Tag Archives: Peter Klein

A FAILED TWIST TO ANOLD PROBLEM:AREPLY TO JOHN N.WILLIAMS (pages 75-81)

Rodrigo BORGES ABSTRACT: John N. Williams argued that Peter Klein’s defeasibility theory of knowledge excludes the possibility of one knowing that one has (first-order) a posteriori knowledge. He does that by way of adding a new twist to an objection Klein himself answered more than forty years ago. In this paper I argue that Williams’ objection misses its target because of …

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STILL A NEW PROBLEM FOR DEFEASIBILITY: A REJOINDER TO BORGES (pages 83-94)

John N. WILLIAMS ABSTRACT: I objected that the defeasibility theory of knowledge prohibits you from knowing that you know that p if your knowledge that p is a posteriori. Rodrigo Borges claims that Peter Klein has already satisfactorily answered a version of my objection. He attempts to defend Klein’s reply and argues that my objection fails because a principle on which …

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