

## NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

**Patrick Bondy** is with the Department of Philosophy at Trent University, on a Limited Term Appointment as Assistant Professor. Prior to that, he held a Postdoctoral Fellowship with the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell University. His main research interests are in epistemology and argumentation theory. His recent and forthcoming publications include “Epistemic Value” (*Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, forthcoming), “Counterfactuals and Epistemic Basing Relations” (*Pacific Philosophical Quarterly*, forthcoming), “Virtues, Evidence, and Ad Hominem Arguments” (*Informal Logic*, forthcoming), and “Epistemic Deontology and Strong Doxastic Voluntarism: A Defense” (*Dialogue*, 2015). Contact: [patrbondy@gmail.com](mailto:patrbondy@gmail.com).

**Brian Hedden** received his PhD from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 2012 and is a Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sydney. He works mainly in epistemology and decision theory, with interests in philosophy of language, ethics, and philosophy of science. He recently published a book entitled *Reasons without Persons* (Oxford University Press, 2015) and is the author of numerous journal articles. Contact: [brian.hedden@sydney.edu.au](mailto:brian.hedden@sydney.edu.au).

**Dustin Olson** is a PhD candidate at the University of Rochester. His current research defends an epistemic interpretation of reflective equilibrium and applies this interpretation to address challenges found in belief control, epistemic normativity, and peer disagreement. Additional research interests include the philosophy of action, the philosophy of time, social and political thought, and Bertrand Russell. Contact: [dustin.olson@rochester.edu](mailto:dustin.olson@rochester.edu).

**Andrew Reisner** is a Senior Lecturer in Practical Philosophy at Uppsala University. Prior to that he was an Associate Professor of Philosophy at McGill University. He has published on a range of topics in theoretical and practical reason, metaethics, and value theory. He is co-editor, with Iwao Hirose, of *Weighing and Reasoning: Themes from the Work of John Broome* (Oxford University Press, 2015), and he is also co-editor, with Absjörn Steglich-Petersen, of *Reasons for Belief* (Cambridge University Press, 2011). Contact: [andrew.reisner@filosofi.uu.se](mailto:andrew.reisner@filosofi.uu.se).

**Sharon Ryan** is Associate Professor of Philosophy at West Virginia University. Her research interests are in epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and philosophy for children. A sample of her publications include: “Wisdom” (*Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, 2013), “Wisdom, Knowledge, and Rationality” (*Acta Analytica*, 2012), “Doxastic Compatibilism and the Ethics of Belief” (*Philosophical Studies*, 2003), “What is Wisdom?” (*Philosophical Studies*, 1999), “The Epistemic Virtues of Consistency” (*Synthese*, 1996), “Does Warrant Entail Truth?” (*Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, 1996). She is also creator of THE QUESTION ([thequestion.blogs.wvu.edu](http://thequestion.blogs.wvu.edu), 2004-2010), an online project designed to get everyone, including young children, excited about philosophy. Contact: [sharon.ryan@mail.wvu.edu](mailto:sharon.ryan@mail.wvu.edu).

**Joseph Van Weelden** is a PhD candidate in Philosophy at McGill University. His research is primarily in value theory, specifically the theory of prudential value. His current project sets out to develop and defend a new version of pluralism about prudential value. His philosophical interests span much of contemporary ethics and metaethics. Secondary areas of interest include epistemology (especially testimony) and metaphysics (especially personal identity). Contact: [joseph.vanweelden@mail.mcgill.ca](mailto:joseph.vanweelden@mail.mcgill.ca).

**Benjamin Wald** is a PhD candidate in philosophy at the University of Toronto. His research interests include philosophy of action, ethics, epistemology, and practical and theoretical reasoning. His current research project is to defend the view that acting for a reason involves taking one’s motivating reason to be a normative reason, and showing how this view fits into an attractive picture of both the nature of belief and intention and the nature of practical and theoretical inference. Contact: [Benjamin.wald@utoronto.ca](mailto:Benjamin.wald@utoronto.ca).