

PROPOSITIONAL MEMORY AND KNOWLEDGE

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ABSTRACT: According to the epistemic theory of propositional memory, to remember that p is simply to retain the knowledge that p . Despite the apparent plausibility of this theory, many putative counterexamples have been raised against it. In this paper, I argue that no clear-cut counterexample to the claim can be proposed since any such attempt is confronted with an insurmountable problem. If there is to be a clear-cut counterexample to the claim, it must be either a case in which one does not believe that p though he remembers that p , or a case in which one remembers that p but his belief that p is somehow unwarranted. I examine a number of putative counterexamples of both types, and show that in neither way can we describe a clear-cut case in which one remembers that p while not knowing that p .

KEYWORDS: propositional memory, the epistemic theory of memory, memory knowledge, memory justification

I. Introduction

We express our thoughts about memory typically with the verb, ‘remember,’ and its cognates. Among different sorts of memory we talk about using this verb, the particular sort of memory I will be concerned with in this paper is expressed by ‘remember’ when it takes a sentential complement, as, for example, in “Bill remembers that he ate breakfast.” Following the tradition, I will call this type of memory ‘propositional memory,’ and define it as follows: for every subject, s , s has a propositional memory that p iff s remembers that p .

This paper is concerned with a particularly important aspect of this concept. As many philosophers remark, the ordinary use of the expression implies knowledge, that is, if x remembers that p , then he knows that p .¹ Despite the fact that this view – RK hereafter, following Moon² – seems to be grounded in our intuitive understanding of the concept, counterexamples to it have been raised. These putative counterexamples are the main topic of this paper. In the following,

¹ Among notable works defending the epistemic theory are: Norman Malcolm, *Knowledge and Certainty: Essays and Lectures* (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1963), Roger Squires, “Memory Unchained,” *The Philosophical Review* 78 (1969): 178-196, David B. Annis, “Memory and Justification,” *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 40, 3 (1980): 324-333, and Robert Audi, “Memorial Justification,” *Philosophical Topics* 23 (1995): 31-45.

² Andrew Moon, “Remembering entails knowing” *Synthese* (2012), DOI 10.1007/s11229-012-0065-3, published online: 26 Jan 2012.

I will argue that no clear-cut counterexample to the claim can be produced since any such attempt is confronted with an insurmountable problem. I take this predicament to be strong evidence that something is radically wrong with the idea of someone's remembering that p without knowing that p , and hence to suffice to show the credibility of RK.

II. Propositional Memory Implies Knowledge

RK is, first of all, supported by the apparent absurdity of a claim like "He remembers that the Ravens won the Super Bowl, but he does not know that the Ravens won the Super Bowl." This seems to express a conceptual confusion, but there is nothing absurd about each of those claims independently. Thus, the reason we cannot make sense of the conjunction of both claims must come from there being a conflict between them. The claim that the subject remembers that p is in conflict with his not knowing the fact that p . Hence, it seems to follow that if we remember that p , we know that p .³

This conclusion explains a well recognized fact about propositional memory: truly remembering that p requires that it be true that p . Nobody can remember that the first president of the U.S. was Thomas Jefferson.⁴ Suppose someone says, "The first president of the U.S. was Thomas Jefferson." However good his justification is, nobody would respond, "Well, you remember that the first president of the U.S. was Thomas Jefferson, but what you remember is false." It is not only that what he rehearses is false, but also that he DOES NOT remember that the first president of the U.S. was Thomas Jefferson. Why can't we remember that p , when p is false? RK can offer a plausible answer to that question. Indeed, if RK is false, it is not very easy to explain why remembering that p requires the truth that p .

In the following, I will examine putative counterexamples to RK. For the sake of clarity, it is beneficial to classify those counterexamples into two categories. Let us suppose that knowledge is warranted true belief. (Following Plantinga, I call whatever makes a true belief knowledge warrant.⁵) Given that propositional memory is necessarily veridical, if one's propositional memory is a warranted belief, then it follows that he knows what he remembers. Hence, if

³ Arguably, this is simply due to a pragmatic confusion. Bernecker proposes such an argument against a similarly intuitive claim that if one remembers that p , he believes that p . See Sven Bernecker, *Memory* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 83.

