NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Fred Adams is Professor of Linguistics & Cognitive Science and Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware. He has published well over 100 articles and chapters on cognitive science, epistemology, philosophy of language, philosophy of action, and related topics. He is also co-author of *The Bounds of Cognition* (Wiley-Blackwell, 2008, with Ken Aizawa) and of *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Psychology* (Cambridge University Press, 2015, with Daniel Weiskopf. Contact: fa@udel.edu.

Rodrigo Borges got his PhD in philosophy from Rutgers in 2015 and has recently started a faculty position at Pontifical Catholic University of Rio Grande do Sul (PUCRS). His work focuses mainly in epistemological issues. He is the co-editor, with Peter Klein and Claudio de Almeida, of *Explaining Knowledge: New Essays on the Gettier Problem* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Contact: epistemen@gmail.com.

Murray Clarke is Professor in the Department of Philosophy at Concordia University in Montreal, Quebec. His research interests span contemporary epistemology, cognitive science and philosophy of science. He is the author of *Reconstructing Reason and Representation* (MIT, 2004). He has published numerous articles including "Resurrecting the Tracking Theories" (*Australasian Journal of Philosophy*, 2005), "Concepts, Intuitions and Epistemic Norms" (*Logos & Episteme*, 2010), and "Critical Notice: Jose Zalabardo's Scepticism and Reliable Belief" (*Teorema*, 2014). Contact: Murray.Clarke@concordia.ca.

Mihai Hîncu is a Postdoctoral Research Fellow (SOP HRD/159/1.5/S/133675 Project) at the Romanian Academy, Iași Branch. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Bucharest in 2012, with a thesis on the unarticulated constituents and the semantics of belief reports. His main areas of specialization are logic, formal semantics, and philosophy of language. Also, his research interests include formal epistemology, decision theory, game theory, and metaethics. Contact: mihaihincu@gmail.com.

Moti Mizrahi is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Florida Institute of Technology. He received his PhD from the Graduate Center of the City University of New York. He has teaching and research interests in argumentation theory,

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epistemology, ethics, metaphysics, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of science. His most recent publications include "Three Arguments against the Expertise Defense" (*Metaphilosophy*, 2015), "Does Conceivability Entail Metaphysical Possibility?" (*Ratio*, 2015, with David R. Morrow), "Kuhn's Incommensurability Thesis: What's the Argument?" (*Social Epistemology*, 2015). He has forthcoming papers in *Argumentation, International Journal for the Study of Skepticism, International Studies in Philosophy of Science*, and *Journal for General Philosophy of Science*. Contact: motimizra@gmail.com.

Alexander Pruss is Professor of Philosophy at Baylor University in Waco, Texas, and works in metaphysics, philosophy of religion, formal epistemology, applied ethics and philosophy of mathematics. Contact: Alexander_Pruss@baylor.edu.

Luis Rosa is a Humboldt post-doctoral fellow at the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy (LMU Munich). His work concentrates on issues concerning epistemic rationality, epistemic logic and philosophy of psychology/AI. Contact: Luis.Rosa@lrz.uni-muenchen.de.

Mark Schroeder is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Southern California. He works widely on topics connected with epistemology, metaethics, normative ethics, and the philosophy of language, and is the author of *Slaves of the Passions* (Oxford University Press, 2007), *Being For: Evaluating the Semantic Program of Expressivism* (Oxford University Press, 2008), *Noncognitivism in Ethics* (Routledge, 2010), *Explaining the Reasons We Share* (Oxford University Press, 2014), and *Expressing Our Attitudes* (Oxford University Press, 2015). He is currently at work on a book, *Reasons First*, exploring, *inter alia*, how knowledge might be grounded in factive relations to the world without a form of epistemological disjunctivism being true. Contact: maschroe@usc.edu.

Michael J. Shaffer is a professor of philosophy at St. Cloud State University. He is the author of *Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism* (Palgrave, 2012) and *The Experimental Turn and the Methods of Philosophy* (Routledge, forthcoming). He has published numerous articles on epistemology, logic and the philosophy of science. Contact: mjshaffer@stcloudstate.edu.

John N. Williams is an associate professor in philosophy in the School of Social Sciences at Singapore Management University. His research interests include paradoxes, epistemology and applied ethics. His most recent articles include: "The Backward Clock, Truth-Tracking, and Safety" (with Neil Sinhababu, *Journal of*

Philosophy, 2015), "Not Knowing You Know: A New Objection to the Defeasibility Theory of Knowledge" (*Analysis*, 2015), "Moore's Paradox in Speech: A Critical Survey" (*Philosophy Compass*, 2015), and "Moore's Paradox in Thought: A Critical Survey" (*Philosophy Compass*, 2015). Contact: johnwilliams@smu.edu. sg.