time, the hearer is also Thou-oriented toward the speaker. In that kind of relationship where the partners are aware of each other and “sympathetically participate in each other’s lives for however short a time we shall call the pure *We-relationship*” (Schutz 1967, 164). The pure We-relationship, according to Schutz (1967, 168), “involves our awareness of each other’s presence and also the knowledge of each that the Other is aware of him.” The pure We-relationship, in other words, is merely the reciprocal form of the Thou-orientation. Schutz separated the pure We-relationship from simply ‘the We-relationship’ that is “a close attentive awareness of the Other, wherein the two interact and share their experiences with each other” (Cox 1973, 122, italics mine). This simultaneous, reciprocal as well as close attentive awareness places the speaker and the hearer in a We-relationship in telling a lie.

In conclusion, the abovementioned terms and remarks are sufficient to comprehend the new model. First of all, typification gives us a clue about how to build commonsense or socially accepted actions. In the commonsense world, we always choose one of the relevant types of lies for relevant context. Metaphorically, it may be said that human is by nature not only social animal but also a socially-accepted-behaved animal. Secondly, if the speaker-hearer mutually interacts with one another with the social awareness, that reciprocal intersubjectivity places them in the We-relationship. Once it occurs, the speaker is subject to a shared commonsense world, social norms, rules, etc. In short, when
you lie, your statement is based on a commonly-typified lie and you are in a sort of social coexistence with your hearer.

3. Definition of the New Model of Lying

Thus far, this paper has focused on a brief explanation of some Schutzean concepts from phenomenological sociology to gain a clear idea of the new model. We now move on to consider the comparison with the trad-C₃ with a useful example making its analysis easier and then to turn to analyse more clearly what has been asserted so far.

3.1. Difference between new-C₃ and trad-C₃

Suppose that you overslept and missed an important meeting. When this happens and you interact with your supervisor, you anticipate that, for instance, she notices your absence, she wants to know where you have been, she might accept your excuse, etc. In more general terms, you anticipate that she behaves typically in line with the commonsense world and its typifications; as you and many others behave—act, lie, etc.—under typically similar circumstances. In the face of such a situation, therefore, you state, to your supervisor, a plausible-to-believe, typical lie such as “I felt very ill” or “I missed the bus” that anyone might believe in our commonsense world. As Schutz (1962, 27) states, “If I, if we, if ‘anybody belonging to us’ found himself in typically similar circumstances he would act in a similar way.” Unlike the trad-C₃ for which only the intention to deceive is rational, you would not, in all likelihood, dare to state that “a hippopotamus held up the traffic” or “I was abducted by aliens” as an excuse for missing the meeting. You have to opt for the most successful-to-be or the most commonsensical anecdote to induce your hearer to believe that it can be true. To understand how we specifically concoct p to deceive the hearer, special attention should be given to the commonsense typifications for relevant context. Consequently, as already mentioned, redoing the ‘similar’ actions presuppose an I-can-do-it-again idealization: the speaker experienced the sort of similar situations in her past², hence, she acted sort of a similar way in the current situation.

To come back to the example, it is important to notice that the process of stating that p can be divided into two subprocesses, i.e. thinking on and opting for.

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² Even if she has not experienced the relevant situation, she still might possess a relevant typification from the observations of the other people or her faculty of inference. For instance, I have never been pulled over by any traffic police but if it occurs and I have to tell a lie in this first-time situation, I still refer to close-relevant typifications of lies in my stock of knowledge at hand to be as commonsensical as possible.
Strictly speaking, the social context for lying might be called a *disjunctive syllogistic* situation: once you decide to lie, you may *think on* at least two different statements, say \( p \) and \( q \), and then you *opt for* the most commonsensical alternative for the hearer; with logical notation, \( p \lor q, \sim q, \therefore p \). Alternatively, as Dewey (1930, 190) asserted, “deliberation is a dramatic rehearsal (in imagination) of various competing possible lines of action.” This phenomenon can best be illuminated by an analysis of the previous example: you overslept and missed an important meeting and have to concoct a valid excuse to protect yourself from the negative consequences of being tardy. You may concoct a considerable amount of statements as an excuse, i.e. “my car broke down,” “my cat ran away,” “I felt very ill,” “my house burned down,” etc. For the sake of simplicity, let us say you reduce your set of excuses into two alternatives: “broken-down car” \( p \) and “burned-down house” \( q \). You reasonably think on that \( p \) is more commonsensical than \( q \) for the hearer in question since if you state that \( q \), then you have to feign that you lost your house, all your belongings, etc. and certainly you must seem upset about the incident. What is more, it would be quite absurd to come to the office on such a hard morning. In the end, stating that \( q \) would be costly as well as quite unmaintainable and thus, a moment’s reflection is sufficient for you to realize that \( q \) is a pathetic excuse for the hearer and to opt for \( p \) as a plausible excuse.