⁴ See, for example, Hintikka's example in Norman Malcolm, *Memory and Mind* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), 26-7.

⁵ Alvin Plantinga, *Warrant: The Current Debate* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 3.

there is to be a scenario in which a subject remembers without knowing that p , the scenario must rule out that the subject has a warranted belief that p in remembering that p . This limits the possible cases in which one remembers that p without knowing that p to: (1) cases in which one does not believe that p though he remembers that p , or (2) cases in which one believes and remembers that p in remembering that p , while the subject is not warranted in believing that p .

My primary aim in this paper is to show that no *clear-cut* counterexample to RK is possible. In the next two sections, I will discuss each type of case in turn and try to develop a dilemma by showing that these two routes to a clear-cut counterexample to RK face serious problems. I assume that if any attempt to refute RK by way of a counterexample is successful, there must be a clear-cut counterexample to RK ultimately, absent any good reason to think that any counterexample to RK is necessarily ambiguous. I can see no such reason, and suppose that the burden of proof is not on my side. Hence, my argument below will provide a strong support to RK, if not prove it.

III. Remembering that p without Believing that p

The first route is by way of a case in which one remembers that p without believing that p . The primary trouble for this route is that it is impossible to describe a case in which we would say a subject clearly has no belief whose propositional content is identical to the content of his propositional memory. As I will show below, this is because we have no plausible way to specify a propositional content which one remembers, but does not believe; attempts to describe such cases seem plausible only insofar as they are underdescribed.

Let us start the discussion by examining one of the most famous examples of this type. Martin and Deutscher, in their seminal work, tell this rather unusual story:

Suppose that someone asks a painter to paint an imaginary scene. The painter agrees to do this and, taking himself to be painting some purely imaginary scene, paints a detailed picture of a farmyard, including a certain colored and shaped house, various people with detailed features, particular items of clothing, and so on. His parents then recognize the picture as a very accurate representation of a scene which the painter saw just once in his childhood. The figures and colors are as the painter saw them only once on the farm which he now depicts. We may add more and more evidence to force the conclusion that the painter did his work by no mere accident. Although the painter sincerely believes that his work is purely imaginary, and represents no real scene, the amazed observers have all

the evidence needed to establish that in fact he is remembering a scene from childhood.⁶

One might be inclined to think that this is an example in which one clearly remembers that p , but does not know that p .⁷ He might argue that the painter does not believe, say, that he saw the scenery, but he is painting the picture because he is remembering the scenery. However, it is not clear that this case really is one in which someone remembers that p but does not believe that p . It is undeniable that the painter is remembering something in painting the picture. Nonetheless, as philosophers have pointed out, what we can confidently attribute to the painter is, at best, only the perceptual or imagistic memory of the scenery.⁸ If so, the story does not clearly constitute a case in which one remembers that p without believing that p . For what must be established is that the painter has a propositional memory that p but no belief that p . Granted that clearly the painter does not believe that he saw the scenery, or have any particular propositional beliefs about it, this much does not suffice for a clear counterexample to RK. What the painter remembers is how a scene looks, and having this memory-based image itself does not entail that he remembers that he saw the scenery or any propositional memories about the scene. In fact, given the ascription of the memory-based image, nothing that occurs in the story is left unexplained. The painter paints that picture because he is entertaining a memory-based image of it, but he does not realize that the image actually comes from his memory. Hence, so far as Martin and Deutscher's description goes, we do not yet have a clear-cut counterexample to RK.

An objector might respond that the story is simply not fully described. He might say, for example, that if a more detailed background story were to be added, we would see that we had both a reason to attribute to the painter the propositional memory that he saw such and such scenery and a reason not to attribute the belief that he saw that scenery. This is not the case, though. For there is a fundamental reason why the story needs to be underdescribed.

⁶ C. B. Martin and Max Deutscher, "Remembering," *The Philosophical Review* 75 (1966): 167-8.

