Gregory STOUTENBURG

LUCK, KNOWLEDGE, AND EPISTEMIC PROBABILITY (pages 97-109)

Gregory STOUTENBURG ABSTRACT: Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his …

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CARTESIANISM, NEO-REIDIANISM, AND THE A PRIORI: REPLY TO PUST (pages 231–235)

Gregory STOUTENBURG ABSTRACT: Joel Pust has recently challenged the Thomas Reid-inspired argument against the reliability of the a priori defended by Alvin Plantinga, Nicholas Wolterstorff, William Alston, and Michael Bergmann. The Reidian argument alleges that the Cartesian insistence on the primacy of a priori rationality and subjective sensory experience as the foundations of epistemic justification is unwarranted because the same kind …

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