

David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey, eds., *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2013)

Reviewed by Eugen Huzum

As you probably already presumed after reading the title of this review, the book presented here is a collection of essays investigating the epistemological problems raised by the phenomenon of disagreement (a topic in which, for good reason, an increasing number of epistemologists are interested lately). If I am not mistaken, it is only the third collection of this type, after David Christensen's special issue of *Episteme* on the epistemology of disagreement (in 2009) and Richard Feldman and Ted Warfield's *Disagreement* (Oxford University Press, 2010). Therefore, *The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays* is a much welcomed and needed publication. Moreover, I do not think that I am at all exaggerating in saying that it is also a must-have (or, at least, a must-read) book for any epistemologist or student interested in epistemology in general, and in the epistemology of disagreement in particular. Now, let me point out the main reasons which support this very confident statement.

The first reason which pleads for my assertion is the fact that the authors whose texts are included in *The Epistemology of Disagreement* are very well known and respected epistemologists, some of them with already strong contributions to the disagreement literature. To be more precise, the papers reunited in the book are signed by John Hawthorne and Amia Srinivasan ("Disagreement Without Transparency: Some Bleak Thoughts"), Thomas Kelly ("Disagreement and the Burdens of Judgment"), Brian Weatherson ("Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise"), David Christensen ("Epistemic Modesty Defended"), Stewart Cohen ("A Defense of the (Almost) Equal Weight View"), Bryan Frances ("Philosophical Renegades"), Sanford Goldberg ("Disagreement, Defeat, and Assertion"), Ernest Sosa ("Can There Be a Discipline of Philosophy? And Can It Be Founded on Intuitions?"), Robert Audi ("Cognitive Disparities: Dimensions of Intellectual Diversity and the Resolution of Disagreements"), Jonathan L. Kvanvig ("Perspectivalism and Reflective Ascent"), and Jennifer Lackey ("Disagreement and Belief Dependence: Why Numbers Matter").

Second, as promised in the title, with only one exception (the paper of Ernest Sosa), all of the essays published in this book are new (and, I must add, very skilful and engaging) contributions on the literature of disagreement.

Third, *The Epistemology of Disagreement* offers a comprehensive and fair treatment to all “traditional” topics and debates in the epistemology of disagreement (and especially the debate between “conciliatory” and “steadfast” theorists of disagreement or the problem of disagreement in and about philosophy).

Fourth, this volume also expands in new directions the epistemology of disagreement, by exploring some new dimensions, concepts or problems regarding (or relating with) this common and challenging – both practically and philosophically – phenomenon (such as the problem of cognitive disparity or the intersections between the epistemology of disagreement and the fallibilistic approach to rationality). As such, the book surely responds to its main objective, which, in the words of its editors, is to “help deepen and expand our understanding of some epistemic phenomena that are central to any thoughtful believer’s engagement with other believers.” (p. 3)

Finally, fifth, David Christensen and Jennifer Lackey offer a very clear and competent introduction to the main topics and debates of the book. Additionally, the essays reunited in *The Epistemology of Disagreement* are very well written and not excessively technical. In consequence, I think that it is quite safe to say that this book will be a valuable instrument not only for experienced epistemologists, but also for students and, in general, for those approaching for the first time the main questions and debates in the epistemology of disagreement.