⁷ I'm not sure whether the present example is really intended to be a counterexample to RK by means of attacking (1). For Martin and Deutscher indicates that it shows that one may remember X without believing that X occurs (167), and this claim itself is not a straightforward attack on RK. Nonetheless, they evidently reject RK in the later part of their paper. See Martin and Deutscher, "Remembering," 192.

⁸ Robert K. Shope, "Remembering, Knowledge, and Memory Traces," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 33, 3 (1973): 304, Alan Holland, "Retained Knowledge," *Mind* 83 (1974): 357-8.

The present trouble comes from the fact that one's entertaining a memory based image entails remembering something or remembering doing something, but not necessarily a specific propositional memory. Of course, the painter might have some propositional memory, but it is hard to tell what it is in the absence of further evidence. Hence, in order to describe a clear-cut case in which the painter remembers what he does not believe, we need some extra evidence that would suggest some specific propositional memory whose content is not also the content of a belief of his.

However, nothing can be decisive evidence for his having a memory with that particular propositional content if it contains no explicit reference to that content. And such a specification is feasible only by way of citing a propositional attitude (with mind-to-world direction of fit) toward the content. Hence, if I am correct, we cannot provide any plausible story in which one remembers that p in entertaining a memory based image without indicating any propositional attitude toward the propositional content that p . Therefore, if one tries to 'fully describe' the story so that it shows clearly that the painter remembers what he does not believe, he must have recourse to, implicitly or explicitly, some of the painter's propositional attitudes toward the propositional content of his memory.

Here is essentially why any scenario in which the painter allegedly remembers what he does not believe must remain underdescribed to begin to seem plausible. The difficulty is that we know of no propositional attitude toward the propositional content that p which can be decisive evidence for one's remembering that p without being evidence for his believing that p as well.

When Lehrer and Richard propose the following counterexample to RK, they recognize this problem, so that they have recourse to a mysterious description:

I am musing about my past and a vivid image occurs to me of an elderly woman standing by a stone well next to a red barn. I have no idea, initially, who the person is. Then suddenly the thought occurs to me that the person is my grandmother, that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. Moreover, the thought is not the result of conjecture or external suggestion; it occurs to me from memory. I have no idea, however, whether this thought that suddenly occurs to me is a true recollection of the past or a figment of my imagination. For all I know, the image I so vividly recall is of some quite different person, or is an image from a movie or dream. I do not know whether my grandmother ever stood by a stone well next to a barn or not. The thought just occurred to me that the woman in the image was my grandmother, and I do not know whether this is so. Suppose, however, in fact, the image is one recollected from a visit to my grandmother's home. The thought has occurred to me from memory, and it is a true recollection. Thus, I do remember that my

grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn, but I do not, by any means, know that this is so.⁹

The key notion here seems to be the ‘thought’ which is “from memory.” Lehrer and Richard must infer that because the ‘thought’ that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn occurs from memory, I remember that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. But how can I not believe that my grandmother stood by a stone well next to a red barn while having the memory based ‘thought’ having the same propositional content? They simply assume that “I do not know, or even believe that” my grandmother stood by a stone well next to a red barn¹⁰. But if so, they cannot mean by ‘thought,’ what is ordinarily meant by the word, for ‘thought that *p*’ is commonly considered a synonym of ‘belief that *p*.’

Hence, if the story is to constitute a true counterexample to RK, as is intended, ‘thought’ must mean something other than this common meaning of the word. But what else could play the role it is supposed to? The first candidate would be simple ‘remembering,’ namely, the *sui generis* propositional memory. It might be claimed that a *sui generis* instance of a propositional memory that *p* does not imply belief that *p*. However, first, it is not clear that there really is such a *sui generis* memory. Even if we concede its existence, we have no idea what it comes to. Thus, we are entitled to ask, “Why doesn’t a *sui generis* instance of propositional memory that *p* imply a belief that *p*?” I can see no plausible explanation forthcoming. In any case, we cannot simply stipulate that a *sui generis* propositional memory does not entail the corresponding belief. Indeed, it is not clear how one can appeal to such a *sui generis* propositional memory that *p* in an attempt of constructing a counterexample to RK without begging the question. The existence of such a *sui generis* propositional memory *ipso facto* entails the possibility that one remembers that *p* without believing that *p*. But how can we assure ourselves that there are any such *sui generis* propositional memories implying no corresponding beliefs without finding in advance any clear-cut example in which one remembers that *p* without believing that *p*? Hence, the