This scenario is useful for any typical supervisor whom you do not know anything about. More accurately, the situation is identified as context-sensitive but hearer-insensitive; it was assumed a typical hearer in a missed-meeting context. Putting forward the new-\( \text{C}_3 \), however, gives rise to a further problem that resides in how you can be sure that the hearer can be induced to believe that \( p \), that is, how you could try as hard as possible to succeed in deceiving. There has been no such a problem with the trad-\( \text{C}_3 \) for it has generally been concerned with the speaker only and mostly ignored the hearer’s social existence. In definitional terms, ‘to intend to deceive’ is sufficient for it. To get the discussion on a concrete footing, let us consider that \( S \) with the intention of deceiving states that \( p \) to \( H_1, H_2, H_3, \text{etc.} \) where \( p \) is false. The traditional model implies that \( p \) is a lie for anyone—\( H_1, H_2, H_3, \text{etc.} \); for it only depends on \( S \); the new model, on the other hand, implies that \( p \) does not only depend on \( S \) but also on \( H—H_1, H_2, H_3, \text{etc.} \), namely that \( p \) might be a lie for \( H_1 \) but not for \( H_2 \) owing to the hearer-sensitive factor. To provide a clear picture, the following two cases will make the set of hearers narrower by transcending from the typical supervisor to the *subtypical* ones and they show how \( p \) might be a lie for \( H_1 \) but not for \( H_2 \).

Take the previous case as an example again: you overslept and missed your meeting.
Case-1: Your boss (Hg) is a firm believer in supernatural beings such as ghosts, evil spirits, etc. Knowing your boss’ superstitious beliefs, you might state that pog, “my house was haunted by ghosts in this morning and I dealt with them.” as a lie for the ‘ghost-believer’ Other since you are aware that she has a high potential to believe that p\textsubscript{g}.

Case-2: Your boss (Ha) is a rational person with a scientific perspective and she is an avid animal lover. Knowing all that you most probably would not say ‘ghost anecdote’ as a lie; even if it provides all the necessary conditions of the traditional model, you by no means dare to say that for any rational person. Instead, you might perhaps say that pa, “my cat looked a bit in low spirits this morning and I dealt with her.” as a lie for the ‘avid-animal-lover’ Other since you are aware that she always gives high importance to animals.

In the above cases, the attentive reader will notice that the hearers—H\textsubscript{g} and H\textsubscript{a} are not typical supervisors or persons for the speaker this time. Knowing something concerning the hearer reduces the scope of her typicality: ‘avid-animal-lover Other’ and ‘ghost-believer Other’ for the cases in question. If the speaker is acquainted with the hearer, then she does not have to categorize the hearer as anonymous in the broadest sense. If we assume, on the other hand, that the speaker has no knowledge concerning the hearers, then she commonsensically assumes that the hearer is a typical person and she would not prefer to state that neither p\textsubscript{g} nor p\textsubscript{a}. In other words, p\textsubscript{g} and p\textsubscript{a} are not to be opted for by a typical hearer(Ht) and thus, any typical speaker would not prefer them as an instance of lying. Technically speaking, wrote Schutz (1962, 18),

"The more anonymous the typifying construct is, the more detached is it from the uniqueness of the individual fellowman involved ... In complete anonymization the individuals are supposed to be interchangeable and the course-of-action type refers to the behavior of ‘whomsoever’ acting in the way defined as typical by the construct.

In conclusion, in comparison with the traditional model, however, the two cases considered, p\textsubscript{g} and p\textsubscript{a} can both be lies for H\textsubscript{g}, H\textsubscript{a}, and H\textsubscript{t} in trad-C\textsubscript{3} since it does not give particular importance to the hearer’s social existence. In other words, trad-C\textsubscript{3} is a ‘whomsoever’ action. In the new-C\textsubscript{3}, on the other hand, p\textsubscript{g} can be a lie for H\textsubscript{g} but not H\textsubscript{a} or H\textsubscript{t}, and p\textsubscript{a} can be a lie for H\textsubscript{a} but not H\textsubscript{g} or H\textsubscript{t}. Needless to say, neither of them can be a lie for H\textsubscript{t}. An analogy can be drawn here: if the traditional—or any hearer-insensitive—model of lying is a factory-product, then the new model of lying is tailor-made. As a result, little thought is required to see that mere trad-C\textsubscript{3} is too broad, unpragmatic, and uncommonsensical for a social human being who always intends to flee the negative consequences of the context in which she has to lie."
Rauf Oran

