Research Articles 3

Research Articles, VII, 3

WHAT MAKES LOGICAL TRUTHS TRUE? (pages 249-272)

Constantin C. BRÎNCUŞ ABSTRACT: The concern of deductive logic is generally viewed as the systematic recognition of logical principles, i.e., of logical truths. This paper presents and analyzes different instantiations of the three main interpretations of logical principles, viz. as ontological principles, as empirical hypotheses, and as true propositions in virtue of meanings. I argue in this paper that logical principles …

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RECOGNIZING ‘TRUTH’ IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY (pages 273-286)

Lajos BRONS ABSTRACT: The debate about truth in Chinese philosophy raises the methodological question How to recognize ‘truth’ in some non-Western tradition of thought? In case of Chinese philosophy it is commonly assumed that the dispute concerns a single question, but a distinction needs to be made between the property of truth, the concept of TRUTH, and the word ·truth·. The …

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SEMANTIC EPISTEMOLOGY REDUX: PROOF AND VALIDITY IN QUANTUM MECHANICS (pages 287-303)

Arnold CUSMARIU ABSTRACT: Definitions I presented in a previous article as part of a semantic approach in epistemology assumed that the concept of derivability from standard logic held across all mathematical and scientific disciplines. The present article argues that this assumption is not true for quantum mechanics (QM) by showing that concepts of validity applicable to proofs in mathematics and in …

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A PROPOS DU RENOUVEAU ANNONCE DE LA METAPHYSIQUE (pages 305-323)

Pierre UZAN ABSTRACT: In this paper, we evaluate the project of resurgence of metaphysics based on the pecularity of the quantum domain, a project that is supported by some contemporary philosophers. Beyond the general arguments against scientific realism that are still applicable here, we show that this project is faced with the three following issues that, we believe, make it unrealizable: …

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SOLVING THE CURRENT GENERALITY PROBLEM (pages 345-350)

Kevin WALLBRIDGE ABSTRACT: Many current popular views in epistemology require a belief to be the result of a reliable process (aka ‘method of belief formation’ or ‘cognitive capacity’) in order to count as knowledge. This means that the generality problem rears its head, i.e. the kind of process in question has to be spelt out, and this looks difficult to do …

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