⁹ Keith Lehrer and Joseph Richard, “Remembering without Knowing,” *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 1 (1975): 121. Here my argument is to suspect that the subject believes what he remembers. But an argument may go the other way round. Moon claims that Bernecker’s claim that a “flashbulb thought is an instance of propositional memory” doesn’t seem clear at all to him, given that the subject has no belief. See Bernecker, *Memory*, 88, and Moon, “Remembering entails knowing”, Section 3.1.

¹⁰ Lehrer and Richard, “Remembering without Knowing,” 124.

'thought' cannot mean a *sui generis* propositional memory, if Lehrer and Richard's story is to constitute a successful counterexample to RK.

'Thought' might mean some other propositional attitudes entailing no corresponding belief. For instance, the fact that it seems to one that p does not entail that he believes that p : it may seem to one that p though one knows that it is not so, as in the case of its seeming to one that there has to be a set of all sets that do not contain themselves, though one has just convinced oneself by an argument that this is impossible. And, given a certain background story, the fact that it seems to one that p can constitute good evidence for his remembering that p . Thus, one might claim that in Lehrer and Richard's story, it simply seems to me that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. Indeed, given what seems to me to be so, we may be inclined to think that I remember that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. Meanwhile, the objector might argue that the fact that I strongly doubt what seems to me to be so supports the claim that I have no corresponding belief. Thus, he might conclude that I remember, but do not believe that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn.

However, this reasoning does not reflect what Lehrer and Richard's story tells. The objector claims that although it seems to me that p , since I strongly doubt whether p , I do not believe that p . Lehrer and Richard's story surely indicates my strong doubt. But what it directly cites is only my second-order doubt about my 'image' (or 'thought'), rather than the first-order one, namely, my doubt whether my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. This is clear when they say, "For all I know, the image I so vividly recall is of some quite different person, or is an image from a movie or dream." Of course, it would be more rational for one to doubt whether p if he has a second-order doubt about his own image indicating that p . Still, we sometimes have such a second-order doubt, while maintaining the first-order belief, particularly when the belief is held only to some degree.

Believing is a matter of degree, and we often believe something which we are not fully convinced of. Given my second-order doubt, it is evident that I am not fully convinced that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. But it does not follow that I do not believe that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn at all. If this story is to be about someone who does not know that p because he does not firmly believe it, it is not a counterexample of the first type, at least. I'll discuss why such a case cannot be fully satisfactory in the next section. At any rate, unless the story clearly excludes

the possibility that I believe it to a degree which is sufficient for knowledge, it does not constitute a clear-cut counterexample to RK.¹¹

But can't the story be straightforwardly presented as if I clearly have the first-order doubt? Given my first-order doubt, i.e., given that I seriously doubt whether my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn, there would be strong evidence that I do not have the belief at all.¹² But the essential trouble is: given the same evidence, it is not clear whether I remember that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn. In fact, any evidence strong enough to convince us that I lack the belief cannot avoid depriving us of the ground for attributing the propositional memory to me.

To see this crucial point, let us consider more carefully how one can lack a belief that p when it seems to him that p . Suppose it suddenly seems to me, for no reason, that Togo gained independence from France. But it is just a groundless idea happens to cross my mind, and I'm fully aware that I know nothing about Togo. We would infer from these facts that I do not believe that Togo gained independence from France. But, of course, the same story (with no further episode) cannot constitute a successful counterexample to RK. For no part of the story clearly suggests us that I remember that Togo gained independence from France. The fact that a groundless thought that p happens to cross one's mind would not indicate that he remembers that p . Thus, if a subject's experience of its seeming that p constitutes good evidence for his remembering that p , that experience cannot be merely haphazard.