3.2. Analysis of the New-C3

Having discussed how to construct the lie for the Other, we now move on to explain that once you lie to the hearer, you share the same commonsense world that both of you are part of intersubjectively. This intersubjectivity, however, is not the rejection of subjectivity: you decide to lie subjectively, but you decide what you state as a lie intersubjectively. It is intersubjective because you live as an individual person among other people, “bound to them through common influence and work, understanding others and being understood by them” (Schutz 1962, XXX). Hence, even though the individual defines her world from her own perspective, she is nevertheless “a social being, rooted in an intersubjective reality” (Schutz 1962, XXX). More precisely, although we all are different individually, when we live together and constitute a social world, then we all are constituents of society and lose our individuality under intersubjectivity necessitating commonsense awareness by being taken for granted. That is, commonsenseness comprehends and conducts its relations with the Other without recognizing it. And the new-C3 renders that unrecognized yet epistemically given part of lying, which is deeply rooted in our daily life. As commonsense people, qua deceivers and deceives,

We are all born into the same world, grow up as children guided by parents and other adults, learn a language, come into contact with others, receive an education, move into some phase of the business of life, and go through the infinitely detailed catalogue of human activity: we play, love, create, suffer, and die. But throughout all of the routine elements and forms of existence, we simply assume, presuppose, and take it for granted that the daily world in which all of these activities go on is there... Thus, the essential foundation of mundane existence remains unrecognized by commonsense men whose lives are nevertheless structured by and built upon the matrix of daily life (Schutz 1962, XXV).

Therefore, the new model of lying is to render the socially taken-for-granted yet unrecognized constituent of the definition of lying that was ignored by the traditional as well as the contemporary rivals. If the speaker genuinely wishes to lie to the hearer in order to get what she expects, she has to imagine both herself and the hearer as a typical person in the We-relationship under the awareness of commonsenseness and make herself a typical liar for the relevant context. The speaker understands herself, the context, the Other, etc. to the extent permitted by the stock of knowledge and previous experiences. Once the speaker places herself in the We-relationship, she should not determine her actions independently of the commonsense world; all of her intersubjective actions, as already stated, are determined by the social existence of the Other and commonsenseness, namely,
she is subject to be typified by the social world. As Schutz (1962, 11) emphasized, “in common-sense thinking if we take into account that this world is not my private world but an intersubjective one and that, therefore, my knowledge of it is not my private affair but from the outset intersubjective or socialized.” Accordingly, being a typical person implies that the speaker or the hearer approximately guesses what the Other states, how the Other behaves, etc. in line with the commonsense world. And both represent similar urges towards commonsense, namely, the evasion of uncommon and the adaption of dominant of related typification. The phrase that the hearer be induced to believe the false statement in the new-C3 resides in that commonsenseness: once you lie to the Other, you are aware of the hearer’s state of mind, context, etc., and you state a lie in a most commonsensical for the Other by avoiding any unusual, atypical or implausible one. Thus, lie to the other should be transformed into lie for the Other in our everyday life.

In the missed-meeting context in which both participants are actively engaged with one another, telling a lie would be like that: first, you want to get rid of the negative consequences of being tardy, so you decide that your excuse has to be persuasive. And, as a typical person—you have been late and found an excuse couple of times in your past—therefore, you have a stock of knowledge at hand for that typical missed-important-thing. Second, even if you do not know anything about the supervisor, you, qua rational person, assume that she is a typical supervisor who expects to hear something typical as an excuse. The collection of all assumptions, typifications, and knowledge is based on commonsense awareness which has been built from your childhood. As constituents of the same commonsense world, you and the supervisor merged into a single and typical commonsense world citizen. As Cox (1973, 123) states,

My experience of the other weaves a network of interconnecting meanings, formed in presence to me and which I follow as it builds. The reality of the other overlaps my reality, and the two become merged into a single co-subjective here and now. I experience the other’s experiences, though not directly. I am aware of what he is thinking, that he believes this or that, and that he thinks such and such is true of me.

Put another way, once you lie to your hearer, you put yourself into her shoes and analyse whether your lie is commonsensical or not for your hearer. Hence, there is now no doubt that if you intend that your hearer be induced to believe something false, you have to opt for the most successful-to-be \( p \) for the hearer in question. Yet, it is crucial to note that successful-to-be does not have to entail that the speaker must be successful to induce to believe that is false. She lies even if she is
unsuccessful as well; the key point is that the speaker intends to try as hard as possible to obtain success in inducing what to state.

Before finishing this subsection, I now want to turn an analytic eye to the discrepancy between to deceive and to induce. The rough definition of deceiving is that you deliberately cause someone to believe something you know to be false by changing her epistemic status. The new-C₃, however, does not consist of deceiving; instead, it consists of inducing, here, which refers to succeeding in causing someone to do something. Semantically speaking, to induce to believe that is false is a subset of to deceive.

