Tag Archives: inference

INFERENCE AND SELF-KNOWLEDGE (pages 77-98)

Benjamin WINOKUR ABSTRACT: A growing cohort of philosophers argue that inference, understood as an agent-level psychological process or event, is subject to a “Taking Condition.” The Taking Condition states, roughly, that drawing an inference requires one to take one’s premise(s) to epistemically support one’s conclusion, where “takings” are some sort of higher-order attitude, thought, intuition, or act. My question is …

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REPLY TO FORRAI: NO REPRIEVE FOR GETTIER “BELIEFS” (pages 327-331)

John BIRO ABSTRACT: In a recent paper in this journal, Gabor Forrai offers ways to resist my argument that in so-called Gettier cases the belief condition is not, as is commonly assumed, satisfied. He argues that I am mistaken in taking someone’s reluctance to assert a proposition he knows follows from a justified belief on finding the latter false as …

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ON INFERENTIALLY REMEMBERING THAT P (pages 225–230)

Andrew NAYLOR ABSTRACT: Most of our memories are inferential, so says Sven Bernecker in Memory: A Philosophical Study. I show that his account of inferentially remembering that p is too strong. A revision of the account that avoids the difficulty is proposed. Since inferential memory that p is memory that q (a proposition distinct from p) with an admixture of inference …

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