One might insist that someone can have the experience of its seeming that p , regularly and consistently, while not believing that p . I concur. But think about a case in which it seems to a man very frequently that p , but he knows that he is merely deluded. Indeed, it happens to be the case that p . The man does not believe that p then. But does he remember that p ? Not really. No matter how regularly and consistently he has the same experience, we would never say that the man remembers that p . We may be inclined to say that the man remembers something, perhaps, the delusional image, but not that he remembers that p . One's repeated,

¹¹ If we may not know things without being fully confident of them, we must face a well-known skeptical challenge. And the global skepticism undermines the basis of any reasonable attempt of providing a good counterexample to RK, since it directly implies that RK is false, if propositional memories are really possible.

¹² One might rather try to describe a case in which I only partially believe that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn, and claim that the degree of my belief is not sufficient for knowledge. But such an attempt would face a trouble analogous to the one discussed in section IV. The lower the degree of my belief is, the less we feel comfortable in saying that I have the corresponding propositional memory.

consistent experience of its seeming that p is not sufficient for attributing a propositional memory to him, even when we are convinced that it is appropriate to attribute a different form of memory to him. So what kind of evidence needs to be added in order to convince us to attribute a propositional memory to him? Nothing seems convincing except for things strongly indicate his corresponding belief. Even when we know that it seems to someone that p regularly and consistently, provided that he does not behave as if p is the case at all, we would remain uncomfortable in saying that he remembers that p . This is so even if we are sure that he has a perceptual or imagistic memory. Meanwhile, if he behaves as if p is the case, we lose all the ground for suspecting that he does not believe that p .

Hence, when we know that it seems to one that p , if we have a good reason to think that he does not believe that p , we lack a good reason to think that he remembers that p . Therefore, if my 'thought' means my experience of its seeming that my grandmother once stood by a stone well next to a red barn, the story cannot constitute a successful counterexample to RK by any means.

Still, it might be responded that the approach fails only because the fact that it seems to one that p may be good evidence for his believing that p . And one might try to produce a counterexample to RK by appeal to a propositional attitude which may not be good evidence for its corresponding belief, e.g., imagining that p , guessing (having an arbitrary thought) that p , doubting that p , wishing that p , etc.

True, one may have a propositional memory while having some of these attitudes toward the same propositional content. But insofar as one's having such an attitude does not constitute evidence for his having the corresponding propositional memory, such a case shows nothing interesting. One might insist that one's guessing that p can be evidence for his remembering that p . But, of course, it cannot be simply assumed, without further remark, that one's guessing that p may be evidence for his remembering that p . This would again be question begging. Furthermore, a moment's reflection tells us that such a situation is counterintuitive. It is strange to imagine someone saying that one remembers that p in guessing that p or that one's guessing that p is due to his remembering that p .

Nonetheless, someone might still insist that we could manage to describe an exceptional, but conceivable situation in which one's having those propositional attitudes counts as good evidence for his propositional memory. Consider this scenario. A decade ago, when Kelly was in high school, he learned that Florida's population in 1990 was 12,937,926. Now, someone asks Kelly Florida's population in 1990. Kelly has no idea, but he just takes a guess and says, "It's 12,937,926." One

might be inclined to say that Kelly actually remembers that Florida's population in 1990 was 12,937,926. For it is highly unlikely that Kelly got it accidentally right.¹³ This sounds right. But such a claim might suggest that Kelly is in fact not guessing, but rather just mistakenly believes that he is taking a guess. Otherwise, the claim must be utterly confused. If one's guesswork is correct, it must be accidentally correct. So if one claims that Kelly remembers that Florida's population in 1990 was 12,937,926 because his guesswork cannot be accidentally correct, then he undermines the claim that it is guesswork at all. But then, how does Kelly come up with the answer? One plausible answer is: he unknowingly believes (probably to some extent) that Florida's population in 1990 was 12,937,926. Surely, sometimes what we once thought was a mere guesswork turns out to be a true recollection.