Inasmuch as to induce to believe comprises both the speaker and the hearer, the new-C₃ is, thence, a subset of trad-C₃. More exactly, all lie-ℕ for the new-C₃ is also a lie for the trad-C₃, whereas all lie-Τ for the trad-C₃ is not a lie for the new-C₃; in technical notation, \( ℕ ⊆ ℤ \). It is self-evident that the scope of the new model is narrower than the scope of the traditional rival and it is no coincidence that this narrowness will be thought of as a caveat for the new model. The scope of the new model is narrower than of the traditional rival, certainly; but this narrowness leads to the new one being more commonsensical and rational, as has been exemplified. Owing to its social characteristics, the definition of lying should treat both the speaker and the hearer as being of equal importance at the expense of being narrower. The other instances belonging to the scope of the traditional model—or of some contemporary models—but not of the new model will be called anti-social bullshit and it is to this we now turn.

3.3. Out of the Scope of New-C₃: Anti-Social Bullshit

In his essay On Bullshit, Harry Frankfurt (2005) states that the distinctive feature of bullshit is that the bullshitter is indifferent toward the truth or falsity of what she says. According to him, “her statement is grounded neither in a belief that it is true nor, as a lie must be, in a belief that it is not true. It is just this lack of connection to a concern with truth—this indifference to how things really are—that I regard as of the essence of bullshit” (Frankfurt 2005, 33-34). In other words, the distinction between a liar and a bullshitter is the fact that a liar must concern about whether what she says is true or false, whilst the bullshitter need not: she just says things without regard to their truth value. Technically speaking, the liar must employ C₂ to her statement.

There are, undoubtedly, some objections to Frankfurt’s definition of bullshit. However, my purpose is not to discuss what bullshit should be. Contrariwise, it is

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3 Blackboard bold typeface denotes the all of the entries of the lie sets of relevant definitions.
to construct a new term to coin the instances which fall within the scope of trad-C3 but beyond the scope of new-C3 by adopting a similar perspective of Frankfurt’s bullshit.

As argued above that the distinguishing characteristic of bullshit is the lack of concern with the truth which is the key difference between a lie and bullshit. The new term, anti-social bullshit, however, is essentially different from both of them. The anti-social bullshit, in contrast to classical bullshit, does care for the truth or falsity of the statement, namely, as if lying, it concerns C2. The anti-social bullshitter, as a result, cares about whether what she says is true or false. The distinctive feature of anti-social bullshit is the fact that it does not care for the hearer’s state of mind. Dissecting the term, the ‘anti-social’ part denotes that the term is against the social norms and commonsense world; the ‘bullshit’ part, on the other hand, denotes that the term lacks concern with the hearer’s state of mind. Properly speaking, anti-social bullshit is a statement that can be replied to as “how can you expect me to believe that?” in daily life. In the extreme cases, the hearer may feel treated like dirt owing to the lacking of concern for herself. Whereas the speaker is aware of the hearer psycho-physically, she ignores her state of mind. Thus, anti-social bullshit is the taking no notice of the hearer by stating a false statement.

Related to deception, there is also a distinction between traditional lies, Frankfurt’s bullshit and anti-social bullshit that is worth mentioning. As Frankfurt (2005, 54) suggests, “the bullshitter may not deceive us, or even intend to do so, either about the facts or about what he takes the facts to be.” From this point, Frankfurt’s bullshit resembles the traditional lie with respect to intentional deception. Conversely, anti-social bullshit does not necessitate an intentional deception condition—namely trad-C3 or new-C3— like some forms of the contemporary definition of lies which will be introduced in section 5; instead, it is characterized by the fact that the speaker is fully aware that the hearer regards her as a dishonest person. As a result, you, as an anti-social bullshitter, are regarded as a dishonest person from the perspective of your hearer and you know that, even if you do not intend to deceive her.

The attentive reader might ask why it is called ‘bullshit’ despite the contrast to classical bullshit. The reason why that word is chosen is to emphasize the ‘lacking of concern’ factor. If it could have been named as an ‘anti-social lie,’ it may cause confusion, since I would have asserted that anti-social lies are not lies. It should be further stressed that the principal characteristic of the anti-social bullshit, ‘lacking concern with’ the hearer would be lost. For that reason, anti-
social bullshit, as a term, is appropriate to emphasize ‘lack of concern’ and ‘against the society’ at the same time.

