

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Fred Adams is Professor of Linguistics & Cognitive Science and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. He has published well over 100 articles and chapters on cognitive science, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and related topics. He is also co-author of *The Bounds of Cognition* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, with Ken Aizawa) and of *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology* (Cambridge University Press, 2015, with Daniel Weiskopf. Contact: fa@udel.edu.

Julien Beillard teaches philosophy at Ryerson University in Toronto, Canada, and sometimes elsewhere. His research interests at present include epistemology, language and mind, and moral and political philosophy. His most recent articles are “Worlds, Triangles and Bolts: Reply to Nulty” (*Metaphysica*, forthcoming), “Equality and Transparency” (*American Philosophical Quarterly*, 2013), and “Moral Relativism is Unintelligible” (*Philosophy Now*, 2013). Contact: julienbeillard@hotmail.com.

Cameron Boulton is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at KU Leuven, working on Prof. Chris Kelp’s FWO funded project, *Justified Belief: Knowledge First Virtue Epistemology*. He received his PhD from the University of Edinburgh in 2014. He has broad research interests in epistemology, and is especially interested in issues at the intersection of epistemology and ethics. Contact: cameron.boulton@kuleuven.be.

T. Ryan Byerly is Lecturer in Philosophy of Religion at the University of Sheffield. He works in philosophy of religion, epistemology, and virtue ethics. In epistemology, his recent publications include “Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides” (*Erkenntnis*, 2015, with Kraig Martin), “A Dispositional, Internalist, Evidentialist Virtue Epistemology” (*Logos & Episteme*, 2014), “Explanationism and Justified Beliefs about the Future” (*Erkenntnis*, 2013), “The Special Value of Epistemic Self-Reliance” (*Ratio*, 2013), and “It Seems Like There Aren’t Any Seemings” (*Philosophia*, 2012). Contact: t.r.byerly@sheffield.ac.uk.

Marc Champagne is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy, Trent University. His main areas of interest are epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophy of signs. Some of his forthcoming publications in epistemology include “Brandom, Peirce, and the Overlooked Friction of Contrapiction” (*Synthese*) and “On Alethic Functionalism’s (Absurdly?) Wide Applicability” (*Teorema*). Contact: marcchampagne@trentu.ca.

Murray Clarke is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec. His research interests span contemporary epistemology, cognitive science and philosophy of science. He is the author of *Reconstructing Reason and Representation* (MIT, 2004). He has published numerous articles including “Resurrecting the Tracking Theories” (*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2005), “Concepts, Intuitions and Epistemic Norms” (*Logos & Episteme*, 2010), and “Critical Notice: Jose Zalabardo’s Scepticism and Reliable Belief” (*Teorema*, 2014). Contact: Murray.Clarke@concordia.ca.

Stewart Cohen is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona and the editor-in-chief of *Philosophical Studies*. His recent papers include: “Reasons to Believe and Reasons to Act” (*Episteme*, forthcoming), “Does Practical Rationality Constrain Epistemic Rationality?” (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, forthcoming), “Williamson on Gettier Cases and Epistemic Logic” (*Inquiry*, 2013, with Juan Comesaña), and “A Tentative Defense of the Equal Weight View” (in *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays*, Oxford University Press, 2013). Contact: cohens@arizona.edu.

Domingos Faria is a PhD candidate at the University of Lisbon, Portugal. His work is supported by a doctoral fellowship (SFRH/BD/85051/2012) awarded by the Portuguese Foundation for Science and Technology. He is also a member of the LanCog (language, mind and cognition) research group. His primary areas of research are epistemology and philosophy of religion. Website: www.domingosfaria.net. Contact: domingofaria@campus.ul.pt.

Tristan Haze is a late-stage PhD candidate at the University of Sydney. His thesis, *Necessity and Propositions*, will put forward a new account of the conditions under which a proposition is necessarily true, supported by a new approach to numerous issues in the philosophy of language. He recently published “A Counterexample to the Breckenridge-Magidor Account of Instantial Reasoning” in the *Journal of Philosophical Research*, and “Against the Brogaard-Salerno

Stricture” in *The Reasoner*. He also practises music and comedy. Contact: tristanhaze@gmail.com.

Rodrigo Laera is researcher at the University of Barcelona (Spain) and The National Council for Scientific and Technical Research (Argentina). He is the author of numerous papers in epistemology and moral philosophy, most of them in spanish. Contact: rodrigolaera@gmail.com.

Kraig Martin is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Harding University. He works in epistemology, philosophy of religion, and ethical theory. He recently defended his dissertation, which was entitled “Justified Closure of Inquiry: A non-Reductive Account.” His recent and forthcoming publications and latest projects are “Problems for Explanationism on Both Sides” (co-authored with T. Ryan Byerly, *Erkenntnis*, 2015) and “On Moral-Natural & Moral-Positive Duties: A Combination Metaethical Theory in the Restoration Tradition” (co-authored with Caleb Clanton, under review). Contact: kmartin10@harding.edu.

Mihai Rusu holds a PhD in Philosophy from Babeş-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca, Romania (2012). Between June 2014 and September 2015 he was a postdoctoral fellow (SOP HRD/159/1.5/S/133675 Project) of the Romanian Academy, Iaşi Branch. His main research interests include modal epistemology and metaphysics, general epistemology, philosophy of language, and modal logic. Contact: miruss_ab@yahoo.com.

Javier González de Prado Salas received his PhD from the University of Southampton in January 2016 and is currently a Teaching Fellow at the Universidad Autónoma de Madrid. His work focuses on topics related to normativity in epistemology, metaethics and the philosophy of language and mind. He is particularly interested in investigating the nature of defeasible reasoning and its implications for different philosophical debates. Contact: j.gonzalezdeprado@gmail.com.