All similar cases in which one appears to remember that p in holding a propositional attitude which cannot constitute evidence for its corresponding belief – doubting, denying, wishing, etc. – would be explained away in a similar fashion, once the story is carefully examined. When one appears to remember that p in his imagining, doubting, denying, or wishing that p , either his remembering is a mere appearance or those propositional attitudes are mistakenly ascribed, perhaps because the subject has second-order thoughts which don't accurately reflect what is going on.

Now, one horn of the dilemma is clear enough: we know of no propositional attitudes which clearly indicate one's propositional memory that p without suggesting his belief that p . Hence, no clear cut description of a case in which one remembers that p without believing that p is possible. Any attempt to describe such a case would remain unsatisfactory, and the scenario, to the extent it seems plausible, would have to be underdescribed.

IV. Undermining Warrant

What about the other horn of the dilemma? The only alternative way to produce a counterexample to RK is to provide a story in which the subject believes and remembers that p but is not warranted in believing that p . In this section, I will show that any attempt to describe such a scenario must confront a difficulty stemming from the epistemic nature of what is remembered.

Here is a putative counterexample of the second type raised by Sven Bernecker:

¹³ Pollock proposes a similar case. See John Pollock, *Knowledge and Justification* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974), 189.

[A]t t_1 you came to justifiably believe that S had borrowed Caesar's *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* from the library. The belief is false. At t_2 , all you can remember is that S checked out a book by Caesar; you have forgotten which book you thought S has borrowed from the library. Now it turns out that your memory belief to the effect that S has checked out a book by Caesar is true because S borrowed Caesar's *Commentarii de Bello Civili*. Can your belief qualify as memory? We should, I reckon, once again answer in the affirmative.¹⁴

Let us notice that this is intended to be a classical Gettier type story. The subject is supposedly justified in believing what he remembers, but since it is merely accidentally true, he doesn't know it. A question naturally crosses our mind: Why isn't the story a straightforward scenario in which one doesn't know what he remembers simply because his memory belief is unjustified? In fact, such an approach to the second type counterexample is atypical. Virtually none of the counterexamples which are worth careful treatment appeals to a scenario in which one's belief is downright unjustified.

This seems to be grounded in our intuitive understanding of propositional memory: we are justified in believing what we remember. Thus, if one appears to be downright unjustified in believing that p , we are reluctant to say that he remembers that p . We can easily see this point by examining such a scenario. Think of someone who came to believe that his blood type is AB, without having it checked, only because AB sounded good to him. He is later asked about his blood type, and says that it is AB, because he feels as if he remembers so. Yet, he is fully aware that he has no legitimate reason to believe that it is AB. Now, do we find this to be a successful counterexample to RK? Of course, not. We accept that he has some memory, likely with a propositional content, but he surely doesn't seem to remember that his blood type is AB.

The intrinsic connection between propositional memory and justification has been endorsed by some philosophers, like Pollock.¹⁵ He claims that we are justified in believing what we remember. We believe that we know many things we learned before, but quite often, we have forgotten how we learned them and could not justify them in the way we could have when we initially learned these things. Are we still justified in believing them? The answer seems to be positive, insofar as we do not realize that we have no access to the original grounds any longer.

¹⁴ Bernecker, *Memory*, 74.

¹⁵ See Pollock, *Knowledge and Justification*, 193. Huemer nicely demonstrates the point by appeal to Russellian five minutes hypothesis. See Michael Huemer, "The Problem of Memory Knowledge," *Pacific Philosophical Quarterly* 80, 4 (1999): 350.

This intuition surely puts certain restrictions on any attempts to describe second type counterexamples to RK. Therefore, antagonists of RK, like Bernecker, hope to provide counterexamples by way of Gettier type scenarios. They try to describe a case in which warrant for one's memory belief is somehow undermined without depriving us of the grounds for comfortably granting the corresponding propositional memory to him.

Unfortunately, those counterexamples are not even close to clear-cut counterexamples. Let's get back to Bernecker's story. Contrary to his conviction, it doesn't seem to be a clear-cut counterexample to RK at all. Attacking another story of the same type proposed by Bernecker, Adams simply denies that the subject has a propositional memory at issue,¹⁶ and Moon has "no clear intuition" about whether the subject has it.¹⁷ It is worth calling attention to the way Bernecker refers to the *memory*, as both philosophers suggest. Bernecker asks whether the subject's belief qualifies as a *memory*. To this extent, we may concur. However, remembering a true belief is not necessarily an instance of propositional memory, as a downright unwarranted true memory belief may not. If he straightforwardly asked us whether the subject remembers that S checked out a book by Caesar, then many of us, including both philosophers, would hesitate. Notice here that this already establishes my point, no matter what rejoinder Bernecker offers. At least, the scenario fails to constitute a clear-cut counterexample to RK.

One might wonder whether we can adjust the scenario so as to present the subject as having the propositional memory. Let us think of another case by Bernecker:

... at t_1 you came to justifiably believe that S has borrowed Caesar's *Commentarii de Bello Gallico* from the library. From this belief you inferred that S has borrowed a book by Caesar. This belief was true. But, unsuspected by you, the belief was true because S has borrowed another book by Caesar, the *Commentarii de Bello Civili*. ... now suppose that you seem to remember at t_2 what you believed at t_1 , namely that S borrowed a book by Caesar. Can you in fact remember what you seem to remember? I don't see any good reasons for answering in the negative.¹⁸

Does the subject remember that S borrowed a book by Caesar? I simply have no clear intuition, probably because, as Adams points out, the scenario is

¹⁶ Fred Adams, "Husker do?" *Philosophical Studies* 153 (2011): 85.

¹⁷ Moon, "Remembering entails knowing," Section 3.3.

¹⁸ Bernecker, *Memory*, 73-74.

“under-described.”¹⁹ So, let us add a little more details, in accordance with Adams’s suggestion, in order to make it clear that the subject has the propositional memory. Suppose that “you saw a book with the name ‘Caesar’ on it, but just inferred the wrong book by Caesar was checked out.” Now, I’m more inclined to say that the subject remembers that S has borrowed a book by Caesar. However, the problem is simply that the subject now appears more likely to know that S has borrowed a book by Caesar. After all, there is a problem analogous to the one we saw above: the more clearly unwarranted one’s belief is, the less clear he has the corresponding propositional memory.

We can observe the same trouble in other Gettier type scenarios. Consider an undefeated defeater scenario in which one’s knowledge is clearly undermined. Suppose John saw Greg driving a car, and came to know that Greg was driving a car. Suppose, furthermore, Greg’s wife later lied to John by telling him that Greg does not drive a car, and suppose that John accepts that, and becomes uncertain about his belief that Greg was driving a car. In this case, John’s lack of conviction seems to undermine the warrant of his belief, so that John no longer knows that Greg was driving a car. Now, those who hope to construct a scenario in which one clearly remembers that p without knowing that p because of an undefeated defeater must be attracted by Naylor’s observation, i.e., “I may remember that p and yet, if my memory lacks conviction or if I have conflicting evidence that is only somewhat credible, not know that p ...”²⁰ If this is correct, we must be able to construct an analogous scenario in which John remembers that Greg was driving a car without knowing it simply by deploying the same type defeater.

Again, the problem is that such a defeater cannot help but present the story also as if John no longer remembers that Greg was driving a car. Imagine a scenario in which John clearly knows that Greg was driving a car, and, in light of a certain background story, it seems clear that John remembers that Greg was driving a car. Let us call this scenario S1. Now, consider the following modified scenario, S2: in addition to the same background story, in S2, John is uncertain about whether Greg was driving a car because of the lie Greg’s wife told. In this modified scenario, because of this defeater we agree that John no longer knows that Greg was driving a car. But in the face of the same defeater, is it clear that John remembers that Greg was driving a car? I’m inclined to say that he does not remember that Greg was driving a car. At least, the answer is far from obvious.²¹

¹⁹ Adams, “Husker do,” 84.

²⁰ Andrew Naylor, “Justification in Memory Knowledge,” *Synthese* 55 (1983): 270.

²¹ A similar story can be found in Bernecker, *Memory*, 78. The scenario is far from a clear-cut counterexample to RK. Indeed, Bernecker implicitly accepts that we may be reluctant to say

However, absent the defeater episode, we clearly think that John remembers that Greg was driving a car. If that is right, not only our intuition as to John's knowledge, but also as to John's propositional memory must have changed between S1 and S2. But how? After all, the difference between the two scenarios consists only in the defeater episode. Thus, our intuition as to John's propositional memory must be affected by whether the defeater is absent or not.

One might wonder if we can meet the challenge by reinforcing our intuition that the subject has the propositional memory. He hopes to adjust the story and add some episode which strongly suggests to us that the subject has the propositional memory. Let us call an episode which gives us such impression a memory episode. Indeed, both S1 and S2 contain the same memory episode which gives us the impression that John remembers that Greg was driving a car. The challenge here is that this memory episode cannot support our intuition strongly enough in S2 in face of the defeater episodes. We hesitate, at least, about declaring that John in S2 remembers that Greg was driving a car. Can we replace the memory episode with one which stays effective even in the face of such a strong defeater episode? Of course, we can. But the essential trouble is that such a memory episode would influence the warrant of the corresponding knowledge claim; in particular, it would weaken the undermining power of the defeater in turn. Consequently, in a story containing such a memory episode, even if the subject clearly remembers that p , it wouldn't be very clear that he doesn't know that p .

Let us add another memory episode to S2. Suppose, for instance, even after John comes to be uncertain about his belief that Greg was driving a car, John is still wondering whether the driver he saw was really not Greg. So John scrutinizes the details of his memory by recalling the visual experience he had. Indeed, in the visual image John recalls in his mind, someone looking just like Greg is driving a car. Now, in this story, does John not remember that Greg was driving a car? I'm inclined to say that John remembers that Greg was driving a car. To say the least of it, it is less problematic to attribute John of the propositional memory in this scenario than the previous one. But how about his knowledge? We also feel more comfortable in saying that John knows that Greg was driving a car.

This sufficiently shows that the more clearly warrant for one's memory belief is defeated, the less clear he has the corresponding propositional memory. All these observations lead us to a conclusion: not only knowledge, but also propositional memory presupposes warrant. And no undefeated defeater episode

that the subject has the propositional memory, because of his lack of confidence. See Adams, "Husker do," 88, and Moon, "Remembering entails knowing," Section 3.2.

can undermine only warrant for knowledge, while keeping warrant for propositional memory unharmed.²²

Now the problem on the other horn of the dilemma is clear. If there is to be any clear-cut counterexample to RK, such a scenario must contain a memory episode which could legitimately give us a clear impression that the subject has a propositional memory, and that impression must be held strongly against any story sufficiently undermining the subject's knowledge. We have no idea what kinds of memory episode and undermining scenario could fulfill this task. Therefore, we cannot describe no clear-cut case in which one remembers that p without knowing that p because he is not warranted in believing that p .

V. Conclusion

We can safely conclude that both routes to constructing a clear-cut counterexample to RK fail to be satisfactory. Neither a case in which one has no belief nor a case in which warrant for one's belief is undermined can constitute a clear-cut example in which one remembers that p without knowing that p . And I see no reason to suppose that some of those necessarily ambiguous stories are in fact genuine counterexamples to RK. Therefore, we have no plausible reason to suppose that there is a genuine counterexample to RK.²³

²² An anonymous reviewer points out that it is possible that a certain defeater undermines knowledge more than memory. If this is true, it leaves open the possibility that one remembers that p without knowing that p . My response is two folds. First of all, it seems unlikely that we can construct a clear-cut counterexample to RK by appeal to such a defeater. Second of all, how can we show the existence of such a defeater without begging the question? The only plausible way of clearly showing that the undermining force of a defeater is more in the case of knowledge than that of memory seems to be by way of describing a case in which one remembers that p without knowing it.

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