With the introduction of the new model of lying, this sort of neologism, anti-social bullshit, is indispensable to be defined in order to incorporate the ruled-out cases of the traditional or contemporary definition of lying. By the virtue of this neologism, the narrow scope of the new model does not pose an analytic problem since the anti-social bullshit encompasses, as already noted, the excluded instances which fall within the trad-C3 scope but beyond of the new-C3 scope. Nevertheless, the new model is not, fortunately, the only model having a relatively narrow scope in the literature. The following section moves on to describe in detail the C&F model of lying.

4. Chisholm and Feehan’s Model of Lying

As stated by C&F (1977, 149), if S lies to H, there should be two conditions:

- **cf-C1**: S says p to H for the purpose of causing H to believe that p;
- **cf-C2**: S believes that p is not true or she believes it to be false.

On the authority of C&F (1977, 149), “… in telling the lie, the liar ‘gives an indication that he is expressing his own opinion.’ And he does this in a special way—by getting his victim to place his faith in him. The sense of ‘say,’ therefore, in which the liar may be said to ‘intend to say what is false,’ is that of ‘to assert’.” Here, ‘to assert’ means ‘to be taken seriously;’ in the traditional model, stating is not asserting. If one states something as a joke, for example, then the statement is not an assertion. Consequently, pursuant to C&F, the seriousness that assertion involves resides in this fact: “the concept of assertion is essentially normative. We can explicate it only by reference to justification. And the justification in question is epistemic, the type of justification that is implied by knowledge and evidence”(Chisholm & Feehan 1977, 152). More precisely, once S asserts something to H, then S believes H to be justified in assuming not only cf-C1 that S believes that p, but also cf-C2 that she intends to cause H to believe that S believes that p. In the opinion of C&F, the point of asserting p is that of causing justified belief in the propositions cf-C1 that the speaker accepts the assertion and cf-C2 that she intends to convey her acceptance of the assertion. Strictly speaking, ‘asserting a proposition’ is:

\[ S \text{ asserts } p \text{ to } H =_{df} S \text{ states } p \text{ to } H \text{ and does so under conditions which, he believes, justify } H \text{ in believing that he, } S, \text{ not only accepts } p \text{ but also intends to contribute causally to } H's \text{ believing that he, } S, \text{ accepts } p. \]

(Chisholm & Feehan 1977, 152)

And the definition of lying is,
There is a proposition \( p \) such that (i) either \( S \) believes that \( p \) is not true or \( S \) believes that \( p \) is false and (ii) \( S \) asserts \( p \) to \( H \). (Chisholm and Feehan 1977, 152)

To understand better what they mean, two well-known cases, which have been proposed by Augustine (1952, 57), may be raised:

Case-1: We have a person who knows or thinks that he is speaking falsely, yet speaks in this way without the intention of deceiving. Such would be the case of a man who, knowing that a certain road is besieged by bandits and fearing that a friend for whose safety he is concerned will take that road, tells that friend that there are no bandits there. He makes this assertion, realizing that his friend does not trust him, and, because of the statement to the contrary by the person, in whom he has no faith, will therefore believe that the bandits are there and will not go by the road.

C&F propose that \( S \) does not lie to \( H \); even though \( S \) believes that the statement is false and acts with the intention of deceiving, \( S \) does not assert a proposition \( p \), because he does not believe that the conditions under which he states \( p \) are conditions that justify \( H \) in believing that \( S \) accepts \( p \).

In the same way that the new model also claims that \( S \) does not lie to \( H \). \( S \) states that “there are no bandits on the road” by being aware that \( H \) cannot be induced to believe that statement. Having the We-relationship with the hearer, \( S \) is entirely aware that \( H \) by no means believes that \( p \); therefore \( p \) is not counted as a lie from the viewpoint of the new model.

Case-2: There is the case of the person who, knowing or thinking what he says is true, nevertheless says it to deceive. This would happen if the man mentioned above were to tell his mistrustful acquaintance that there are bandits on the road, knowing that they are there and telling it so that his hearer, because of his distrust of the speaker, may proceed to take that road and so fall into the hands of the bandits. (Augustine 1952, 57)

C&F(1977) claim that \( S \) does not lie to \( H \). Even though \( S \) believes that there are bandits on the road, \( S \) intends to cause \( H \) to believe that \( S \) believes that there are no bandits on the road. But \( S \) does not believe the statement to be false. Hence his assertion of that statement is not a lie.

Similarly, the new model argues that \( S \) does not lie to \( H \) here either. Although \( S \) intends that \( H \) be induced to believe his statement, \( S \) does not believe the statement to be false. This example has shown the speaker-sensitive party of the new model. That is, whereas new-C\(_3\) has been satisfied, C\(_2\) has not been. The importance of this example lies in the fact that it makes us recall that even if you could have induced your hearer to believe that something is false, it is still not a lie as long as you do not believe it to be false.
It goes without saying that both C&F and the new model have a characteristic aspect in common: you lie only if you expect that you will be successful in deceiving the hearer with your false statement. In spite of close resemblance, the ground of the new model deviates considerably from the C&F model. By contrast with C&F, this paper’s thesis is based on the human being as a social being who relates with one another intersubjectively in the commonsense world in which lying occurs and, unlike being seriousness, the new model asserts that lying, as an intersubjective action, should be based on the awareness of the commonsense world and of its typification. In the following paragraph, this disparity is conveniently exemplified.

Here is a substantial discrepancy between C&F and the new model is that the hearer is an animal being able to understand some basic words and acting based on these words: suppose that I say to my cat “Look out! There is a bird over there!” by knowing that she completely understands what I mean. Do I lie to her? According to C&F (1977), if I make my statement to cause her to believe that there is a bird over there, then I lie to her. As per the new model, on the other hand, I do not and cannot lie to her. The reason is that it cannot be treated as a social being to my cat. More accurately, in the new model of lying, the hearer must be a conscious human being. What is more, aside from animals, the new model also asserts, as opposed to C&F (1977), that you cannot lie in any case to a polygraph or artificial intelligence since, needless to say, there is no such other-party social being.

In conclusion, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that the new model is the narrowest version among all of the definitions of lying. For that reason, there are good grounds for doubting that it will be criticized owing to ruling out some notable instances of lying. The following section, thus, examines some types of lying from the viewpoint of the new model.

5. Objections to the New Model of Lying

While the new model is more rational and commonsensical than its rivals for our social world, it is self-evident that it will be open to criticism. For the time being, however, I will concentrate on the objections raised to traditional and C&F lying. There are, admittedly, many objections and objectors, yet to keep this paper

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4 Fried (1978, 55) also states that “A person lies when he asserts a proposition he believes to be false… Their [Chisholm and Feehan’s] central emphasis on assertion is identical to mine, which is not necessarily remarkable given the fact that the authors are heavily influenced, as am I, by Augustine’s and Kant’s discussion of lying. We differ principally in that they find a way to treat as not lying at all some cases which seem to me to be cases of justified lying. But my reasons and theirs are close and the difference is largely one of form”
concise and focused, I mainly adhere to the objections of Thomas Carson and Jennifer Lackey. Before I present the instances, it would be useful to introduce their lie definitions which are distinct from the traditional view.

As Carson (2010, 30) defined lying:

A person S tells a lie to another person S1 iff: 1. S makes a false statement X to S1, 2. S believes that X is false or probably false (or, alternatively, S does not believe that X is true), 3. S states X in a context in which S thereby warrants the truth of X to S1, and 4. S does not take herself to be not warranting the truth of what she says to S1.

“To lie, on my view, is to invite others to trust and rely on what one says by warranting its truth, but, at the same time, to betray that trust by making false statements that one does not believe” (Carson 2010, 34). In other words, Carson thinks that the liar betrays trust when she lies. His main argument is that when you lie, you betray trust and lying does not be with intending to deceive.

Lackey (2013) also argues that lying does not involve an intention ‘to deceive.’ Instead, it involves an intention ‘to be deceptive.’ She proposes that there is a distinction between the intention ‘to deceive’ and ‘to be deceptive.’ More precisely,

Deceiving: A deceives B with respect to whether p if and only if A aims to bring about a false belief in B regarding whether p.

Being deceptive: A is deceptive to B with respect to whether p if A aims to conceal information from B regarding whether p (Lackey 2013, 241).

According to Lackey (2013, 237), therefore, the three conditions of lying are, “(i) A states that p to B, (ii) A believes that p is false and (iii) A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that p.”

The following subsections present the three major objection-to-be cases, i.e. ‘inveterate liar’, ‘bald-faced lies’, and ‘coercion lies.’ Of these, the bald-faced lie is “an undisguised lie, one where a speaker states that p where she believes that p is false and it is common knowledge that what is being stated does not reflect what the speaker actually believes” (Lackey 2013, 237-238). Another objection is called ‘coercion lies’ which occurs “when a speaker believes that p is false, states that p, and does so, not with the intention to deceive, but because she is coerced or frightened into doing so” (Lackey 2013, 239).

5.1. Case-1: Inveterate Liar

Carson (2006, 292) argues that

Chisholm and Feehan’s definition has the very odd and unacceptable result that a
person who is notoriously dishonest couldn't tell lies to those he knows distrust him. Their definition implies that it is self-contradictory to say that I lie when I know that others know that I am lying (and thus are not justified in believing that I believe (accept) what I say).

As seen above, Carson claims that the C&F model is problematic since it is self-contradictory.\(^5\)

The new model is eager to share this objection fully with C&F. It is certain that it is not an instance of lying from the viewpoint of the new model either since by ignoring the hearer’s state of mind, the action that the speaker does cannot be called even a real conversation or speech, much less lying; or it might be a typical example of anti-social bullshit. More precisely, if H knows that S is an inveterate liar and S also has this knowledge—H knows that S is an inveterate liar—, then all of S’s attempts to induce H to believe that something false will be in vain. As a famous for being an inveterate liar, nobody takes her opinion, testimony, etc. seriously. Hence it is not an overstatement to say that being known as an inveterate liar is equal to being socially inaudible.

To put this into perspective, imagine an infant talking barely, a parrot mimicking human speech, and a person, \textit{qua} hearer, all in a room. And suppose that the infant and the parrot start to use profanity towards the hearer. However, if the hearer is a sensible adult, then she would not take them seriously for she is acutely aware that they do not and cannot intend to intimidate, offend or otherwise give rise to emotional harm. Technically speaking, contrary to any adult human being, the infant or the parrot lack intention to offend as well as commonsense awareness; and this is not surprising, considering the lack of awareness with not acting for the Other.

The case of the inveterate liar greatly resembles the abovementioned case, the swearer infant—or parrot in that both of their hearers are aware that the speaker lacks concern with the awareness of the Other’s states of mind. As a result, unlike the traditional rival, the new model claims that even if she has intended deception, an inveterate liar cannot lie to her hearer. It goes without saying that it seems quite absurd that an inveterate liar cannot lie. A little consideration, however, will show that the word ‘liar’—of inveterate liar— refers to the traditional model since the ground of English vocabulary is based on the most

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\(^5\) As Fallis (2009, 46) puts it, “…when someone who is known to be an inveterate liar makes a statement, there is no reason for anyone to believe that she believes that the statement is true. So, if she knows that she is known to be an inveterate liar, the conditions of CFL will not be satisfied. But presumably, someone who is known to be an inveterate liar can still lie. Thus, CFL is still too narrow” (CFL stands for Chisholm Feehan Lying).
prevailing—traditional—definition of lying. The phrase ‘cannot lie,’ on the other hand, refers to the new model of lying. In short, an inveterate liar can only lie in the traditional sense. From the perspective of the new model, the inveterate liar just bullshits anti-socially.

Case-2: Bald-faced Lies

A bald-faced lie is when the speaker states that $p$ where $p$ is false and both the speaker and hearer are aware that the Other knows this. Let us cite an example:

A student is caught flagrantly cheating on an exam for the fourth time this term, all of the conclusive evidence for which is passed on to the dean of Academic Affairs. Both the student and the dean know that he cheated on the exam, and they each know that the other knows this, but the student is also aware of the fact that the dean punishes students for academic dishonesty only when there is a confession. Given this, when the student is called to the dean’s office, he states, “I did not cheat on the exam” (Lackey 2013, 238).

It deserves mention that this case might evoke the case of the inveterate liar; however, by denying the guilty of cheating, the student is here not trying to deceive the dean into thinking otherwise, rather he protects himself from sanction. Hence, the student’s false statement does not satisfy the traditional model, pursuant to which lying is qualified by the intent to deceive.

As argued by Carson (2006) and Lackey (2013), the student is clearly lying. Carson (2006, 295) asserts that if the student “plays it straight and looks grave and serious, then his statements are warranted to be true and count as lies according to my definition.” Lackey (2013, 237), on the other hand, asserts, as already stated, that “A intends to be deceptive to B in stating that $p$.” As specified by her, although the student does not intend to bring about any false beliefs in the dean, he is clearly lying with the intention of being deceptive. Even though Carson and Lackey are distinct from one another, both agree that bald-faced lies are an example of lying.

As the reader may easily guess that bald-faced lies are not an instance of lying for the new-C3 since it lacks intentional deception. From this point, she is totally right about that. However, I would like to analyse why it lacks intentional

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6 Some philosophers argue that bald-faced lies are not lies. For example, Meibauer (2014, 140) argues that bald-faced lies are not lies because the bald-faced liar does not really present $p$ as true in the context since he lets shine through that $p$ is false. He would not feel committed to the truth of $p$, and he would not be ready to provide further evidence. Keiser (2016, 464) also thinks that bald-faced lies are not genuine instances of lying because they are not genuine instances of assertion.
deception from the perspective of the new model. Put differently, I quite the
counter argue that the student is not lying in conformity with the new model
insofar as he does not concern with the dean’s state of mind and does not try as
hard as possible to succeed in deceiving the dean about his false statement:
whatever the student says, the dean continues to believe that he is a cheater and
the student knows this. He does not and cannot attempt to manipulate the dean’s
state of mind; the action is ineffective, taking no notice of the hearer and not for
the Other. What he states, in this case, seems entirely independent of the hearer’s
state of mind. Thus, by knowing that the dean absolutely knows that he cheated,
what the student states entirely fits the definition of anti-social bullshit. To round
off this picture, a concrete example should be given: if the student says something
in Mandarin by knowing that the dean cannot understand any Mandarin, then the
dean’s belief remains unchanged since any statement is for the dean since the
student takes no notice of the dean and unsurprisingly, cannot affect his state of
mind.

5.2. Case-3: Coercion Lies

A typical example of a coercion lie is as follows:

I witness a crime and clearly see that a particular individual committed the crime.
Later, the same person is accused of the crime, and, as a witness in court; I am
asked whether or not I saw the defendant commit the crime. I make the false
statement that I did not see the defendant commit the crime, for fear of being
harmed or killed by him. It does not necessarily follow that I intend that my false
statements deceive anyone. (I might hope that no one believes my testimony and
that he is convicted in spite of it.) Deceiving the jury is not a means to preserving
my life. Giving false testimony is necessary to save my life, but deceiving others is
not; the deception is merely an unintended ‘side effect’. I do not intend to deceive
the jury in this case, but it seems clear that my false testimony would constitute a
lie. (Carson 2006, 289)

As seen above, Carson, as well as Lackey (2013), asserts that the witness clearly
lies, because the witness knows that the jury and the judge will not be justified in
believing that he believes what he says.

For this case, how the witness acts for the hearers in question is significant.
The witness will be aware of the fact that any judge might be in all likelihood
remarkably experienced in spotting fictitious testimony and the fact that
everybody knows about this, so does the defendant (supposing that the defendant
is in the court at the time of the hearing). Therefore, once the witness states that “I
did not see the defendant commit the crime,” the statement is for two different
types of Others, namely ‘the judge or the jury’ and ‘the defendant.’ And if the
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witness really fears being harmed or getting killed by the defendant, he has to
immerse himself in the role of a perjurer and looks earnest and assertive
concerning his intention that both the judge and the jury be induced to believe his
false statement; otherwise, he might still be in trouble. The defendant might say
that “you have just droned something out, you have deliberately acted like that so
that the judge could spot your perjury and punish me!” In case of such a probable
bad consequence, the witness must envision the judge, the jury, the defendant—
typifications of a typical courtroom—and himself as in the We-relationship. If the
witness feigns in this direction, then it is called a lie from the point of view of the
new model. Conversely, if the witness only claims the defendant’s innocence, in an
atomic manner without looking assertive with taking no notice of anyone’s state of
mind he is not lying: he just acts perfunctorily just because he is coerced to do that
and does not try as hard as possible for to succeed in deceiving. Put differently,
instead of the action of lying, it might look as same as a kind of performing art
done compulsorily from the perspective of the hearers by ignoring their social
existence and states of mind, namely in short, it would be a coerced anti-social
bullshit.

Last, it may be of interest to add that even though contemporary definitions
of Lackey and Carson differ from one another, it can roughly be said that they
generally possess the broadest extension. Put differently, the traditional definition
is a subset of contemporary rivals, that is, all lie-τ for the trad-C₃ is also a lie for
the contemporary rivals, whereas all lie-ℂ for the contemporaries is not a lie for
trad-C₃. The set of all instances of lies used in this paper in technical notation can
be summarized as ℕ⊆𝔽⊆𝕋⊆ℂ, where the set of F refers to Chisholm and Feehan’s
lies.

6. Conclusion

A good deal of progress has been made towards giving a new way of considering
lying in which not only the speaker-sensitive but also the hearer-sensitive despite
having clearly become more disputable. Granted that by ruling out some admitted
cases of lying, the scope of the new model is much narrower than its rivals. Despite
being narrower, however, it might be more commonsensical and rational for our
intersubjective social world in which lying occurs. And the ruled-out cases are
classified as anti-social bullshit which can be replied to with that rhetorical
question, “how can you expect me to believe that?” in our daily life. Nevertheless,
the reader might think and ask that “the new model only claims that the lie must
be plausible-to-believe. So what?" You can undoubtedly define the new model as
plausible-to-believe. However, it is not what this paper intended. Instead, this
paper aims to show why most of the prevalent attitudes toward lying are defective. Now that lying is an intersubjective social action, we should give more importance to the hearer’s social existence as well as the social norms and phenomenological sociology was ideally suited for this new attitude. Therefore, being plausible-to-believe is not what to look for; it is only the result of the socio-analytic attitude which implies that lying makes you—qua liar—a typical the Other. The lie is not only the statement that comes out of the mouth but also that goes into the ear. As a result, if you, qua constituent of the commonsense world, would like to obtain the desired output for your action, you must give proper input to the hearer.

References:


